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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This study investigates the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms 
and performance of Indonesian listed companies. Using panel data approach, the 
sample consists of 262 companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange for the 
period between 2010 to 2014. The results show that Indonesian family-controlled 
companies have better performance than non-family-controlled companies. However, 
not all attributes of corporate governance mechanisms are significant between family-
controlled companies and non-family controlled companies. It is found that larger 
boards increase the performance of non-family-controlled companies due to their 
ability to generate more ideas and provide more advice, experience and knowledge, 
which cannot be found in family directors. Family-controlled companies tend to have 
small boards; thus, they can make decisions quickly and more easily. Qualifications of 
directors in larger boards, frequency of board meetings, board expertise and the 
presence of female directors lead to enhanced performance, both for family-controlled 
companies and non-family-controlled companies. Boards with higher education and 
expertise, presence of female directors and more frequent board meetings can provide 
creative solutions, solve complex problems and improve performance. Directors who 
hold large managerial ownership tend to concentrate more on personal interests, 
whilst small board commissioners control the opportunistic behaviour of management 
and bridge the interests of managers and owners. The findings also suggest that 
smaller audit committee and higher frequency of audit committee meetings increase 
the performance of both family- and non-family-controlled companies. On the other 
hand, the findings show that smaller size of independent audit committee enhance 
performance for family-controlled companies while larger size for non-family-
controlled companies. Thus, regulators need to note the different corporate 
governance practices between family- and non-family-controlled companies. It is 
recommended that a pool of independent commissioners with knowledge and 
experience in enhancing better corporate governance mechanisms be appointed for 
companies in Indonesia. 
 
Keywords: corporate governance mechanisms, family-controlled companies, firm 
performance, Indonesia. 
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ABSTRAK 
 
 
Kajian ini mengkaji hubungan di antara mekanisme tadbir urus korporat dan prestasi 
syarikat di kalangan Syarikat Tersenarai di Indonesia. Dengan menggunakan 
pendekatan data panel, sampel kajian terdiri dari 262 syarikat yang tersenarai di Bursa 
Saham Indonesia bagi tempoh 2010 ke 2014. Hasil kajian menunjukkan bahawa 
syarikat kawalan keluarga di Indonesia mempunyai prestasi yang lebih kukuh 
berbanding syarikat bukan kawalan keluarga.Walau bagaimanapun, tidak semua sifat-
sifat mekanisme tadbir urus korporat mempamerkan perbezaan yang signifikan antara 
syarikat kawalan dan bukan kawalan keluarga. Saiz lembaga pengarah yang besar 
meningkatkan prestasi syarikat bukan kawalan keluarga kerana mempunyai lebih 
banyak idea dan nasihat, pengalaman dan pengetahuan yang tidak terdapat pada 
pengarah syarikat kawalan keluarga. Syarikat kawalan keluarga mempunyai saiz 
lembaga pengarah yang kecil, dan membolehkan mereka membuat keputusan dengan 
cepat dan tepat. Lembaga pengarah yang berkelayakan, kekerapan mesyuarat lembaga 
pengarah, pakar bidang dan pengarah wanita meningkatkan prestasi syarikat kawalan 
dan bukan kawalan keluarga. Pengarah yang mempunyai pendidikan tinggi, pakar 
bidang, pengarah wanita dan kekerapan mesyuarat lembaga pengarah yang tinggi 
boleh memberikan penyelesaian kreatif, menyelesaikan masalah yang kompleks serta 
meningkatkan prestasi syarikat. Pengarah yang memiliki pegangan saham syarikat 
yang besar lebih cenderung untuk menumpukan perhatian kepada kepentingan 
peribadi, manakala saiz pesuruhjaya lembaga pengarah yang kecil mampu mengawal 
pengurusan dari mengambil kesempatan dan merapatkan kepentingan pengurus dan 
pemilik. Dapatan kajian menunjukkan jawatan kuasa audit yang kecil dan 
peningkatan kekerapan mesyuarat jawatan kuasa audit mampu meningkatkan prestasi 
syarikat kawalan dan bukan kawalan keluarga. Sebaliknya, dapatan menunjukkan saiz 
kebebasan jawatan kuasa audit yang lebih kecil meningkatkan prestasi bagi syarikat 
kawalan keluarga, manakala saiz yang lebih besar bagi bukan kawalan keluarga. Oleh 
itu, pihak berkuasa perlu mengambil perhatian tentang amalan tadbir urus korporat 
yang berbeza di antara syarikat kawalan keluarga dan bukan kawalan keluarga. 
Disarankan sekumpulan pesuruhjaya bebas yang berpengetahuan dan berpengalaman 
dilantik bagi meningkatkan mekanisme tadbir urus korporat bagi syarikat-syarikat di 
Indonesia. 
 
Kata kunci: mekanisme tadbir urus korporat, syarikat kawalan keluarga, prestasi 
syarikat, Indonesia. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Overview of the Chapter 
This chapter comprises eight sections. Section 1.2 discusses the background of family 
and non-family controlled company performance, ownership structure and good 
corporate governance mechanisms as well as the motivation for the study; Section 1.3 
discusses the problem statement; Section 1.4 presents the research questions; and 
Section 1.5 presents the research objectives. In Section 1.6, the significance of the 
study is explained. Section 1.7 describes the scope and limitations of the study. 
Finally, the last section 1.8 provides the organization of the thesis. 
 
1.2 Background and Motivation for the Study 
The Asia financial crisis of 1997 grew into a multi-dimensional crisis, forcing many 
large companies into bankruptcy; claims have been made that one of the primary 
reasons for the financial crisis was weak corporate governance. Steiner and Steiner 
(2006) defined corporate governance as a set of guidelines by which a firm is 
managed, including the objectives, strategy and planning structure, with a view to 
achieve the interests of stakeholders and enhancing firm performance. Some have 
argued that the level of performance depends on good corporate governance practices 
in the company (Obradovich & Gill, 2013; Arora & Sharma, 2016). Good corporate 
governance can raise the confidence of investors so that they can invest their funds 
and achieve appropriate returns on their investments (Yopie & Itan, 2016). Corporate 
governance is a mechanism for regulating the relationship among shareholders, 
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management board and other stakeholders to effectively enhance a company’s 
performance and achieve the best interests of stakeholders (Hai & Lien, 2012). It is on 
this premise and evidence that this study focuses on the importance of corporate 
governance. 
 
Corporate governance mechanisms are often used to deal with problems related to the 
company’s stakeholders. To address or solve these problems, companies often rely on 
large shareholders to make decisions. Usually, family-controlled companies have 
large shareholders who hold a large block of shares in Indonesia (Singapurwoko, 
2013; Itan, 2015). A business is classified as a family-controlled company if a family 
director or a group of family members has ownership of a minimum of 20% and is the 
largest controlling blockholder in the company (Yopie & Itan, 2016). 
 
The study of the governance of family-controlled companies in Indonesia is important 
because it contributes significantly to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the 
country (Darmadi, 2012). Family-controlled companies contribute more than half to 
Indonesia’s economic growth (Darmadi, 2012). Therefore, the study of family-
controlled companies is a vital element in this current study. 
 
A family-controlled company tends to have the desire to stay strong to hand over the 
company to the next generation (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Miller & Le- Breton-Miller, 
2005a, 2005b). Thus, a strong corporate governance structure is necessary for the 
family-controlled companies to maintain the viability of both the family and business. 
This causes a family-controlled company to have a long-term investment horizon 
(Yasser, 2011), which can bring in high returns and increase the value of the company 
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(Miller & LeBreton-Miller, 2006). Often, a family-controlled company has a 
competitive advantage because it is usually stable and focuses on profitability and 
long-term value (Ismail & Mahfouz, 2009). 
 
Family-controlled companies are often found in East Asian countries, and one of 
those countries is Indonesia. Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) studied 2,980 
corporations in nine Asian countries. They argued that a single shareholder controlled 
more than two-thirds of the firms. Furthermore, the agents of closely held companies 
tend to be relatives of the controlling shareholder's family, and that older firms are 
generally family-controlled, dispelling the notion that ownership becomes dispersed 
over time. Amran and Che-Ahmad (2011) revealed that higher family ownership in a 
firm can increase the firm’s performance and enhance the family’s wealth. 
Furthermore, family-controlled companies are more concerned with their next 
generation, specifically the reputation of company, and they will not place the 
family’s wealth at stake. Because of this, the board of directors in these companies 
will try to decrease current consumption by paying lower dividends (James, 1999; 
Miller & Le-Breton-Miller, 2005a, 2005b). In contrast, the non-family controlled 
companies will be more likely to engage in current consumption, such as profit 
sharing, dividends and compensation payments (Carney, 2005; Darmadi, 2013). 
 
A family-controlled company usually starts as a small company operating locally. 
Over time, some family-controlled companies evolve into large companies and 
successfully compete with other leading public companies in the world (Itan, 2015). 
As a family-controlled company experiences transformation through a process of 
regeneration, the focus of the family business shifts from short-term to long-term 
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survival with greater diversification, internationalization and professionalization 
(Darmadi, 2012).  
 
Previous researchers have conducted studies about the influence of the attributes of 
the board of directors on company performance in Indonesia (Prabowo & Simpson, 
2011; Darmadi, 2012; Yopie & Itan, 2016; Naimah & Hamidah, 2017). However, 
very few studies exist on board of commissioners’ attributes and company 
performance in Indonesia. Indonesia is unique because the country has a two-tier 
board system, comprising the board of directors and board of commissioners. Hence, 
besides examining the board of directors’ attributes, this study also examines the 
board of commissioners’ attributes, such as independence of board commissioners 
(unaffiliated directors). Based on previous researchers (Prabowo & Simpson, 2011; 
Yopie & Itan, 2016; Naimah & Hamidah, 2017), board of directors and board of 
commissioners have influence on the performance of Indonesian companies. 
 
The implementation of two-tier board system (board of director and board of 
commissioner) applies not only in Indonesia, but also in several countries in  the 
world continue to uphold this system, such as China, Germany, Japan, Taiwan, 
Denmark, Netherlands and France (Yeh, Taylor & Hoye, 2009). However, two-tier 
board systems in Indonesia have different characteristics in comparison with those in 
other countries. For example, the position of supervisory board are more likely to be 
passive, not involved in the management and serve as an advisor to monitor the board 
of director in the management of the company. Board of commissioner cannot 
suspend a member of the board of director although the board were elected by the 
board of commissioner. Instead, board of director membership can only be suspended 
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by general meeting of shareholders. Board of commissioner members are also given 
the authorization to give approval for certain decisions made by the board of director 
such as bank loans that require security of company assets. Based on the above 
discussion, the board of commissioner in Indonesia has power to supervise the board 
of director’s decision (Arifai, Tran, Molespour & Wong, 2018). 
 
Board of commissioner’s power in the constitution also recommends appointing the 
members of audit committees to assist the board of commissioner in terms of 
monitoring the financial firms. This power can influence the shareholder interest to 
place its representative as an agent that can protect the owners’ interests. In line with 
this, Siregar and Sidharta (2008) found that the board of commissioner in Indonesia 
was dominated by the majority shareholder, as a result, members of the board of 
commissioner are less free to expropriate shareholders’ interests. These findings 
suggest that there was a high affiliate relationship between the shareholders and board 
of commssioner members in Indonesia. The effectiveness of board of commissioner 
on family involvement can be viewed from a positive perspective. The board of 
commissioner function as supervisor and adviser to the board of director. Findings 
from previous studies have shown the importance of monitoring efforts to mitigate 
opportunistic behavior affecting the interests of shareholders, and the presence of the 
family in the board of commissioner is expected to maximize the functions of 
supervision and give positive impact on firm performance (Arifai et al., 2018).  
 
The next issue addressed in this study is audit committee characteristics. The main 
task of an audit committee is to advise the firm’s financial performance and reporting. 
The audit committee also looks into matters, such as directors’ remuneration, 
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selection, removal, scope of work and independence, in addition to resolving internal 
conflicts. Audit committees also review and agree upon the chosen accounting 
policies, including the adoption of the right standards and practices for financial 
reporting and disclosure of audit and financial reports (Code, 2006).  
 
Besides monitoring the company’s accounting processes, the audit committee ensures 
that the company adheres to the relevant legislation, ethics and controls to prevent the 
occurrence of fraud (Hamid, Othman & Rahim, 2014). Therefore, this study examines 
the variables of the board of directors’ attributes (board size, board qualification, 
board meetings, board diversity, board expertise and managerial ownership); board of 
commissioners’ attributes (number of board commissioners and the independence of 
commissioners (unaffiliated directors)); and of audit committee characteristics (audit 
committee size, audit committee independence and audit committee meetings) that are 
lacking in previous studies in the Indonesian setting. 
 
Hence, there are gaps that need to be bridged. These variables are presumed to have 
an influence on the performance of firms listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. 
The gap motivated the researcher to examine the impact of the relationship of the 
board of directors’ attributes, board of commissioners’ attributes and audit committee 
characteristics and the performance of Indonesian companies. The researcher has 
found that very few studies have been conducted in Indonesia on these two variables: 
1) independence of board of commissioners (unaffiliated directors); and 2) board 
expertise. The Corporate Governance (CG) Code (2006) in Indonesia requires 
directors that serve in a company to have qualifications and expertise in order to help 
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the company to achieve its goals and enhance performance. Therefore, board 
expertise is also considered in this study. 
 
This study measures firm performance from two perspectives: 1) accounting-approach; 
and 2) market-approach measures. A company’s performance can be measured by 
using an external approach (market-based) and internal approach (accounting-based). 
The accounting approach measurement is Return on Equity (ROE); while the market-
approach measurement is Tobin’s Q (Q). The two approaches are adopted in this 
study because claims have been made that accounting-based measures are open to 
manipulation by managers. Thus, both types of measures are used in this study to 
ensure robustness of the results. 
 
This study is expected to be able to fill the existing gaps by using panel data to 
determine the relationship of the attributes of board of directors, the attributes of 
board of commissioners and audit committee characteristics and firm performance. In 
contrast, previous studies (Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Andres, 2008; Chu, 2009; Lin & 
Chang, 2010; Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2011) have focused on corporate governance 
issues in their countries. This study concentrates specifically on comparing family-
controlled companies and non-family controlled companies in Indonesia. 
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
A family-controlled firm is identified as a company that passes from one generation to 
the next generation, and in order to be successful, family-controlled firms must 
maintain and reach the company’s goals for continuing the family business. 
Therefore, the dynamics of transition in a family company plays an important role in 
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guaranteeing the sustainability of the firm (Darmadi, 2012; Surifah, 2012; 
Singapurwoko, 2013; Yopie & Itan, 2016). Sustainability is related to the existence of 
a company and to its performance over time. Local studies have found that Indonesian 
family companies play a large role in enhancing the economic growth of a country 
(Darmadi, 2012; Singapurwoko, 2013), whereby family companies contribute around 
45% to 70% of the growth in GDP and create employment opportunities (Darmadi, 
2012). 
 
Majority of firms in Indonesia started from traditional local family-controlled 
companies and evolved into big enterprises, and then were successfully listed on the 
Indonesian Stock Exchange. Indonesia has several prominent Indonesian family 
businessmen, like Mr. Lim Sui Liong, owner of the Salim group, Mr. Mochtar Riady, 
owner of the Lippo group, Mr. Eka Cipta Wijaya, owner of the Sinarmas group and 
Mr. Chairul, owner of the Para Group.  
 
Although Indonesian listed firms were characterized with higher family holdings, 
there are limited studies which address the managerial ownership and involvement. 
According to Indonesia’s Company Law, all Indonesian firms are required to adopt 
two-tier boards system in the organizational structure of the firm. This system puts the 
responsibility of the management in the hands of management board, board of 
directors, while responsibilities in maintaining board of director’s work are carried out 
by supervisory board, board of commissioners. Many previous studies looking at the 
effects of ownership and family involvement in management have been accomplished 
in countries with one-tier board system and found mixed findings (Millet, Reyes & 
Zhao, 2010; Alizadeh, Chashmi & Bahnamiri, 2014). Some studies discovered that 
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family involvements in the board of directors can help monitoring of management and 
reduce agency costs (Schleifer & Vishny, 1986; O'Boyle Jr, Pollack & Rutherford, 
2012). However, other studies discovered a negative effect of family involvement 
(Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2003; Barth, Gulbrandsen & Schønea, 2005; Adhami & Asgari, 
2013). Many questions regarding the impact of family involvement in two-tier boards 
in Indonesian firms are still unanswered. 
 
In Indonesia, it has been found that firm performance of family-controlled firms is 
better than non-family controlled firms (Sujoko & Sobiantoro, 2000; Darmadi, 2013; 
Harjito & Singapurwoko, 2014). However, little empirical evidence exists that can 
verify and support this claim. Yopie and Itan (2016) found that companies with non-
professional family directors have higher performance compared to companies with 
professional family directors. He claimed that family directors tend to have longer 
tenure and lower education level compared to professional non-family directors. 
Moreover, he found that professional family directors have failed to manage 
professionally because they lack the will. On the other hand, Sujoko and Sobiantoro 
(2007), Darmadi (2013) and Harjito and Singapurwoko (2014) argued to the contrary. 
Sujoko and Sobiantoro (2007) and Darmadi (2013) claimed that it is important to 
have family directors to enhance performance of the company. The reason is family 
spirit is reflected in a firms’ strategy and it brings about higher profitability. Harjito 
and Singapurwoko (2014) stated that family-controlled companies tend to minimize 
the agency problems between agents and principals, and thus, minimize agency costs. 
Due to these issues, this current study examines whether or not Indonesian listed 
family-controlled firms have better performance than non-family controlled firms. 
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In terms of surviving global competition, managers must not just focus on how to 
increase benefits and expand the company’s subsidiaries. A businessman must 
maintain a good relationship with several related parties, such as the government, 
shareholders, managers and employees and maintain a conducive environment. He or 
she must disclose reliable and transparent corporate reporting and activities (Itan, 
2015). Therefore, a company needs guidelines and concepts to maintain and enhance 
performance through good corporate governance. 
 
The agency theory is one of the fundamental theories in corporate governance that 
relates to organizational behavior even though it was introduced by a financial 
economist (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The agency theory is a supposition that 
explains the relationship between majority shareholders and minority shareholders, 
where the majority shareholders elect the agent to provide the services on his or her 
behalf. For organizations, agency problems occur when the majority shareholders 
have power to make their own decision for company and neglect the interest for 
minority shareholders. With powerful and holding significant numbers of shares in a 
company, directors are subject to monitoring and supervision, which can increase 
agency cost. Thus, it may lead to decrease in firm performance and value of the 
majority shareholders’ investment. This misaligned interest between the majority and 
minority shareholders leads to Type II agency problem. In ensuring the interest of the 
shareholders, corporate governance mechanisms help to monitor and control agent 
behavior.  
 
Another relevant theory in corporate governance is the stewardship theory, whereby 
agents are considered as good stewards and do the best to achieve the interests of 
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shareholders. In this theory, the stewards are the family owners; thus, they will work 
hard and protect their business survival by having substantial shares. The 
agents/stewards are viewed as loyal to shareholders and strive to achieve high 
performance for the company. Thus, to maintain harmonization between principal and 
agent, stewardship needs to be blended with good corporate governance mechanisms. 
 
Corporate governance is an important element for achieving high performance, and 
good corporate governance mechanisms have led to some companies having better 
performance than others. Thus, the researcher also examines mechanisms of corporate 
governance in both family-controlled and non-family controlled firms. The questions 
that this study seeks to answer are: 1) ‘What type of firms,  family-controlled or non-
family controlled, have higher firm performance?’; and 2) ‘Are there any relationships 
between corporate governance mechanims, such as attributes of the board of directors 
(board size, board qualification, board meetings, females on the board, board 
expertise and managerial ownership); attributes of the board of commissioners (size 
and independence of board of commissioners); and audit committee characteristics 
(audit committee size, audit committee independence and audit committee meetings) 
and firm performance?’. 
 
For board composition in Indonesia, the CG Code (2006) requires that the board of 
directors should comprise at least three directors who are responsible to both the 
board of commissioners and shareholders (Widanarni & Aida, 2007). The duties of 
the board of commissioners include supervising all actions of the board of directors. 
Hence, its function is non-executive. Another requirement of the Code (2006) is that a 
minimum of 30% of the total number of commissioners should be independent 
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commissioners with at least one unaffiliated commissioner (Darmadi, 2012). All these 
factors motivate the researcher to examine whether or not there is a significant 
relationship between the two-tier board system of family-controlled and non-family 
controlled companies. 
 
The CG Code (2006) also requires that the board structure in Indonesian companies 
must have directors who have high education and professional skills for running the 
companies. The directors are also required to attend the meetings with commissioners 
to discuss problems the company faces and identify solutions and strategies. It is 
important for companies to equip themselves to face global competition.  
 
One of the important board attributes that can influence the performance of a board 
director is the presence of female directors (Kusumastuti, Supatmi, & Sastra, 2012; 
Darmadi, 2013; Vania & Supatmi, 2014). In this study, the researcher examines the 
relationship between female directors on the board structure and firm performance. 
The number of female directors on the board is increasing in Indonesian companies 
(Darmadi, 2013). Several studies (Kusumastuti et al., 2012; Vania & Supatmi, 2014) 
have demonstrated support for gender diversity on the board. From the perspective of 
corporate governance, diversity can build a balance on the board and ensure decisions 
are not male-dominated (Vania & Supatmi, 2014). Gender diversity may be able to 
improve firm value and performance (Darmadi, 2013).  
 
This study also attempts to discover if managerial ownership has an impact on firm 
performance in Indonesian listed companies. The trend of managerial ownership in 
Indonesian companies is that families own the highest concentration of shares and 
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family members are the largest shareholders who hold positions, such as managers 
and directors (Claessens et al., 2000; Achmad, Rusmin, Neilson & Tower, 2009; Itan, 
2015). Thus, minority shareholders are often at a disadvantage because family 
members are the largest shareholders, and major shareholders have the power to make 
decisions in their own interests to the detriment of the minority shareholders. 
Furthermore, family-owned company managers are rewarded with managerial shares 
to align their interests and increase the shareholders’ wealth. Hence, based on the 
issues above, this study considers whether or not managerial ownership has a 
relationship with firm performance. 
 
Several studies have mentioned that both managerial ownership and family 
involvement in a company affect performance positively. Some research has found 
that family-controlled firms create value and profits for the company when the 
company is still controlled by its founder (Itan, 2015). Several studies on companies 
in Indonesia have shown companies that are controlled by influential family members 
significantly contribute to performance and that a company controlled by the family 
will be more innovative in developing the company (Sujoko & Soebiantoro, 2007; 
Ismail & Mahfodz, 2009; Dewantoro, 2011). 
 
Conversely, some researchers have stated that family control does not positively 
impact firm performance. Several studies have mentioned that the family-controlled 
firms merely focus on maximizing profits (Yuliani, 2012), avoiding risks (Surifah, 
2013) and dominating the decision-making process (Prabowo & Simpson, 2011), 
thereby giving less attention to other external factors that can facilitate the acquisition 
of more resources. In brief, family-controlled companies negatively affect the 
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performance and value of the company (Prabowo & Simpson, 2011; Yuliani, 2012; 
Surifah, 2013). 
 
Another question in this study is, “Do audit committee characteristics have a 
relationship with firm performance in Indonesian listed companies?”. The CG Code in 
Indonesia requires publicly listed companies in Indonesia to have an audit committee. 
The role of the audit committee is to provide an independent opinion based on the 
members’ professional judgement and report relevant matters to the board of 
commissioners to identify and solve problems faced by the company toward 
achieving high performance (Naimah & Hamidah, 2017). 
 
The audit committee is a very important component of the board structure due to its 
specific role of protecting the interests of shareholders in relation to financial 
oversight and control (Al-Matari, Al-Swidi, & Fadzil, 2014; Naimah & Hamidah, 
2017). The primary function of the audit committee is to oversee the firm’s financial 
reporting process, review financial reports, control internal accounting, carry out audit 
and monitor management practices (Klein, 2002). The above matter is true about audit 
committees of Indonesian companies whose duties have grown bigger after the 
adoption of several CG Codes (Naimah & Hamidah, 2017). The Indonesian CG Code 
adopted in 2006 sets out the recommendations regarding audit committees in 
Indonesia. 
 
Implementation of good corporate governance can be measured by several indicators 
or variables, both from the accounting perspective and market perspective. 
Assessment of companies is often based on the market price of the stocks, and the 
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good performance of a company can maximize prosperity for shareholders, eventually 
increasing the company’s share price. If the share price increases, so does 
shareholders’ wealth. To achieve good performance, shareholders insist managers to 
engage with strong corporate governance. 
 
This study needs to be conducted in order to understand how corporate governance 
mechanisms can play a role in the relationship with firm performance. Knowledge on 
the influence of corporate governance on firm performance is incomplete if 
researchers do not know about the mechanisms that drive firm performance. This 
study analyses the relationship between family-controlled companies and internal 
corporate governance mechanisms, such as the attributes of the board of directors and 
the board of commissioners and audit committee characteristics and firm performance. 
This current study measures several variables, such as attributes of the board of 
directors (board size, board qualification, board meetings, female on board, board 
expertise and managerial ownership); attributes of the board of commissioners (board 
size, independence (unaffiliated directors)); and audit committee characteristics (audit 
committee size, audit committee independence and audit committee meetings). Firm 
performance variables are measured using ROE and Tobin’s Q (Q). 
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1.4 Research Questions 
Based on the attributes of board of directors and board of commissioners and the 
characteristics of the audit committees, the following research questions are posed in 
this study. 
1. Is there any difference in firm performance between family-controlled 
companies and non-family controlled companies listed on the Indonesian 
Stock Exchange? 
2. Is there any relationship between attributes of board of directors of family-
controlled companies and non-family controlled companies listed on the 
Indonesian Stock Exchange and firm performance? 
3. Is there any relationship between the attributes of board of commissioners 
in family-controlled companies and non-family controlled companies 
listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange and firm performance? 
4. Is there any relationship between the characteristics of audit committee in 
family-controlled companies and non-family controlled companies listed 
on the Indonesian Stock Exchange and firm performance? 
 
1.5 Research Objectives  
This research focuses on attributes of board of directors and board of commissioners 
and audit committee characteristics. Specially, the objectives of this study are: 
1. To examine the difference between firm performance of family-controlled 
companies and non-family controlled companies listed on the Indonesian 
Stock Exchange. 
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2. To examine the relationship between the attributes of board of directors of 
family-controlled companies and non-family controlled companies listed 
on the Indonesian Stock Exchange and firm performance; 
3. To examine the relationship between the attributes of board of 
commissioners of family-controlled companies and non-family controlled 
companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange and firm performance; 
and 
4. To examine the relationship between audit committee characteristics of 
family-controlled companies and non-family controlled companies listed 
on the Indonesian Stock Exchange and firm performance. 
 
 
1.6 Significance of The Study 
The significance of this study is discussed from the aspects of contributions to 
literature and theoretical, methodological and practical aspects. 
1.6.1 Literature Aspect 
Studies on the influence of family-controlled and non-family controlled firms with 
respect to the attributes of boards of directors, the attributes of boards of 
commissioners and the characteristics of audit committee on firm performance have 
been examined in Asian countries, such as Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong and 
Malaysia. In Indonesia, such studies on family-controlled and non-family controlled 
firms are lacking. Thus, by conducting this study, the findings will help enrich 
information related to the impact of internal mechanisms of corporate governance on 
firm performance, particularly in public listed companies on the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange which are used as the sample in this study. Thus, the findings of this study 
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provide more information and can be compared to family-controlled firms in other 
ASEAN countries. 
 
Currently, very few studies exist on the function and impact of board attributes in 
Indonesia. Therefore, the findings of this study may provide valuable insights into 
family-controlled and non-family controlled firms in Indonesia. This study also 
provides useful information on family ownership and corporate governance and how 
good firm performance can be achieved by Indonesian companies. 
1.6.2 Theoretical Aspect 
This study highlights theories underlying corporate governance, specifically the 
agency theory and the stewardship theory in relationship to the performance of family 
and non-family controlled firms. Eddleston and Kellermans (2007) discussed 
stewardship theory with respect to family companies. Further, the stewardship theory 
was utilized by Eddleston and Kellermans (2007) to explain the reason for some 
family-controlled firms flourishing while other family-controlled firms being plagued 
by conflict. Their results suggest that a participative strategy process is positively 
related and conflict is negatively linked to family-controlled firm performance.  
1.6.3 Methodology Aspect 
This study uses secondary data and applies panel data from 2010 to 2014. A panel 
data approach was adopted, and secondary data was gathered through the IDX 
database, the Indonesian Capital Market Directory (ICMD) and finance.yahoo.com, to 
obtain financial statement data and last stock prices for the years concerned. For 
measurement, this research makes a comparative study of the governance of the 
selected Indonesian family and non-family controlled firms using the CG Code in 
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Indonesia and corporate governance factors, such as board size and independent 
commissioners as has been done in several previous studies (La Porta, Lopez-De-
Silanes & Shleifer, 1999; Ibrahim, Samad, & Amir, 2009; Itan, 2015). 
 
The methodological contribution of this study is the inclusion of new variable, i.e., 
board expertise. Previous studies (Darmadi, 2012; Prabowo & Simpson, 2011; Surifah, 
2013) have focused on female directors and board directors’ education. Those studies 
have not tested the relationship of board expertise and firm performance in Indonesia. 
Therefore, this study considers board expertise as a new contribution in relation to 
corporate governance in Indonesia. 
1.6.4 Practical Aspect 
For practical contributions, the findings can provide more meaningful insights to 
investors who want to invest their funds in Indonesian Stock Exchange companies, 
Bappepam (Capital Market and Non-Bank Financial Sector Regulator) and 
consultants in designing rules for family and non-family controlled companies. The 
findings of this study contribute valuable potential sources for the public, investors 
and stakeholders, in general, which will help them to know and understand the 
characteristics of family-controlled and non-family controlled firms and the role of 
corporate governance mechanisms (board of directors’ attributes, board of 
commissioners’ attributes and audit committee characteristics) with respect to firm 
performance. Most Indonesian companies, including family-controlled companies, 
have been applying regulations as required by Bursa Efek Indonesia, which is the 
Indonesian Stock Exchange based in Jakarta and Bapepam, which is the Capital 
Market and Financial Supervisory Agency. However, family-controlled companies 
have the option to follow either the regulations imposed by Bapepam or use their 
20 
 
existing practices, as long as those family companies are not against regulations. In 
this context, this current study provides ideas about the function of the board structure 
for maximizing the performance and minimizing agency problems of Indonesian 
firms, especially in family-controlled companies. 
 
1.7 Scope and Limitations of the Study 
This study focuses on examining the relationship between family-controlled and non-
family controlled firms with respect to the attributes of board of directors and board of 
commissioners and audit committee characteristics and performance of companies 
listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. This study uses a sample of companies 
registered with the IDX that have submitted their annual financial audit reports for 
five years from 2010 to 2014. This study uses secondary data available from the IDX 
database and Indonesia Capital Market Directory (ICMD). 
 
1.8 Organization of the Study 
This study comprises six chapters. Chapter One focuses on the introduction, 
justification for the study, research question and objectives, contributions of the study 
and scope of the study. Chapter Two highlights the review of prior literature and 
empirical findings on family business, board structure, audit committee characteristics, 
managerial ownership and firm performance. This is followed by Chapter Three, 
which contains the conceptual framework of the study and theoretical justifications 
for the hypotheses development. Chapter Four outlines the data collection, research 
design and instruments, measurement of variables and the techniques of data analysis. 
This is followed by Chapter Five, which highlights the results and discussions. Finally, 
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Chapter Six concludes and summarises the study, and the implications and limitations 
of the study are also provided in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Overview of the Chapter 
This chapter comprises 10 main sections. Section 2.2 reviews the literature regarding 
the development of corporate governance in Indonesia. Section 2.3 explains the 
committees and laws on corporate governance. Next, Section 2.4 discusses one tier 
and two-tier board systems. Section 2.5 discusses the performance of family-
controlled companies around the world. Section 2.6 explains family company 
performance in Indonesia. Section 2.7 reviews the performance of family-controlled 
and non-family controlled firms. Next, Section 2.8 presents the literature related to 
corporate governance mechanisms (attributes of the board of directors, attributes of 
the board of commissioners and audit committee characteristics). Section 2.9 
discusses firm performance and Section 2.10 concludes the chapter. 
 
2.2 Good Corporate Governance (GCG) in Indonesia 
Good Corporate Governance (GCG) has become a hot issue whereby several 
researchers have begun to study it over the past few years in Indonesia (Darmadi, 
2012; Singapurwoko, 2013; Itan, 2015). Issues related to GCG have also attracted the 
attention of economists and businessmen in many countries, especially in Indonesia 
(Darmadi, 2012). The financial crises in Asian countries in 1997, 2007 and 2008 were 
allegedly caused by weak corporate governance mechanisms. The reasons for the 
crises were relatively similar in most Asian countries, and some of the reasons include 
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links between business and government, monopoly and market intervention (Tjager, 
Nyoman, Alijoyo, Humphery, Djemat, & Sembodo, 2003). 
 
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) determines corporate governance as “the 
guidelines, structures and processes for the direction and control of companies”. The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which in 1999 
published its Principles of Corporate Governance, offers a more detailed definition of 
corporate governance as follows: 
“The internal means by which corporations are operated and controlled 
[…], which involve a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the 
objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those 
objectives and monitoring performance are determined. Good corporate 
governance should provide proper incentives for the board and 
management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company 
and shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring, thereby 
encouraging firms to use resources more efficiently.” 
(OECD, 1999) 
 
Based on the definition above, the mechanisms of corporate governance are 
considered to be both the internal and external controls of a company. The main 
aspects of the internal mechanisms are board structures, ownership structures and 
audit committee characteristics of the companies; while the main aspects of external 
mechanisms are markets and the legal system (Darmadi, 2013). In this context, the 
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implementation of GCG is to enhance the stability and increase the productivity of a 
company. 
 
The financial crisis of 1997-1998 in Indonesia had a significantly dramatic impact on 
the economic, social and political fronts. The financial crisis significantly increased 
poverty and caused the Rupiah currency’s deflation by almost 85%. In Indonesia, the 
recession was fuelled by several institutional weaknesses, which were either the 
inadequate or the lack of enforcement of the regulations by the Central Bank and 
extremely poor financial and irregular banking practices (Hartono & Herman, 2001). 
 
Indonesia has undertaken many efforts to implement GCG from both the government 
as well as private sides. These efforts have included establishment of the adoption of 
new regulations, corporate governance institutions and revisions of existing 
regulations to support the process of standards and practices of corporate governance 
in the country. More specifically, the first Code of GCG in Indonesia was established 
in 2001 and was amended in 2006. Furthermore, in terms of improving corporate 
governance practices and standards, Indonesia has taken several steps by creating new 
laws and enhancing legislation. 
 
The fundamental weaknesses of the economy in Indonesia are mainly due to poor 
financial performance, low competitiveness, absence of professionalism, non-
response to changes in the business environment, economic mismanagement, less 
efficient business sectors and a fragile banking system. Therefore, GCG is needed by 
companies to control and maintain the management system based on the principles of 
the Code of Corporate Governance. 
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Figure 2.1. History of corporate governance in Indonesia. 
 
The principles of GCG set out by the National Committee on Governance (NCG, 
2006) are as follows: 
1. Transparency 
Transparency means maintaining objectivity in running a business; a company 
should contribute material and provide relevant information related to the 
current condition of a company in a way that makes it easy to be understood and 
accessed by stakeholders. Enterprises must take the action to reveal not only 
problems as required by legislation, but also important decisions made by the 
internal party (shareholders and other stakeholders) and the external party 
(creditors and government). 
 
2001 
The National Committee on Corporate Governance publishes the first Indonesian 
Code of Corporate Governance 
2006 
Regulation on obligation to implement good corporate governance in banking 
sector through Central Bank regulation PBI No. 8/4/PBI/2006. 
 
The National Committee on Corporate Governance publishes the second 
Indonesian Code of Corporate Governance, a revision of the Code 2001. 
2014 
The National Committee on Corporate Governance publishes the first edition of the 
Indonesia Corporate Governance Manual. 
2000 
The National Committee on Corporate Governance issues the corporate governance 
code 
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2. Accountability 
A firm must be transparent and accountable for its performance. Thus, a firm 
should be controlled properly, measured in accordance with the interests and 
objectives of the company, while considering the interests of principals and 
other stakeholders. Also, to achieve sustainable firm performance, 
accountability plays an important role. 
3. Responsibility 
Responsibility means the responsibility of those directors and managers for their 
actions and accountability on behalf of the company to shareholders. This 
principle is realized with the awareness that responsibility is a logical 
consequence of dealing with the stakeholders. There must be awareness of 
social responsibility to avoid abuses of power. Management must be 
professional, up-hold ethics and maintain a healthy business. 
4. Independence 
To ensure the principles of GCG, the firm should be controlled independently; 
one department msut not dominate the others and there must be no intervention 
by the others. Independence is necessary to avoid any potential conflicts of 
interest that may arise among the majority shareholders. 
2. Fairness 
A company should always consider and be concerned with the interests and 
objectives of principals and other stakeholders based on the principles of 
fairness and equality. 
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2.2.1 Characteristics of Good Corporate Governance in Indonesia 
A country’s culture and legal and regulatory framework influence a company’s 
corporate governance framework. Indonesia’s Corporate Manual of 2014 
(http://www.ifc.org) mentions the following characteristics and features: 
1. The role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
Over the last 20 years, several state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been 
converted into partly privatized firms through strategic alliances, in which the state 
may still hold a majority interest. In spite of this, there are several important sectors in 
the Indonesian economy that remain either largely dominated by SOEs or are state 
monopolies, for example, railways and shipbuilding, mining, banking, electricity, post 
and telecommunications and oil and gas sectors. In numerous equitized SOEs, the 
state retains a majority interest of 51% and exercises its control via the general 
manager and the commissioners appointed by the state to the company’s board of 
commissioners (IFC, 2014). 
2. Concentrated ownership 
Many firms in Indonesia were started as a local business owned either by a 
small group of shareholders, a single controlling shareholder or families. Although 
many companies have grown significantly, the monitoring principals have not 
changed. This concentrated managerial ownership often entails a lack of proper 
legislations (the documents or financial regulations), proper book-keeping and 
supervisory activities. These deficiencies impede the ability of outsiders to become 
shareholders and leaves room for abuse of minority shareholders. For example, weak 
protection of investors or external shareholders and insider dominance has resulted in 
failed deals and the under-development of the capital markets in Indonesia (IFC, 
2014).  
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3. Little separation of ownership and control 
Majority shareholders who control the management act as prime-director of the 
business and also sit on the board of directors. It is to find joint stock businesses in 
which the prime-director acts concurrently as the prime-commissioner. Failing to 
separate ownership and control can lead a company to ineffectiveness and fraud (IFC, 
2014). 
4. Unwidely holding structures 
Normally, large business groups are in the form of parent companies with 
monitoring subsidiary companies. While holding structures can cross-shareholdings, 
serve legitimate purposes and lack of transparency have the tendency to create opaque 
ownership structures. This could make a company face difficulties in understanding 
the needs of investors and shareholders. The structures could be used to expropriate 
and circumvent the rights of individual shareholders. Poor consolidated accounting or 
even its absence thereof is a further corporate governance issue that has yet to be 
tackled (IFC, 2014). 
5. Inexperienced and inadequate corporate bodies 
Some aspects of Indonesia’s current concept of board of directors and board of 
commissioners were first introduced under the International Constitutional Law (ICL) 
in 1995 and the regulation on SOEs in 2003. However, these concepts have not been 
applied seriously until recently, when firms began to draft and adhere to the Articles 
of Association (AoA) with firm rules and regulations. However, the boards of 
directors have commonly attempted to bypass supervision mechanisms put in place by 
the AoA, such as board of commissioners and internal auditors. The function of the 
board of commissioners, as well as its committees, the prime-director and the board of 
directors as a whole, as well as the corporate secretary, often remain unclear in the 
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daily company operations. The members of these boards must have experience, skills 
and knowledge. However, they lack awareness of their responsibilities due to a 
historical lack of general good practice in these areas. A lack of skills and knowledge 
in the field of corporate governance leads to lower economic development of the 
company. 
 
2.2.2 The Legal and Regulatory Framework of Corporate Governance in 
Indonesia 
The legal and regulatory corporate governance framework in Indonesia has some 
unique characteristics that are a product of the development of Indonesia’s economy 
and history.  
 
In 1968, the law for domestic investment was approved as the first comprehensive 
piece of legislation for local firms. Further, in 2007, significant changes were made to 
the structure, legal and regulatory corporate governance standards for firms and 
investment in Indonesia, whereby the government created a new law for investment.  
 
The IFC, a member of the World Bank Group, commissioned the creation of the 
Indonesia Corporate Governance Manual (CG Manual) as part of the corporate 
governance program in Indonesia, which the IFC had begun implementing since 2012. 
In 2014, the IFC issued the first edition of the Indonesia Corporate Governance 
Manual, which was issued in conjunction with the Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK), 
which is the Indonesian Financial Services Authority. The manual sought to help 
companies benchmark their current implementation of corporate governance with best 
standards and contribute to financial vunerability by identifying the weaknesses and 
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making improvements accordingly. The improvements may contribute to the 
shareholder rights, disclosure and transparency, the role of the board of directors and 
commissioners, material corporate transactions and internal control. 
 
Where appropriate, this manual (IFC, 2014) refers to other legal documents and laws. 
The legislation in Indonesia has continued to change, develop and improve. For 
example, the ICL was revised several times to eliminate inconsistencies in provisions 
that regulate the activities of securities issuance, the exercise of shareholders, 
governing bodies and other matters. Most of the regulations and laws that have an 
effect on corporate governance and used in this manual (IFC, 2014) have been 
enacted over the last few years, although they may have evolved from past laws. 
Finally, all Indonesian companies are being encouraged to implement GCG in their 
companies, although these provisions are suggested more for publicly listed 
companies. 
 
Foreign Investment Law on 1967 is the first regulation on foreign investment in 
Indonesia. After a series of amendments stretching from the late 1960s to the 1970s, 
the regulatory system was replaced in 2007 to cover all forms of foreign capital 
investments in Indonesia. This was done to modernize the system and because the old 
system was unsuitable to speed up the development of the national economy. 
 
Over the past five years, Indonesia has improved corporate governance in Indonesia’s 
document charter as well as legal and regulatory framework. However, the actual 
practices of and adherence to corporate governance standards by Indonesian 
companies remain in its infant stages. Indonesian firms are subject to competition, 
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auditing, anti-corruption, construction, other accounting standards, taxation laws, 
bankruptcy, labor and tender processes. 
 
2.2.3 Code of Corporate Governance in Indonesia 
Implementation of GCG uses two approaches: 1) ethics-based for businesses that are 
predominantly driven by consciousness to keep healthy longer term stakeholders and 
contribute profit in short-term orientation; and 2) regulatory-based that are usually 
driven by the initiative to design regulations for the enforcing company. Both these 
approaches have strengths and weaknesses; therefore, they are complimentary as each 
approach can create a great environment for business. 
 
The ethics-based approach is used in Indonesia as presented in the voluntary Code 
(2006). The function of the Code is to provide references for businesses to implement 
GCG practices to maintain long-term company survival so that companies should 
know the steps to cross-check the process, increase transparency and accountability 
and consider corporate social responsibility. These are included in the provisions of 
GCG. The Code is seen as a living document that could be amended depending on 
current situations; thus, although the Code of GCG in Indonesia was published in 
2001, it was amended in 2006 to include duties of the board of directors and 
provisions for stockholders to seek compensation for violations of their rights. GCG 
includes the larger society, business community and the role of each authority, which 
is described in the first part of the Code. It links the practices of GCG and related 
macro-perspectives by describing the role of each authority. 
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The Code is a comprehensive reference for those who want to implement GCG in 
their companies because this code provides guidance on macro-aspects, principles, 
functions and role of companies. In addition, the Code gives information on how to 
practice GCG. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. The principles of code of corporate governance 
 
 
The Code of GCG in Indonesia contains accountability, principles of transparency, 
independence, responsibility and fairness. It provides standards to guide the 
companies to implement GCG and to achieve certain goals. They are designed to: 
1. Maintain the company’s sustainable growth;  
2. Empower the function of each organization in the company; 
3. Encourage the related parties to take any decision and action based on high 
moral values in compliance with laws and regulations; 
4. Stimulate concern for corporate social responsibility; 
5. Optimize the company’s value; and 
6. Maintain and enhance a company’s competitiveness. 
 
The Code of GCG is an important reference for all Indonesian companies, including 
companies operating based on Sharia Law. The Code of GCG is used as the minimum 
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Fairness 
Accountability 
Responsibility Transparency 
 
Code of CG 
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standard of national corporate governance, and the Code can be adapted for 
companies that aim to implement GCG. Implementation of GCG in Indonesian 
companies is still weak. Therefore, the expectation is that SOEs, public listed 
companies, companies that raise and manage public funds, province and region-
owned companies, firms whose products or services are widely used by the public and 
firms with extensive influence on the environment, will implement the Code of GCG. 
Further, to progress, it is expected that companies must use the Code of GCG. 
 
2.3 The Committee and Law on Corporate Governance in Indonesia 
The issue of corporate governance is growing in Asian economics, especially in 
Indonesia. Indonesia still lags behind in the implementation of corporate governance 
compared to other countries in Asia. Therefore, several committees have been 
established and legal provisions enacted that require Indonesian companies to 
implement the Code. These are as follows: 
 
2.3.1 High Level Finance Committee on Corporate Governance 
The National Committee on Governance (NCG) in Indonesia was founded on 30 
November 2004. The function of the NCG is to act as an advisory department in 
formulating the guidelines of corporate governance and dispersing the principles of 
GCG by conducting studies and providing recommendations to enhance the 
awareness on legislation related to the issues with new regulations to encourage 
companies in Indonesia to be listed on the stock market (Kung, Carverhill, & McLeod, 
2010). 
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2.3.2 The Capital Market and Non-Bank Financial Sector Regulator (Bapepam-
LK) 
Bapepam-LK is an organization established by the government of Indonesia to create 
capital market activity in an orderly, fair and efficient manner, and protect the 
interests of investors and the public (Bapepam-LK, 2014). Bapepam-LK (2014) also 
focuses on corporate governance practices by participating in several meetings to 
discuss the issue of corporate governance. For example, these include a conference 
conducted by OECD in March 2009. In September 2009, Bapepam-LK met with the 
Artic Response Company Group (ARCG) in Manila to discuss how to improve and 
enhance GCG in Asian countries. 
 
Bapepam-LK (2014) supervises publicly listed companies in Indonesia to ensure that 
they comply with and follow company laws and regulations. Bapepam-LK (2014) can 
also impose sanctions on publicly listed companies that do not comply with and 
follow company laws and regulations. Thus, Bapepam-LK (2014) is important for 
improving and implementing GCG in Indonesia. 
2.3.3 Company Law (40/2007) 
One principle of corporate governance of the NCG (NCG, 2006) is transparency. 
Company Law 40 (2007) requires transparency for all statements disclosed in the 
audited financial reports of publicly listed companies (Kung et al., 2010). The articles 
under the Company Law explain the functions and duties of the company’s 
governance bodies (board of director structures, board of commissioner structures, 
and general meeting of shareholders) and the prerequisites for issuing a good annual 
report. The articles require that the board of directors and board of commissioners 
must sign the financial report to endorse the report, make sure the contents are correct 
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and a public accountant audits the financial report. The Company Law contains 
regulations to promote GCG practices of accountability, transparency, fairness and 
responsibility. 
 
In 2010, Bapepam-LK (2014) addressed the framework of corporate governance in 
the Report on Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC). As a benchmark, it 
provides a helpful reference by using the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. 
To sustain corporate governance standards and practices in Indonesia, the ROSC was 
continued in 2010. However, the implementation of GCG in Indonesian companies, in 
accordance with the OECD principles, is still far behind compared to other countries 
in Asia, even though corporate governance practices have become a critical need in 
the global economy. To enhance firm performance in non-family and family- 
controlled firms, Indonesia is adopting international standards that fit local 
characteristics of corporate governance mechanisms. 
 
Regan (1998) claims that companies which apply good governance practices may 
boost the management’s reputation and provide appropriate returns for shareholders. 
An efficient corporate governance standard is required for a company’ success and 
overall market stability. 
 
2.4 One-Tier and Two-Tier Board Systems 
Traditionally, one and two-tier corporate governance systems have evolved from the 
corporate law of Anglo-Saxon countries (US, UK, Canada and Australia) and 
Mainland European countries (Germany and Netherland), respectively. Under the 
Anglo-Saxon model, a company is governed by one corporate body that undertakes 
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both the management and monitoring functions (one-tier board system). Further, 
under the Mainland European model, two separate bodies operate independently: the 
board of directors and the supervisory board (two-tier board system). 
 
If a company adopts the one-tier board system, the company is governed by a unified 
board performing both management and supervisory functions; thus, there is no 
separate supervisory board. The majority of the board members will act as 
independent, although the deed of foundation may require a higher percentage. The 
main aim of such independence is that the unified board can carry out its supervisory 
functions objectively. 
 
In a one-tier board, the executive directors and the supervisory directors are mutually 
established as the “Board of Directors”. The supervisory directors are “non-executive 
directors” in a one-tier board. The different functions of the executive and non-
executive directors of a one-tier board have to be described in the company’s AoA. 
Non-executive directors perform a monitoring role, determine the remuneration of the 
executive members and one of them holds the position of chairman of the Board. 
 
On the other hand, in a company under the two-tier board system, the board structure 
is separated into the board of directors and the board of commissioners (supervisory 
board). The duties of the board of directors are day-to-day management of the 
company, while the duties of the board of commissioners involve supervisory 
functions. The board of directors exercises its rights and performs its duties as an 
independent body. The deed of incorporation may provide that the board of directors 
is appointed directly by the shareholders' meeting. The board exercises its rights and 
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performs its tasks as a body in connection with all management issues of the 
company, whereas all board members may represent the company personally. 
 
In general, Indonesian corporate law sets a list that falls within the exclusive 
competence of the supreme body of the company. The Companies Act further lists 
issues for which boards of public companies limited by shares are specifically 
responsible if the company's shares are listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. The 
board will prepare an annual governance report that must be approved by the general 
meeting of shareholders and published on the firm's website.  
 
For the purpose of controlling the firm's management, the members of the firm are 
obliged to elect a supervisory board. The supervisory board also acts as an 
independent body and its members may not be instructed in this capacity by the 
employer or by the shareholders. Under Indonesian law, public companies limited by 
shares may operate a two-tier system.  
 
Postma, Ees and Sterken (2001) analyzed board composition and firm performance of 
91 Dutch listed firms in 1996. Since the Netherlands adopts the two-tier board 
systems, they found that the managing director does not determine performance, 
however; they claimed that supervisory board has a negative relationship with firm 
performance.  
 
Rose (2007) examined 443 Denmark companies from 1998 to 2001. She claimed that 
two-tier board characteristics in Danish companies have a positively significant 
relationship with firm performance by using Tobin’s Q. The positive influence results 
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from a larger talent pool, which firms are able to use for recruiting qualified board 
members despite gender-specific criteria. 
 
2.5 The Performance of Family-Controlled Companies Around the World 
Family businesses have different styles, cultures, motivations, strategies and 
ownership structures as compared to non-family businesses (Daily & Dollinger, 1992; 
Bartholomeusz & Tanewski, 2006; Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2010; Ibrahim & Samad, 
2011). Family businesses have a strong relationship with family traits, family ties and 
long-term intentions (Chrisman, Chua & Sharma, 2005; Hamid et al., 2014; Berg & 
Bart-Jan, 2014). Further, family businesses always adapt to the business environment 
compared to other types of companies (Chrisman, Chua, & Steier, 2005). 
 
Family businesses dominate the economic landscape. According to the latest statistics 
from the Family Firm Institute, family firms account for two thirds of all businesses 
around the world, generate around 70-90 percent of annual global GDP, and create 
50-80 percent of jobs in the majority of countries worldwide (Family Firm Institute, 
2017). In the United States, one third of S&P 500 firms are controlled and managed 
by the founding family, family firms account for 89 percent of total tax returns, 64 
percent of GDP, and employ 62 percent of the total workforce (Anderson & Reeb, 
2003; Astrachan & Shanker, 2003). 
 
Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer (2002) claimed that family members in the United 
Kingdom (UK) prefer to maintain their shares in the firm rather than sell to outsiders. 
This is because they believe that family members can give competitive advantage to 
the company. Wan-Hussin (2009) examined the relationship between board 
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composition and corporate transparency in Malaysian family firms on 2001 to 2002. 
He found that higher proportion of affiliated directors are more likely to make greater 
performance. A family-controlled company also have capabilities and competencies 
to adapt and survive in an evolving and dynamic environment (Chrisman et al., 2005). 
 
Berg and Bart-Jan (2014) examine the relationship between top 100 family businesses 
with firm performance in the Netherlands which proxies of firm performance uses 
return on asset (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). They found that the family 
business is most concerned with internal shareholders as compared to external 
shareholders. They also revealed that when the world economy is growing, the growth 
of family business is lags behind. However, the family business can survive when the 
economy is not doing well. Finally, they found that family members have emotional 
links with their business. Therefore, family-controlled companies cherish their 
employees more as compared to non-family controlled companies. Overall, a 
commitment exists not only on the financial side, but also the social side of running 
the business. 
 
Daily and Dollinger (1992) compared 186 companies performance between family-
controlled companies and non-family controlled companies in Dubai. They revealed 
that family-controlled companies contribute to higher performance than non-family 
controlled companies. They also found that family-controlled companies have higher 
sales growth, better improvement in net profit and outperform their competitors 
compared to non-family controlled companies. 
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Bartholomeusz and Tanewski (2006) examined the performance between family-
controlled companies and non-family controlled companies in 100 Australian firms by 
using a panel data for year 2002. Data collected were used to test hypotheses that: (1) 
corporate governance structures varied between two firm types, and (2) family firms 
utilize greatly different corporate governance structures and these differences lead to 
performance differentials. It was found that family control displaces other owners. 
Large blockholders are less likely to own capital of family firms, and board members 
are less likely to own shares. Family firms are less likely to be subject to disinterested 
or independent monitoring and are likely to have a lower proportion of disinterested 
or independent directors on their boards. However, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued 
that the performance of family-controlled companies is worse than that of their non-
family controlled counterparts. The results reveal that older family members are no 
longer competent or qualified to run the companies. 
 
Black, De Carvalho and Gorga (2012) examined the corporate governance in BRIK 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India and Korea) and found that the relationship between 
corporate governance and market value of a firm is strongly influenced by country 
characteristics. Similary, Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (2010) find that 
foregin firms invest less in internal governance mechanisms relative to US firms. 
They found that negative relationship between government investment and firm 
performance (Tobins’ Q) when compared to US firms. 
 
Bhatt and Bhattacharya (2017) investigates the relationship between firm performance 
and board characteristics in top-listed Indian family-controlled firms and non-family 
controlled firms for the period 2002 to 2012. They examine the relationship between 
41 
 
board structure and firm performance by segregating the sample based on family 
management, family ownership and family representative directors. They found a 
negative effect of board structure on firm performance in family firms compared to 
non-family firms. Contrary to the most Western literature, family management was 
not found to significantly affect firm performance as compared to professionally 
managed firms. In the subset analysis of family firms, higher proportion of family 
ownership and family representative directors did not show any significant impact on 
the firm performance. Having a higher proportion of independent directors, larger 
board size or an independent chairman does not appear to improve this insignificant 
relationship between family firms and firm performance in India.  
 
Yasser, Entebang and Mansor (2011) examine the relation between four corporate 
governance mechanisms (board size, board composition, CEO/ chairman duality and 
audit committee) with two measures of firm performance (ROE and profit margin) in 
the case of 30 listed Pakistani firms. Results found a significant relationship between 
performance and three of the corporate governance mechanisms (board size, board 
composition and audit committee). 
 
Amran and Che-Ahmad (2010) examined the relationship between family-controlled 
and non-family controlled firms and firm performance by using 730 companies in 
Malaysia from 2003 through to 2007. They revealed a significant difference between 
family-controlled and non-family controlled firms on firm performance when using 
Tobin’s Q, Operating Cash Flow and ROA as a proxy. The findings also show that 
family-controlled firms have better performance than non-family controlled firms. 
However, the family-controlled firms have fewer meetings compared to non-family 
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controlled firms because family businesses commonly conduct informal meetings. 
Family members easily meet and discuss during family gatherings without the need to 
conduct a formal meeting during working hours. 
 
Ibrahim and Samad (2011) found mixed results on firm performance in Malaysian 
companies from the market and accounting-based approaches from 1999 through to 
2005. They found that family-owned firms have lower firm value than non-family 
owned firms when measured by the market approach (Tobin’s Q). However, family 
ownership has higher firm performance than non-family ownership based on ROE. 
 
2.6 Family Companies’ Performance in Indonesia 
Companies in Indonesia are mostly characterized by family ownership in which the 
top management positions, whether it is the board of commissioners or the board of 
directors, are filled by family members. The separation of cash-flow and control rights 
occurs because of ownership concentration of public companies. This phenomenon is 
in place due to the shareholders being able to command the company either at once or 
indirectly. It is common that a number of companies in Indonesia are controlled by 
the same shareholders. This happens because some ownership mechanisms, especially 
pyramid ownership and cross ownership, are commonly found in developing nations, 
including Indonesia, and some developed countries through other companies (Savitri, 
2018). 
 
A family-concentrated company applies the best business strategy for the sake of the 
company’s business development. The right strategy will lead to improvement and 
maximum results in the achievement of financial performance in the family company. 
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Therefore, business strategy cannot be separated from family companies since 
entrepreneurship will promote innovation and brilliant ideas for developing the family 
companies and surviving the competitions with other family companies or non-family 
companies (Yudha & Singappurwoko, 2017).   
 
In Asia, several previous studies have claimed that family companies fuel economic 
growth (Filatotchev, Lien & Piesse, 2005; La Porta et al., 1999). Businessmen, like Li 
Jia Chen (Hong Kong), Jack Ma (China), Lim Kok Thay (Malaysia) and Kyuk Ho 
Shin (South Korea), are well-known among family group companies. In Indonesia, 
Abidin Yusuf (Satnusa Persada, Tbk) and Salim (Salim Group) are among the 
prominent family companies in the Indonesian market. 
 
In Indonesia, 3% of family businesses established between years 1932 to 1943 and 
2% established between years 1944 to 1955 are still in operation today. For family 
companies established from between 1956 to 1967; and 1968 to 1979, only about 24% 
are still operating today. About 37% of family businesses established from 1992 to 
2003 are still in operation (Kodrat, Sukardi & Gunawan, 2007). 
 
The shareholders in Indonesian listed companies comprise individuals or groups, the 
government, foreign companies or foreign individuals, financial companies, non-
listed companies and other publicly listed companies. Prabowo and Simpson (2011) 
revealed that there is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and 
company performance. Therefore, the researcher defines the controlling shareholder 
as one owning at least 20% of common shares (Itan, 2015). 
44 
 
Achmad et al. (2009) examined the significance of family ownership structure on firm 
performance by using manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange from 2003 to 2006. They found that non-family controlled firms have better 
performance when measured by ROA than family-controlled firms. Prabowo and 
Simpson (2011) revealed that there is a relationship between board composition and 
board leadership and firm performance. They argued that family-controlled firms are 
negatively related to firm performance. 
 
Darmadi (2012) examined the relationship between board size and commissioners’ 
independence and company performance by using data of non-financial public family 
companies in Indonesia listed from 2005 to 2007. He argued that family-controlled 
companies are likely to mitigate agency problems by employing smaller boards. Itan 
(2015) examined company performance in Indonesia by using ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
The findings reveal that non-family controlled companies have better performance 
than family-controlled companies in both approaches.  
 
Harjito and Singapurwoko (2014) examined firm performance of family-controlled 
and non-family controlled Indonesian firms. They revealed that family-controlled 
companies have high firm performance and are more efficient than other companies 
with respect to insider ownership, debt policy and dividend policy. Further, the 
findings also explain that descendant-controlled companies have better performance 
than founder-controlled companies. Therefore, family relationship can improve and 
provide better firm performance, supporting the fact that founders and descendants 
bring about better firm performance compared to managers without founding-family 
ties. 
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2.7 Family and Non-family Controlled Firm Performance 
Some research has shown that businesses controlled by non-family members show 
more positive results than businesses that are family-controlled when performance 
indicators are used to measure firm performance (Sindhuja, 2009; Ibrahim et al., 
2009). However, other researchers have found that companies managed by families 
perform better than companies managed by non-families (Darmadi, 2013; Harjito & 
Singapurwoko, 2014; Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Maury, 2006; Amran & Che-Ahmad, 
2010). Therefore, the findings on the firm performance of family and non-family 
controlled companies remain inconclusive.  
 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) found that family-controlled companies have better 
performance than non-family controlled companies in terms of both market (Tobin’s 
Q) and accounting approaches (ROA and ROE) by using panel study on S&P 500 
companies. The findings show that family ownershop is present in one-third of the 
S&P 500 firms and accounts for 18% of the firm shares. 
 
Sraer and Thesmar (2007) analyze the performance of French family-controlled 
companies over the period 1994 to 2000, finding that family-controlled companies 
outperform non-family controlled companies. Their results are in line with those of 
Anderson and Reeb (2003), who analyze the relationship between founding-family 
ownership and firm performance in the US market, concluding that family-controlled 
companies perform better than non-family ones. More precisely, they find that when 
family members serve as CEO, performance is better than with outside CEOs, 
suggesting that family ownership is an elective organizational structure. Scholes, 
Wilson, Wright and Noke (2012) investigate listed family-controlled companies in the 
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UK between 2007 and 2009, finding that family-controlled companies have superior 
profitability and considerably less debt than their counterparts, but have a lower 
growth rate. Allouche, Amann, Jaussaud and Kurashina (2008) find evidence of better 
performance among Japanese family-controlled companies. Other studies also find 
evidence of family-controlled companies have higher performance in advanced and 
competitive economies (Peng & Jiang, 2010; Essen, Carney, Gedajlovic & Heugens, 
2011). 
 
Maury (2006) used 1,672 non-financial companies in 13 Western European countries 
(Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Germany, Austria, Norway, Spain, Italy, Portugal, 
Switzerland, UK and Sweden) in 1998. He found that active family-controlled 
companies outperform in terms of profitability in different legal regimes and family-
controlled companies have lower agency problems than non-family controlled 
companies, but conflict between the family director and minority shareholders exists. 
 
Amran and Che-Ahmad (2010) conducted a study on the relationship between family 
and non-family controlled companies and firm performance by using 146 companies 
from 2003 to 2007. They found differences between family and non-family controlled 
firm performance when measured by Q, ROA and operating cash flow (OCF). They 
claimed that family-controlled companies have lower number of meetings because 
family companies usually conduct informal meetings, where they meet and discuss 
during family get together. 
 
For non-family controlled companies, board structure, education and skills of 
directors, board meetings and audit committee are found to improve firm 
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performance. It is in line with the suggestion made by the Code (2006) that board 
structure should consist of board of directors and board of commissioners and 
companies should have at least one independent commissioner on the board. The 
directors sitting on the board should have skills, experience and credibility to manage 
the company and independent commissioners should bring in independent judgement. 
In terms of board meetings, the board should hold meetings once a month which is 
required by the Code (2006), and the number of board meetings held in a year and 
detailed attendance of each individual director must be disclosed. For audit 
committee, audit committee should control and monitor the actions of directors and 
provide the report to the board of commissioners. The Code (2006) requires that at 
least one audit committee member should be independent. 
 
Ibrahim et al. (2009) conducted a study on 290 Main Board companies in Malaysia 
from 1999 to 2005. They found mixed results on firm performance, whereby 
indicators of performance used were Tobin’s Q, ROE and ROA. They claimed that 
firm performance is lower in family-controlled companies compared to non-family 
controlled companies when measured using Tobin’s Q. However, performance has 
higher value for family-controlled companies when measured by ROE. These findings 
indicate that from the market approach (Tobin’s Q), firm performance reflects the 
current condition of the company as to whether or not the company is performing 
financially well. In contrast, when using the accounting approach (ROE), the data 
used was based on accrual basis. 
 
Most companies in Indonesia are owned by families or individuals. The impact of 
global recession in 2007 and 2008 caused the value of the Rupiah to drop and the 
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power to sell and buy became unstable. Importers tried hard to increase their 
production cost while exporters tried to cut down production (Akhmadi, Yusrina, 
Asri, Yumma, Athia, & Rahmitha, 2011). Previous studies (Amran & Che-Ahmad, 
2011; Darmadi, 2013; Berg & Bart-Jan, 2014; Itan, 2015) from different countries 
have revealed that companies owned by families have greater ability to be sustainable 
when facing a crisis and have better performance than companies that are non-family 
owned. However, a lack of scientific research in Indonesia exists that discusses and 
explains the impact between family-controlled and non-family controlled businesses 
and performance.  
 
Vieira (2014) examines whether ownership of Portugal public firms is related to firm 
performance by comparing the family-controlled companies and non-family 
controlled companies for period between 1999 and 2010. She found that family-
controlled companies outperform than non-family controlled companies. The firm 
performance of family-controlled companies is more sensitive to the crisis periods 
and ages compared to their counterparts. 
 
De Massis, Frattini, Mahjocchi and Piscitello (2018) compare family and non-family 
firms and how institutional distance influences their international location choice. 
Specifically, they argue that family firms do not respond to institutional pressures in 
the same way as non-family firms. Through a quantitative analysis of top 100 Italian 
firms observed in the period 2000 to 2013, they show that firms are generally more 
likely to choose foreign locations with higher institutional quality, i.e., countries with 
clearer rules, more secure systems, and more transparent institutions. Moreover, 
compared to non-family firms, family firms are less reluctant to invest. In locations 
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with institutional voids, where family firms’ social capital facilitates access to and 
screening of new business opportunities (Carney, 2005), family firms may exploit 
their relational capabilities those that enable them to better position themselves than 
non-family firms to benefit from the favors of politicians and other networks. Thus 
confirming the role of the external context in influencing family firms’ 
internationalization decisions. 
 
2.8 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Corporate governance has two mechanisms, i.e., internal mechanisms (board structure 
and audit committee) and external mechanisms (capital market, legal systems and 
managerial labor market). Shleifer and Vishny (1977) declared that implementing 
GCG mechanisms in companies will assure the owners of returns in accordance with 
their investments. Itan (2015) conducted a study on the impact of quality of corporate 
governance on capital structure and firm performance, measured by Tobins’ Q and 
ROA. Darmadi (2012) conducted a study on the effect of the mechanisms of corporate 
governance on share concentration and ownership and company performance 
measured by level of profitability for Indonesian listed firms.  
 
This study focuses on the internal mechanisms, i.e., board of directors (board size, 
qualification, meetings, gender diversity, expertise and managerial ownership) and 
board of commissioners (size of board and independence) and audit committee 
characteristics (audit committee size, independence and meetings) that influence  
performance using Tobins’ Q and ROE. The results show limited evidence that 
family-controlled firms are negatively related to board size but that family-controlled 
firms are likely to mitigate agency issues by employing smaller boards. Furthermore, 
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board independence demonstrates no significance in either mitigating or exacerbating 
agency issues. 
 
Table 2.1 Previous studies of family-controlled companies 
Author (Year) Primary Subject Findings 
Anderson and Reeb 
(2003)  
Family firm 
performance  
(agency theory)  
1. Family firms are 1/3 of the 
S&P 500 and perform better than 
non-family firms in the sample.  
2. Firms with family CEOs 
perform better that outside CEOs  
 
Anderson and Reeb 
(2003)  
Board Composition  
(agency theory)  
1. The most valuable public 
family firms are ones that have 
independent directors balancing 
firm representation.  
2. Agency II conflicts are 
mitigated when independent 
directors balance the power of 
family directors and management.  
 
Chrisman, Chua, and 
Steier (2005)  
Family firm 
introduction 
 
(stewardship theory)  
1. One goal of the family 
entrepreneur is to build a business 
that is also a family institution.  
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Table 2.1 Cont’d 
 
Author (Year) Primary Subject Findings 
Chrisman, Chua, and 
Sharma (2005)  
Agency vs. Stewardship  1. Study found support for the 
use of agency based compensation 
mechanisms to align the interests 
of family managers.  
2. Altruism does not blind 
families from reality and kinship 
does not unconditionally guarantee 
appropriate behavior by relatives  
3. Better firm performance is 
linked to the use of incentives and 
control mechanisms.  
Corbetta and 
Salvatto (2004)  
Agency vs. Stewardship  1. Stewardship theory adds to 
family business literature where 
agency theory cannot adequately 
explain inter/intrafirm behavior.  
 
Miller and 
LeBreton-Miller 
(2006)  
Ownership  
(agency theory)  
1. Long-term orientations of 
family firms allow management to 
invest in actions that create a 
competitive advantage (such as 
trusting supplier relationships) by 
allowing the firm to focus on the 
development of its core 
competence  
 
Miller, LeBreton-
Miller, et al. (2005)  
Ownership  
(agency theory)  
1. Family firm research is 
sensitive to the definition of 
“family firm”.  
 
2. Only family firms managed 
by the lone founder (concentrated 
ownership) outperform the broader 
population.  
 
Sharma (2005)  Divestment (M&A)  
(Resource-based view)  
1. Divestment decisions are 
influenced by the breadth of family 
involvement and the collectivist 
nature of the family and 
community.  
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2.8.1 Attributes of Board of Directors 
2.8.1.1 Board Size 
 
According to Company Law (40/2007) on Limited Liability Company Article 1, the 
board of directors is an authorized corporate structure fully responsible and in charge 
of the management of the company, with the aim of achieving the goals and 
objectives of the company. Board size refers to the total number of directors who sit 
on the board and manage the interests of shareholders (Darmadi, 2013; Itan, 2015). 
Darmadi (2013) stated that board size is an important element to determine effective 
governance because directors are expected to be able to use their knowledge, 
experience and expertise.  
 
Amran and Che-Ahmad (2011) found that Malaysian non-family controlled firms 
seem to have smaller boards to enhance firm value. In a similar study conducted, 
Hamid et al. (2014) found a strong relationship of small boards with performance for 
both family and non-family companies. Itan (2015) revealed that different 
institutional and legal environments could create problems for the board but the 
seriousness of these issues also depends on the effectiveness and specific functions of 
boards.  
 
Board size has often been examined by experts (Yermack, 1996; Chen, Chen & 
Cheng, 2008; Itan, 2015), but mixed results have been found with respect to board 
size in family-controlled companies. Using S&P 1,500 enterprises in the period 1996-
2000, Chen, Chen, and Cheng (2008) revealed that family-controlled firms have 
smaller boards and lesser independence than non-family controlled companies. 
Yermack (1996) examined the relationship between board size and firm performance. 
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He used 452 United States (US) industrial companies and found a clear inverse 
relationship between board size and market valuation of companies. Ferris, 
Jagannathan and Pritchard (2003) conducted a study by using firms on COMPUSTAT 
with at least US$100 million in total assets at the beginning of 1995. They stated that 
a small board has a strong and positive relationship with firm value. On the other 
hand, Itan (2015) argued that small number of board directors is more effective than 
large number board directors because a small board in a company contributes higher 
Tobins’ Q than a large board.  
 
Chen and Nowland (2010) conducted a study in Asia (Malaysia, Singapore, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan) and found that a larger board in family-controlled companies 
decreases performance because the monitoring of the board was still weak. A similar 
study conducted by Chen et al. (2008) found weak implementation of board 
governance practices in family-controlled companies due to small size of family 
directors.   
 
Thus, mixed arguments and debates exist among experts about whether a large board 
is better than a small board and vice versa. Darmadi (2012) stated that large boards 
can provide more resources, have high problem-solving capabilities and provide 
advice and strategies to firms to increase their performance. Surifah (2013) stated that 
large firms prefer larger boards than small boards because they expect that large 
boards can be beneficial, in terms of solving problems, setting strategies and sharing 
ideas to enhance performance and achieving the company’s goals. Zainal, Mustafa, 
and Jusoff (2009) conducted a study on Malaysian companies. They claimed that 
large boards contribute more to performance because larger boards have more skills, 
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knowledge and experience that members can share during shareholders’ meetings. 
Badu and Appiah (2017) conducted a study by using 137 listed companies in Ghana 
and Nigeria. They found an optimal corporate board size effectively monitors and 
advises the management, thereby enhancing performance. Therefore, large boards 
appear to be more effective as compared to small boards. 
 
Others have found contradictory results. For example, Itan (2015) studied family-
controlled companies in Indonesia. He claimed that large boards do not enhance 
performance, and in fact, reduce value because large boards are inefficient when 
making decisions. Large boards have more ideas and give more advice, which makes 
it difficult for a manager to make the correct decisions. Sometimes, complications and 
conflicts occur. Hence, large boards inhibit the development of a company. Horvath 
and Spirollari (2012) conducted a study of US companies. They found that large 
boards face difficulty in communicating and coordinating among group members, 
thus creating conflict because of different opinions among directors. Large boards 
also do not help the top management to monitor the firm effectively (Jensen, 1993). 
On the other hand, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) stated that small boards in Malaysian 
companies contribute more in terms of monitoring the company effectively because 
small boards can make decisions quickly. Therefore, small boards are expected to be 
better than large boards. 
2.8.1.2 Board Qualification 
 
The Code (2006) in Indonesia requires that board of directors should use their ability 
and qualities, such as education, skills, professionalism, knowledge, experience and 
integrity to carry out their job and duties. 
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A board acts as an internal corporate governance and control system in a business 
(Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). In terms of ensuring boards make correct 
decisions, each board member is expected to be equipped with management 
knowledge and skills to improve firm performance. Professional knowledge, such as 
knowledge of taxation, accounting and financing, marketing, information and 
development systems, legal issues and other related areas are needed to achieve better 
firm performance. The qualifications of board members are positively significant to 
management decisions, which can be translated into enhanced firm performance 
(Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2011). High educational background and skills are needed in 
a company to increase firm performance. Yasser (2011) claimed that education and 
skills can significantly impact family firm performance. A family member who has 
technical knowledge is in a better position to monitor the activities of management. 
Moreover, families have incentives to solve problems, prevent the occurrence of fraud 
and protect the shareholders’ interests (Darmadi, 2012; Inmyxai & Takahashi, 2009; 
Yusuf, 1995).  
 
Chen, Cheng and Hwang (2005) found that higher education of directors has a strong 
relationship with firm profitability in Taiwanese listed companies. Switzer and Huang 
(2007) examined Canadian companies. They found that performance of mutual funds 
has an impact on managerial human capital characteristics. 
 
Sebora and Wakefield (1998) found that directors who have higher qualifications can 
manage a company effectively. Education is an important element for directors 
because it is an investment in knowledge that can increase productivity in a company 
(Schultz, 1993). Directors who are well educated can better understand financial 
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matters and be able to handle problems and control management in a company 
compared to less-educated directors (Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2011). However, 
Srivastava and Lee (2008) examined the relationship between top management 
characteristics (age, tenure, and education) and performance in companies in the US. 
They found that top management characteristics have a weak relationship with firm 
performance.  
2.8.1.3 Board Meeting Frequency 
 
Board meeting frequency refers to the number of board meetings in a year. The 
Decree on Managing Boards and Supervisory Capital Markets (Bapepam-LK, 2014) 
says that a company must conduct meetings at least once a month. The board of 
directors must disclose the frequency of meetings held in one year and details of 
attendance of each director individually. 
 
The frequency of board meetings is an important attribute and measurement for 
boards to run their operations in a company. However, the finding on whether high 
board meeting frequency contributes to firm performance has shown inconsistent 
results in previous studies (Surifah, 2013). Therefore, if the board of director lack 
skills, knowledge and experience to manage or control a company, a higher frequency 
of board meetings can reduce the problems. Therefore, high frequency of board 
meetings may positively and significantly influence firm performance (Darmadi, 
2013). 
 
Based on the agency theory, Harjito and Singapurwoko (2014) suggested that board 
directors are contributors to managing agency problems. Moreover, the board of 
directors exercises governance at full board meetings when non-executive directors 
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formally participate in the corporate meetings. Therefore, non-executive directors 
contribute by attending board meetings and monitoring corporate decisions. Efforts of 
non-executive directors can increase board activity and contributions (Arosa, 
Itturalde, & Maseda, 2013).  
2.8.1.4 Board Expertise 
 
An expert is an individual who has good experience, skills, technical knowledge and 
ability in a particular area (Kusumastuti et al., 2012). Fairchild and Li (2005) argued 
that companies are looking for expert directors to monitor and control the 
management because expert directors have the skills, experience and able to handle 
the company effectively. Johannisson and Huse (2000) found that the background and 
experience of directors contribute positively to family firms. The behavioral skills of 
professionals combined with that of managers can be used to develop solutions for 
company performance problems (Greene, 2008). 
 
Some studies have explained the relationship between board expertise and firm 
performance (Lawler, Mohrman & Susan, 2003; Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2011; Yasser, 
2011; Hamid et al., 2014). A professional should have competent skills and 
knowledge and a professional is expected to be more effective as a strategic business 
partner (Lawler et al., 2003). These characteristics apply to specific business settings. 
Therefore, these professionals could indirectly contribute to firm value. Hamid et al. 
(2014) studied the impact of abilities and skills of the board directors on firm 
performance and how they provide advice and counsel to managers. Board experts 
can contribute ideas and strategies for the company to face competition and advice 
and monitor management activities effectively. Amran and Che-Ahmad (2011) found 
that board experts, such as lawyers, consultants and auditors, support directors in 
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terms of decision-making. Thus, board expertise has a strong relationship with firm 
value (Yasser, 2011). 
 
McDonald, Westphal, and Graebner (2008) discussed how board expertise 
significantly influences firm performance by using large and medium sized US 
industries and services firms listed in the 1998 Forbes and Fortune 500 list. The 
knowledge and experience of outside directors can help a company to improve 
performance. Board directors who have experience in dealing with the same product 
markets can contribute to the value of the company. However, if the product markets 
are different, the knowledge and experience of outside directors may be needed to 
provide strategies and ideas to improve firm performance.  
 
Amran and Che-Ahmad (2011) explained the relationship between board expertise 
and firm performance. During acquisitions, companies prefer independent directors 
with specific expertise rather than general expertise. For example, McDonald et al. 
(2008) found that chief operating officers (COOs), chief marketing officers (CMOs) 
and chief finance officers (CFOs) are experts in their knowledge areas and can 
contribute ideas and strategies based on that expertise. This study also found that 
outside directors can contribute to better firm performance. 
 
Kusumastuti et al. (2012) stated that the expertise of directors in areas such as 
taxation, law, accounting, marketing, financing and consulting in Indonesian 
companies can support managers in their decision-making. Therefore, directors’ 
expertise may have a positive influence on firm performance. Agrawal and Chadha 
(2005) found that directors with a certified public accountant (CPA), chartered 
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financial analyst (CFA) or similar professional qualifications on the audit committee 
can translate into fewer earnings restatements. However, in Indonesia, companies still 
do not focus on directors’ expertise, especially in family-controlled firms. They prefer 
hiring family members over capable candidates from the outside.  
 
Amran and Che-Ahmad (2011) studied the influence of board mechanisms on 
Malaysian family companies’ performance by using a sample of 189 family 
companies from 2003 to 2007. They revealed that it negatively influences board 
expertise and performance. They explained that a fewer number of experts are more 
suitable for board effectiveness as compared to a high number of experts. The fewer 
number of experts result in better discussion and faster agreement and quicker 
decision-making among directors.  
2.8.1.5 Females on the Board 
 
Board diversity with respect to gender is an interesting component of the corporate 
governance mechanism in Indonesia because of the prevailing cultural assumption 
that men are more appropriate to manage a company. Statistical data of the Ministry 
of Manpower and Transmigration show that in 2014, the number of women in 
leadership positions was 37,801 (13%) of a total of 290,464 workers in leadership 
positions (Ministry of Manpower, 2014). 
 
The small number of women in managerial positions may be due to different cultural 
views about the root causes of success that men and women achieve. A successful 
man is considered as high achiever in terms of talent or intelligence, whereas a 
woman’s success is more often attributed to luck (Darmadi, 2013). In addition, in the 
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event of failure, some studies have suggested that failure of women is caused by 
incompetence, whereas failure among men is due to bad luck (Crawford, 2006). 
 
Females on the board factor has been examined by several previous studies with 
mixed findings. A female director is a component of board diversity (Majdalani et al., 
2014). Female directors can benefit the company in three ways: 1) female board 
members are more experienced in terms of market knowledge compared to male 
board members. As such, this experience will help the directors to make right 
decisions; 2) female board members can bring out a better image and perception when 
communicating with customers, which in turn, can enhance firm performance; and 3) 
female board members can explain the business environment well enough to be 
accepted or understood by other board members. This current study expects that 
female board members can have a positive influence on firm performance. 
 
Female directors can bring benefits and strengthen a company. In Spain, a higher 
number of female directors in the top management can help a company gain benefits 
from outside stakeholders, such as the government, community, institutional 
shareholders and society (Sanchez & Silaghi, 2017). Female directors can gain 
support and commitment of customers and employees in a company. Majdalani et al. 
(2014) stated that female directors in Arab Saudia can present a better image to 
employees and promise career development opportunities to female managers. 
 
To exercise their monitoring and advisory roles efficiently, boards require a variety of 
skills, information, experience and capabilities (Adams & Kirchmair, 2016). It has 
been suggested that women represent a source of valuable human capital with value-
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creation potential and that there are two main advantages of having women on the 
board (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). First, women are not part of the “old boys” network, 
which increase their level of independence. Second, regardless of age and education, 
women may bring to the board a new managerial practice that can prove themselves 
efficient in complementing existing ones, thus leading to improvements in the boards’ 
functioning (Gomez, Lafuente & Vaillant, 2018). Thus, the positive relationship 
between gender diversity in boards and performance is indicative of the quality of the 
business’ governance system, and of how organizations capitalize on the human 
capital of their board members (men and women). It has been argued that excessive 
diversity may cause communication and coordination costs within the board (Hillman 
et al., 2007); however, this concern is unlikely to be empirically relevant for most 
boards because the number of boards dominated by women is small. 
 
In Indonesia, the overall female population was about 49.6% in 2014, and the number 
of female directors in Indonesian companies was about 5.0% on all boards in 2014 
and about 11.6% on IDX listed firms.  Although more males serve on boards than 
females, a prevailing belief is that female directors can provide different opinions to 
enhance firm performance (Guy, Niethammer, & Moline, 2011). 
 
Female directors provide different perspectives in terms of knowledge, skills, 
counselling and advice. In a meeting, different views, attitudes, beliefs and opinions 
are expressed by female and male directors (Majdalani et al., 2014) that impact a 
firm’s decision-making. Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992), Hambrick, Cho, and Chen 
(1996) and Darmadi (2013) explained that different views and opinions sometimes 
may cause internal conflicts among the members, reduce efficiency in decision-
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making and lower firm performance. However, Amason (1996) suggested that such 
functional conflicts can increase the creativity of directors and produce a wider range 
of perspectives to help in decision-making, thus contributing to firm performance. 
 
In family-controlled companies, a traditional perception exists that successors of the 
company should be the eldest son of the owners (Holliday & Letherby, 1993). Kets de 
Vries (1993) stated that a daughter is unwelcome in some family companies because 
indirectly, the son-in-law must have a chance to be involved in that company. The 
founder of the family company is concerned with family name. A married daughter 
will follow her husband’s surname, and this impact on the symbolic identity of the 
company. Nonetheless, companies in African-American countries choose a daughter 
as successor because they expect that a female can manage the company well and 
receive benefits from outside stakeholders (Hillman, Canella & Harris, 2002).  
 
Amran and Che-Ahmad (2011) found that male directors can out-perform female 
directors and could face competition better. However, Shaw, Marlow, Lam, and 
Carter (2009) claimed that female business owners undercapitalize their companies, 
typically investing only one-third of the capital that men do, causing a decrease in 
firm performance. 
 
2.8.1.6 Managerial Ownership 
 
High ownership concentration may give rise to agency problems between 
shareholders and managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), but managerial ownership has 
been seen as a way to curb agency conflicts. Managerial ownership aligns the interests 
of managers with those of outside shareholders (alignment effect); therefore, 
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managers will try their best to achieve the goals of their companies and pursue value-
maximizing behavior (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, Demsetz (1983) argued 
that high ownership by managers would lead those managers to be concerned with 
their own personal interests rather than the interests of outside shareholders. 
Therefore, the value of the company will decrease (entrenchment effects). 
 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) conducted a study on US companies. They found a linear 
relationship between managerial ownership structures and firm performance. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) suggested the alignment-of-interest hypothesis. To minimize 
agency costs, this hypothesis posits that management ownership increases while the 
operational performance and firm value increases as well. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) explained that when managerial ownership is higher, a greater alignment of 
interests will occur for outside shareholders and managers. Holderness, Kroszner, and 
Sheehan (1999) found a positively significant relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm value when ownership is below 5%. 
 
In contrast, Mandaci and Gumus (2010) conducted a study in Turkish companies. 
They found a negative relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance measured by Tobins’ Q. Their results support Demsetz (1983) who 
found that higher managerial ownership in a company would lead the managers to be 
more concerned with their own interests rather than those of outside shareholders, 
thereby decreasing firm value. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010) measured managerial 
ownership and firm performance using Tobins’ Q in companies in the US from 1988 
to 2003. They found that managerial ownership has a negative relationship with firm 
performance. Managers are more likely to decrease their ownership when the firm’s 
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performance is good and more likely to increase their ownership when the finances of 
the company are constrained. However, Mat Nor and Sulong (2007) found that the 
managers who own a small portion of shares in a company will be concerned with 
their own best interests rather than in trying to maximize benefits for the company in 
Malaysia. To solve these problems, they suggested increasing the shares held by 
managers that can then reduce agency costs. 
 
Fauzi and Locke (2012) explained that one reason for successful implementation of 
corporate governance is the managerial ownership structure of the companies in New 
Zealand. Managerial ownership structure is reflected through either stocks or debt 
instruments so that these structures can be explored for possible forms of agency 
issues that might happen.  
 
Fleming, Heaney, and McCosker (2005) examined the alignment and entrenchment 
hypotheses between managerial ownership and firm performance with Tobin’s Q as a 
proxy for profitability in Australia companies. They found low levels of managerial 
ownership for the alignment hypotheses. However, there were high levels of 
managerial ownership for entrenchment of interest. Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung 
(2000) found that share ownerships in the range from 0 to 5% and above 25% are 
associated with the alignment hypothesis effects. On the other hand, share ownership 
in the range of 5% to 25% ownership is associated with the entrenchment hypothesis. 
 
Siregar and Sidharta (2008) explained that managers’ who control and monitor a 
firm’s equity, try to secure the most favorable employment conditions. Accordingly, 
the directors who monitor the company’s assets can potentially expropriate outside 
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investors by committing funds to non-beneficial projects that provide personal 
benefits to these directors (Ibrahim et al., 2009). Demtsetz and Villalonga (2001) 
argued that no relationship exists between managerial ownership and firm 
performance when using Tobins’ Q as a measurement for firm performance. 
 
Itan (2015) examined the relationship between quality of corporate governance and 
firm performance in family-controlled firms in Indonesia. He used 126 family 
companies in Indonesia as sample size from 2009 to 2013. He found a negative 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance when using Tobins’ 
Q as a proxy for profitability. A high proportion of managerial ownership leads 
managers to focus on personal interests. However, a positive relationship was found 
when ROA was used as a proxy for profitability. The finding explains that the higher 
the managerial ownership in non-family controlled companies, the better the decisions 
made, thus enhancing firm performance (Siregar, 2008; Sanjaya, 2011). 
 
2.8.2 Attributes of the Board of Commissioners 
2.8.2.1 Size of the Board of Commissioners 
 
The Code in Indonesia requires that the number of board commissioners should be 
tailored to manage effectively the company in terms of decision-making (NCG, 2006; 
IFC, 2014). The composition of the board of commissioners should adhere to the 
following: 1) at least one member is an independent commissioner domiciled in 
Indonesia; 2) the number of board commissioners should be at least three, which is 
the same as the board of directors; and 3) independent board commissioners must be 
at least 30% of the number of commissioners (IFC, 2014). 
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The board of commissioners is one of the control mechanisms in a company 
(Darmadi, 2012; Singapurwoko, 2013). The board of commissioners is the main 
internal mechanism to carry out the functions of the company and control 
opportunistic behavior of management. In addition, the commissioners can bridge the 
interests between the principals and managers in the company (Sembiring, 2005). 
 
Several studies (Darmadi, 2012; Saragih et al., 2012; Harjito & Singapurowoko, 
2014; Itan, 2015) have debated the impact on the size of the board of commissioners 
and firm performance and found mixed results. Saragih et al. (2012) and Darmadi 
(2012) claimed that a larger number of commissioners may influence the relationship 
because commissioners can effectively monitor the manager’s actions, hence 
enhancing firm performance. However, Harjito and Singapurowoko (2014) and Itan 
(2015) found inconsistent results and argued that a negative relationship exists 
between the size of the board of commissioners and firm performance. They argued 
that a larger number of board commissioners decrease the effectiveness of the 
company because a large number would make it difficult to carry out the board’s 
duties and included reasons such as difficulty in communication and coordination 
among commissioners. 
 
In contrast, Darmadi (2012) argued that the effectiveness of a company depends on 
the size of the board of commissioners. He found that more commissioners could 
provide useful information, new ideas, counselling and strategic options in order to 
increase firm value compared to a smaller board of commissioners. 
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2.8.2.2 Independence of Board of Commissioners (Unaffiliated Directors) 
 
Bapepam-LK (2014) (Indonesian Capital Market Supervisory Agency) through 
SE03/PM/2000 and the Indonesian Stock Exchange No.339/BEJ/07-2001, require a 
minimum one member of the board of commissioners to be an independent member. 
The Limited Liability Company Law (40/2007) states that independent board 
commissioners (unaffiliated directors) are outsiders who are not affiliated with both 
the boards of directors and commissioners. More specifically, the independent board 
commissioners (unaffiliated directors) must fulfil the following criteria: 1) they do not 
have any positon as a director in any other company; 2) they are not affiliated with the 
directors and commissioners; 3) they do not have any shares or ownership in the 
company either directly or indirectly; and 4) they are outsiders of the public company. 
 
Indonesia has adopted a two-tier board system that separates the board structure into a 
board of directors and a board of commissioners. Board directors are directors who 
manage the daily operations of the business; while the main duty of commissioners is 
to act as a supervisory board that supervises and controls the actions of directors and 
sets policies. The independence of the board of commissioners (dewan komisaris) in 
Indonesia is stipulated in the Code of Corporate Governance where a minimum 30% 
of the total board commissioners must be independent. Ramdani and Van (2009) 
argued that board independence can assist the boards in taking care of stakeholders’ 
interests and the number of independent board commissioners is related to firm 
performance. Based on the agency theory, more independent commissioners may 
enhance firm performance. 
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According to the Code of Corporate Governance Indonesia (amended 2006), a 
minimum 30% of the total number of board commissioners must comprise 
independent commissioners. This requirement provides for a statutory balance of 
authority between inside and outside directors. Non-executive directors are more 
independent, objective and capable of resisting personal interests when making board 
decisions (Surifah, 2013). Sujoko and Soebiantoro (2007) argued that companies need 
commissioners who are more accountable to shareholders and not just independent of 
management. 
 
In contrast, Saragih et al. (2012) claimed that a large number of independent board 
commissioners could stifle strategic actions, leading to over-controlling and 
monitoring and creating a lack of independence of management. Itan (2015) found 
that high proportion of independent board commissioners in Indonesian family 
companies is negatively related to firm performance. The reason behind that is 
because a manager who stays for a long time in a company can build a close and 
friendly relationship with the independent commissioners. Therefore, it becomes 
difficult to make independent judgements on decisions taken.  
2.8.3 Audit Committee Characteristics 
2.8.3.1 Audit Committee Size 
The IDX and Bapepam-LK, 2014, through Kep-339/BEJ/07-2001, stipulate that it is 
compulsory for publicly listed companies in Indonesia to have an audit committee, 
within the framework of the implementation of GCG. The function of the audit 
committee is to provide an independent opinion based on the members’ professional 
judgement and report to the board of commissioners related matters to solve problems 
and to achieve high firm performance. Investors, as outside parties, cannot observe 
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directly the quality of a firm’s information systems; hence, the perception of the 
performance of the audit committee will affect investors' assessments of the firm’s 
performance. 
 
The Code in Indonesia requires that a company should have a minimum of three audit 
committee members, comprising at least one independent commissioner and two 
members from outside. The firm should establish an audit committee no later than six 
months after listing on the IDX. Any public listed company that has not appointed an 
audit committee must declare it in a written statement (NCG, 2006). 
 
The main function of an audit committee is to monitor the financial performance and 
financial reporting in Indonesia (Alijoyo, Antonious, Bouma, & Sutawinangun, 2004). 
In this sense, it is expected that the audit committee can monitor the quality of the 
financial report, assist the external audit and internal control systems (including 
internal audit), independence, remuneration, scope of audit work and the resolution of 
disputes between external auditors and top management. Further, the audit committee 
reviews and agrees upon the chosen accounting policies. The audit committee must 
persuade the company to disclose all issues on financial reporting and ensure the 
correct accounting standards are adopted. Also, besides controlling the reliability of 
the company’s accounting processes, the audit committee ensures cooperation with 
the legal department, including attempts to prevent fraud in the company (Turley & 
Zaman, 2007). 
 
An audit committee with few members could mean a lack of diversity of skills and 
knowledge, which may render it ineffective (Owen-Jackson, Robinson, & Shelton, 
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2009). Raghunandan and Rama (2007), Sharma, Naiker, and Lee (2009) and 
Rainsbury, Bradbury and Cahan (2009) stated that the quality of the audit committee 
affects the quality of corporate financial reporting. In addition, they stated that an 
internal control system is very important to ensure the integrity of the company. The 
main activities of directors are monitoring and being responsible for the internal 
control of the company, but these tasks have been delegated to the audit committee. 
Therefore, the task of the audit committee is to provide accurate and quality financial 
statements with full disclosure to the shareholders (Sharma et al., 2009; DeZoort, 
Hermanson & Houston, 2013).  
 
Ishak, Haron, Salleh, and Rashid (2011) and Al-Matari et al. (2014) stated that there is 
a positively significant relationship between the quality of external audit and the audit 
committee on the disclosure of financial statements. Yang and Krishnan (2005) and 
Hamid et al. (2014) also claimed that an audit committee can improve an 
organization's internal control. Through this, a conclusion can be drawn that the 
control of management and monitoring by an audit committee can improve firm 
performance. 
 
Zhou, Owusu-Ansah and Maggina (2018) examine whether the characteristics of 
boards of directors and audit committees and the formation of the committees are 
associated with firm performance. Agency theory suggests that well-governed firms 
perform relatively better than their poorly-governed counterparts. However, resource 
dependency theory suggests that a board with more insider directors could have more 
expertise on how to better operate the firm, thus contributing to better firm 
performance. They use a sample of firms publicly traded on the Athens Stock 
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Exchange during 2008 to 2012 and found that large-sized boards performed better, 
but firms having more independent board members performed poorly. 
2.8.3.2 Audit Committee Independence 
An audit committee comprising independent directors is seen as being better able to 
assess the quality of corporate practices and financial reports and the ratio of 
independent commissioners on the committee can measure overall audit committee 
independence (Kang & Kim, 2011). Such independence is viewed as important. For 
example, Swamy (2011) found that audit committee independence guarantees that 
corporate governance practices are being adhered to. Abdullah, Shah, and Hassan 
(2008) stated that the audit committee’s independence plays an important role in 
minimizing financial fraud. They found that a lack of independent members on an 
audit committee and the presence of inside directors can lead to a higher incidence of 
financial fraud. Therefore, an audit committee with more independent members is 
viewed as being more independent compared to an audit committee having a higher 
number of inside directors (Hamid et al., 2014). 
 
Independence is an important element of the audit committee. However, studies on 
audit committee independence have produced contradictory results. Al-Matari et al. 
(2014) argued that no relationship exists between the independence of audit 
committee board members and firm performance. Conversely, Klein (2002) claimed 
that the outside directors on the audit committee can enhance firm performance and 
bring about high shareholder returns. Chan and Li (2008) found that the presence of 
independent audit committee and expert members can increase firm performance. 
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Many researchers have examined audit committee independence and firm 
performance. Owen-Jakson et al. (2009) found that audit committee independence and 
audit committee meetings have a negative relationship with financial fraud. Abbott, 
Parker and Peters (2004) stated that audit committee independence is negatively 
associated with misstatements. Furthermore, they found that audit committee size and 
audit committee expertise have a significant and negative relationship with firm 
performance.  
2.8.3.3 Frequency of Audit Committee Meetings 
The audit committee oversees and monitors the financial reporting process, internal 
control of the company and external audit. The audit committee is the liaison between 
management and the external auditor (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & Lapides, 
2000). The existence of an audit committee is a characteristic of GCG as stipulated in 
the Decree of the Board of Business and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(Bapepam-LK, 2014) through Kep-29/PM/2004. In carrying out its functions, duties 
and responsibilities, an audit committee holds meetings periodically as determined by 
the audit committee itself. In these meetings, the audit committee may review 
financial reporting accuracy and/or discuss significant issues. 
 
Several scholars have studied frequency of meetings and firm performance. Al-Matari 
et al. (2014) indicated that a greater frequency of meetings can decrease incidences of 
financial reporting issues and improve the quality of external audit. Therefore, it is 
important for audit committees to meet frequently to do their job well. Raghunandan 
and Rama (2007) argued that a high frequency of audit committee meetings would be 
more effective and can enhance firm performance (Abbott et al., 2004). A larger audit 
committee will be inefficient if they do not know the problems and job description of 
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each member of the board; therefore, such an audit committee should have frequent 
meetings (Beasley et al., 2000; Aldamen, Duncan, Kelly, McNamara, & Nagel, 2012). 
Sharma, Naiker, and Lee (2009) found a negative relationship between audit 
committee meetings and multiple directors and audit committee independence. On the 
other hand, they found a positive relationship between high risk of misreporting in 
financial reports and audit committee size, managerial and institutional ownership, 
board independence and board expertise. The existing regulations do not mention 
explicitly the number of audit committee meetings that should be held in a year. 
Hence, no relevant guidelines exist for the number of meetings that should be held.  
 
Previous studies have tested factors related to the frequency of audit committee 
meetings (Mendez & Garcia, 2007). Raghunandan and Rama (2007) and Sharma et al. 
(2009) provided evidence that firm size, number of audit committee members, 
stakeholder percentage, board size, expertise or accounting and finance committee 
competencies have a relationship with frequency of audit committee meetings. 
 
To the researcher’s knowledge, studies in Indonesia related to determinants of the 
frequency of audit committee meetings are limited. The absence of definitive 
guidelines and a lack of research evidence related to determinants of the frequency of 
audit committee meetings have motivated this study to examine the determinants of 
the frequency of audit committee meetings of companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. 
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2.9 Firm Performance 
The implementation of GCG is expected to enhance firm performance. Thus, 
corporate governance is an important determinant of a firm’s performance (Harjito & 
Singapurwoko, 2014; Itan, 2015). Companies should continuously evaluate their 
performance to determine whether or not they have achieved the best interests of 
stakeholders and the goals of the company.  
 
A better governance structure can impact firm performance in several ways. Firstly, 
with good corporate governance structure in place, the expropriation of company 
resources by management is less likely to take place. Therefore, with improved 
governance, efficient utilization of company resources can result in higher operating 
income and firm performance. Secondly, investors will be more confident to invest in 
companies with a good corporate structure and will be more inclined to pay a 
premium for companies with a high governance standard (Arifai et al., 2018). 
This current study uses two approaches that are usually used to determine firm 
performance: market and accounting-based approaches. The market approach proxies 
are Tobin’s Q and ROE. The accounting approach uses ROE as a proxy to determine 
firm performance. 
 
Itan (2015) explained the difference between accounting approach and market 
approach as proxies for firm performance. First, the accounting approach is 
backward-looking and market approach is forward-looking. Second, the accounting 
approach deals with the behavior of accountants in setting up accounting standards 
based on their profession while the market approach deals with community of 
investors constrained by their optimism and pessimism. 
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The firm performance indicators in this study are Tobin’s Q and ROE. Based on 
suggestions in previous research, multiple measures can give a more accurate 
description of firm performance (Rechner & Dalton, 1991). Cochran and Wood 
(1984) claimed that although there is no consensus as to what constitutes proper 
measurement of financial performance, such measures fall into two broad categories 
namely, accounting returns and investor returns. 
 
2.9.1 Market Approach 
2.9.1.1 Tobin’s Q (Q) 
 
Tobin's Q is one of the proxies for profitability that is often used as a firm 
performance measurement in studying corporate governance (Amran & Che-Ahmad, 
2010; Yasser, 2011; Itan, 2015). Tobin’s Q is an indicator of firm performance 
because investors usually use it to measure firm performance. Tobin’s Q is measured 
by market equity value and debt divided by total assets. In Indonesia, the market 
equity value is the value of share price at the fiscal year end. 
2.9.2 Accounting Approach 
2.9.2.1 Return on Equity (ROE) 
 
Amran and Che-Ahmad (2011) stated that ROE is a metric used by several 
researchers as a proxy for firm performance. ROE is defined as net income divided by 
shareholders’ equity (Yasser, 2011; Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2011; Miller & Breton-
Miller, 2006). 
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2.10 Conclusion 
This chapter reviews literature on mechanisms of corporate governance, namely, the 
attributes of the board of directors, the attributes of the board of commissioners, audit 
committee characteristics and the performance of family and non-family controlled 
firms. In addition, this chapter considers whether corporate governance positively 
influences firm performance. The development of hypotheses related to factors 
discussed that affect corporate governance mechanisms is discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter explains the theoretical framework and hypotheses development based 
on the related theories and empirical evidence discussed in Chapter 2. This study 
proposes three equations as follows: Equation 1 examines the effect of corporate 
governance mechanisms (attributes of board of directors, attributes of board of 
commissioners and audit committee characteristics) on firm performance by using a 
sample of family-controlled firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (excluding 
banks). Equation 2 focuses on the effect of mechanisms of corporate governance 
(attributes of the board of directors, attributes of the board of commissioners and audit 
committee characteristics) on firm performance by using a sample of non-family 
controlled businesses on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (excluding banks). Twelve 
hypotheses are developed for this study, with one attribute being examined under one 
hypothesis.  
 
This chapter is organized into six sections. Section 3.2 discusses the theories 
underlying corporate governance. Section 3.3 presents the theoretical framework of 
this study. Next, section 3.4 explains the theoretical perspectives and empirical 
evidence for hypothesis H1: testing the relationship between family and non-family 
controlled companies on the Indonesian Stock Exchange and firm performance. 
Section 3.5 explains the corporate governance mechanism attributes that are presented 
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in Section 3.5.1 and which discuss hypotheses H2, H3, H4, H5, H6 and H7, focusing on 
board size, board qualifications, frequency of board meetings, board expertise, board 
diversity and managerial ownership that are grouped under the attributes of the board 
of directors. Section 3.5.2 discusses hypotheses H8 and H9, that are related to size of 
the board of commissioners and independence (unaffiliated directors) grouped under 
the attributes of the board of commissioners. Next, Section 3.5.3 focuses on audit 
committee characteristics and hypotheses H10, H11 and H12 related to audit committee 
size, audit committee independence and the frequency of audit committee meetings. 
Section 3.6 concludes the chapter.  
 
3.2 Theories Underlying Corporate Governance 
Top managers of a public listed company are usually not the owners of the company. 
In fact, most top managers have only a small portion of the shares in the companies 
that they manage. The real owners (principals) elect a board of directors who hire a 
manager as their agent to run the daily operations of the company. Once directors are 
employed, questions such as, can this director be trusted and are they putting 
themselves or the company first, often arise (Donaldson & Davis, 1994). Several 
theories have been developed to answer these questions. For this study agency theory 
and stewardship theory will be utilised. 
3.2.1 Agency Theory 
Most of the corporate governance research is based on the agency theory. Corporate 
governance focuses on the separation of control and ownership that leads to the 
principal-agent problem, due to dispersed ownership in the modern company (Berle & 
Means, 1932). Darmadi (2013) and Itan (2015) looked at corporate governance as a 
79 
 
mechanism, in which the board, as a group of important people in the company, can 
minimize the problems caused by the relationship between agents and principals. In 
this context, the agent is a manager while the directors and commissioners serve as 
part of the monitoring mechanism (Harjito & Singapurwoko, 2014). 
 
Majority shareholders are a group of people or an individual that hold the majority of 
shares of a firm, while minority shareholders are those persons holding a very few 
shares of the firm. The majority shareholders are having higher voting power and can 
take any decision in favour of their benefits, which hampers the interests of the 
minority shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). This kind of agency problem prevails 
in a country or company, where the ownership is concentrated in the hands of few 
persons or with the family owners, then the minority shareholders find it is difficult to 
protect their interests or wealth (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). 
 
Hamid et al. (2014) stated agency problems arise due to conflicts between the desires 
of the owner of the company (majority shareholder) and the minority shareholders. 
Therefore, the structure of ownership is regarded as crucial in addressing the agency 
problem. A good ownership structure will reflect good firm performance because the 
managers are competent and have sufficient authority to carry out their duties (Harjito 
& Singapurwoko, 2014). 
 
Previous studies (Siregar, 2008; Siregar & Sidharta, 2008; Sanjaya, 2011) have found 
that managerial ownership of companies on the Indonesian Stock Exchange is 
concentrated ownership. According to Siregar (2008), 99% of firms listed on the 
Indonesian Stock Exchange have a concentrated ownership structure. Meanwhile, 
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continental data of Asia as a whole shows 93% of public companies in the continent 
are concentrated and owned by the controlling shareholders (Claessens et al., 2000). 
The findings are consistent with Siregar and Sidharta (2008) and Sanjaya (2011), who 
claimed that general companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange are mostly 
concentrated ownerships. Shleifer and Vishny (1997), La Porta et al., (1999) and 
Claessens et al. (2000) also found that the concentration of control rights among 
controlling shareholders may lead to the expropriation of minority shareholders. The 
adverse effect of control rights on firm performance is in line with the argument that 
major shareholders will be able to manage the company to obtain a private benefit. 
Therefore, when control is exerted by the major controlling shareholder, the 
controlling shareholder will seek to allocate the company’s resources to generate the 
private benefits. Controlling shareholders could use the implementation of policies 
and incentives to obtain private benefits over the minority shareholders. Therefore, 
the presence of agency theory Type II takes place in this situation. 
3.2.2 Stewardship Theory 
The stewardship theory presents that the manager is considered as a good steward, 
whereby he or she will work in the best interests of the owner (Donaldson & Davis, 
1994). Further, the stewardship theory is based on social psychology that focuses on 
the behaviour of directors. The behavior of a steward is pro-organization and he/she 
acts in a collectivistic manner with high utility for the company. Managers acting as 
stewards will not seek their personal interests because they prefer to achieve 
organizational goals (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). The non-financial 
factor is the motivation of the managers, and managers use their authority to achieve 
higher profit and benefits for the firm. 
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The stewardship theory posits a strong significant relationship between the manager 
and the objectives of the company; thus, the manager will protect and maximize the 
wealth of shareholders through the company's performance. From the perspective of 
the stewardship theory, the roles of Chairman and CEO are separated (Clarke, 2004). 
 
The stewardship theory assumes that stewards behave as trustworthy and focus on the 
collective good of the constituents in the firm regardless of the manager’s self-interests 
(Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1994). The possibility of moral hazard is 
minimized because the steward decides to work on behalf of the owners; thus, the risk 
differential between owner and manager that drives the hidden actions of managers in the 
principal-agent model is minimised by the steward-manager. The steward-manager 
believes ownership will be equitably shared the residual claims from the firm; thus, 
maximization of those claims for the owner maximizes the share of the steward-manager. 
In other words, there is no misalignment between the interests of managers and owners 
because the stewards are believe to pursuit of what is best for the organization is what is 
best for their constituents and themselves (Davis et al., 1997).  
 
Therefore, for this study, agency and stewardship theories are two fundamental theories in 
answering the research questions. It is expected that the independent variables (board of 
director attributes, board of commissioner attributes and audit committee characteristics) 
influence firm performance. It is claimed that when managerial ownership is high and 
concentrated, the higher benefits and costs are borne by the same owner (Demsetz & 
Lehn, 1985). Further, family-controlled companies usually invest most of their private 
wealth in the company, which is not well-diversified. Thus, families are more concerned 
with the firm’s survival because the risks are not fully diversified and have a strong 
incentive to monitor management closely. Monitoring tends to be lower in companies 
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controlled by family than non-family controlled companies (Fleming et al., 2005). The 
controlling shareholders will serve the interests of minority shareholders as well as their 
own interest (Schulze et al., 2001).  
 
3.3 Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework discusses corporate governance internal mechanisms 
(attributes of the board of directors, attributes of the board of commissioners and audit 
committee characteristics) for family-controlled firms and non-family controlled firms 
in relationship to firm performance as suggested in this study. 
 
3.3.1  Proposed Theoretical Framework 
Many previous researchers have examined and explained the relationship between 
mechanisms of corporate governance in family and non-family controlled firms and 
firm performance globally. However, some studies in the context of Indonesia lack 
focus, especially for corporate governance practices in family and non-family 
controlled firms, which may enhance firm performance. This study’s model is 
developed from the core research question, i.e., how do corporate governance 
mechanisms (attributes of the board of directors, attributes of the board of 
commissioners and audit committee characteristics) in family and non-family 
controlled companies on the Indonesian Stock Exchange affect firm performance? 
 
Family-controlled companies are likely to be more concerned with their continuance 
as a going concern because family companies invest most of their private wealth in 
their company, which is not well-diversified. Therefore, family companies have a 
strong incentive to monitor the daily operations of the company. Further, monitoring 
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costs tend to be lower if a company is controlled by the family compared to non-
family controlled companies (Fleming et al., 2005). The controlling shareholders will 
be concerned with the interests of minority shareholders as with their own interests 
(Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001), and exploitative behavior of agents 
towards the principals (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). As a steward, the family- 
controlled companies are more concerned with the interests of the company and 
stakeholders rather than with their personal interests. Therefore, stewards will protect 
and maximize shareholders’ interests by increasing firm performance (Eddleston & 
Kellermans, 2007). 
 
The model is presented in Figure 3.1. The model presents a hypothesized linkage 
between attributes of the board of directors, attributes of the board of commissioners, 
audit committee characteristics of family and non-family controlled firms and 
performance. 
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Figure 3.1. Theoretical framework for two-tier board system and audit committee 
characteristics and firm performance 
 
 
 
The theoretical framework in this study is based on the agency theory and stewardship 
theory. Previous studies (Darmadi, 2012; Yopie & Itan, 2016) have attempted to 
validate either the agency or the stewardship theory as “one of the best ways” to 
corporate governance, which assumes that all managers are either agents or stewards, 
respectively. This approach has produced mixed findings. Therefore, this study  
utilizes both theories (agency theory and stewardship theory) when studying corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
TWO-TIER BOARD SYSTEM 
 
Board of Director Attributes 
- Board Size (H2) 
- Board Qualification (H3) 
- Board Meeting (H4) 
- Board Expertise (H5) 
- Females on the Board (H6) 
- Managerial Ownership (H7) 
 
 
Board of Commissioner Attributes 
- Board Size (H8) 
- Board Independence (Unaffiliated) 
(H9) 
 
 
Audit Committees Characteristics 
- Audit Committee Size (H10) 
- Audit Committee Independence (H11) 
- Audit Committee Meeting (H12) 
 
Control Variables 
- Debt  
- Firm Age  
- Firm Size 
- Industry Type 
Firm Performance 
Accounting-based 
- Return On Equity 
 
Market-based 
- Tobin’s Q (Q) 
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Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that legal protection and concentrated ownerships 
are important ways of mitigating agency problems. One of the proposed methods of 
controlling agency problems is to link managerial compensation to the performance of 
company, which would give incentives for managers to maximize shareholder value 
(Holmstrom, 1979; Murphy, 1999). However, compensation alone cannot achieve 
good corporate governance (Frydman & Saks, 2010). In addition, Bebchuk and Fried 
(2004) argue that compensation is related to managers’ ability to extract rent. Other 
research focuses on role of governance structure in the reduction of agency problems. 
These studies attempt to provide empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of 
governance structures by measuring the effect of these governance structures on firm 
performance.  
 
On the other hand, Jensen and Meckling (1976), the progenitors of the agency theory, 
the issue of Type II agency problem occurs between majority shareholders and 
minority shareholders (Ratnawati & Hamid, 2015). The effect of control rights on 
firm performance is in line with the argument that majority shareholders will be able 
to manage the company to obtain private benefits. Therefore, when control is exerted 
by the majority shareholders, the controlling shareholders will seek to allocate the 
company’s resources to generate private benefits (Ratnawati, Hamid & Popoola, 
2016).  
 
Darmadi (2012) claimed that executive directors have higher value for boards because 
they provide the skills, experience, expertise and knowledge in a company and they 
are better in evaluating the directors due to their familiarity with fair decisions. 
Previous researchers, such as Harjito and Singapurwoko (2014), have suggested that 
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the agency theory is an individualistic utility motivation resulting in divergent of 
interests between majority shareholders and minority shareholders (Type II). Thus, 
additional theories are needed to explain the relationship between the interests of 
majority and minority shareholders as viewed from non-economic assumptions 
(Doucouliagos, 1994). 
 
The stewardship theory provides another model of management, where the agent or 
manager is expected to be a good manager who will try his/her best to achieve the 
interests of shareholders and the goals of the company. The stewardship theory 
focuses on the behavior of the directors. The characteristics of stewardship behaviour 
include pro-organization, collectivism and a high usability for the company 
(Jaskiewicz & Klein, 2007; Harjito & Singapurwoko, 2014). The stewardship theory 
looks at the strong relationship between the manager and the success of the company, 
wherein the manager will protect and maximize the wealth of shareholders through 
the company's performance.  
 
Therefore, for the purposes of this study, both the agency theory and stewardship 
theory are used in terms of answering the research questions. This study expects that 
the independent variables (family-controlled companies), attributes of the board of 
directors (board size, board qualification, board meeting, board expertise, female on 
board, managerial ownership), attributes of the board of commissioners (board 
commissioner size, independent of board commissioner) and audit committee 
characteristics (audit committee size, audit committee independence and audit 
committee meeting frequency) influence firm performance (measured by Tobin’s Q 
and ROE).  
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3.4 Family and Non-family Firm Performance 
There are several definitions for a family business in studies (La Porta et al., 1999; 
Itan, 2015). This current study uses a family director or a group of member families 
which have minimum ownership of 20% in the Indonesian setting. Moreover, based 
on Indonesian Capital Market Law, Article (1) 1995, a family director who holds at 
least 20% shareholding of a company is a substantial shareholder. La Porta et al. 
(1999) found that a shareholder holding a minimum of 20% shares can control a 
company effectively. 
 
From the agency theory perspective, family-controlled firms have incentives to 
minimize agency costs because the owners have high concentrated ownership (Yopie 
& Itan, 2016). As family-controlled firms have concentrated shareholdings, they have 
substantial reasons to increase firm value and minimize agency conflicts (Martinez, 
Stohr, & Quiroga, 2007; Harjito & Singapurwoko, 2014). In family companies, the 
family invests the family’s wealth into the company; therefore, families have a strong 
incentive to control the daily operations and manager’s activities to minimize the 
agency costs. However, the problem between the owners and managers is difficult to 
avoid in the family-controlled firms. Villalonga and Amit (2006) found that the 
agency costs in family-controlled companies can arise between major family owners 
and minority owners. 
 
The stewardship theory focuses on the behavior of the directors. Darmadi (2012) 
claimed that the managers are trustworthy individuals to manage the company in 
terms of achieving the company’s goals. Because the family directors spend their 
working lives in the company that they manage, they are expected to understand the 
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condition of company better than non-family directors; thus, they can make superior 
and right decisions. 
 
The stewardship theory considers a strong relationship between the agent and 
company’s goals; in this view, a manager will protect shareholders’ interests and 
maximize the wealth of these shareholders by enhancing firm performance (Clarke, 
2004). It has been proposed that a sense of psychology in family ownership can 
motivate and enhance firm performance (Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2011). The 
stewardship theory has been practiced successfully in family companies (Corbetta & 
Salvato, 2004). 
 
Hence, based on the arguments of the agency and stewardship theories, this study 
expects family-controlled companies to have higher performance than non-family 
controlled companies. Family control is believed to lead a family- controlled company 
to outperform a non-family controlled company because of its uniqueness and the 
family company spirit. This spirit make companies achieve a competitive advantage 
and have a higher sense of belonging that make owners become more concerned with 
the survival of the company. Hence, they will control their companies effectively 
(Berg & Bart-Jan, 2014). The presence of the family spirit to outperform will make 
performance of family-controlled firms better than non-family controlled firms. This 
family spirit and effective control are reflected in the company's strategy and can 
generate higher profitability (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000; Sujoko & Soebiantoro, 
2007). 
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In addition, family-controlled companies are motivated to achieve long-term company 
viability by making long-term investments with the expectations of returns over time 
(Ismail & Mahfodz, 2009). In turn, this perspective and the long-term investments 
improve the reputation of the company and make investors feel safe and confident to 
invest. Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
 H1: Family-controlled companies have better firm performance than non-
family controlled companies. 
 
3.5 Corporate Governance Mechanism Attributes 
The structure of the board of directors is an important factor in enhancing firm 
performance in Indonesia. An effective board will be able to enhance firm 
performance. This study examines the attributes and characteristics of the two-tier 
board system, namely, the board of directors (board size, board qualification, board 
meetings, board expertise, board diversity and managerial ownership), board of 
commissioners (board size and board independence) and audit committee 
characteristics (audit committee size, audit committee independence and audit 
committee meetings) as the hypotheses variables. 
 
3.5.1 Attributes of the Board of Directors 
3.5.1.1 Board Size 
 
Several previous studies (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Daily et al., 1999; Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2006; Darmadi, 2013) have examined the role of board size, but have 
opposing conclusions. Jensen (1993), Haniffa, and Hudaib (2006) and Yermack 
(1996) stated that to ensure board effectiveness, board size should not be large, while 
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some feel that a smaller board can better enhance firm performance. The agency 
theory argues that smaller boards can reduce agency costs in a company. For example, 
Borokhovich, Brunarski, Donahue, and Harman (2006) found that a small number of 
directors is more effective than a large number of directors in terms of decisions 
made. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) argued that a small board makes it easier to monitor 
each member and make decisions quickly.  
 
However, various studies (Pfeffer, 1972; Goodstein, Gautam & Boeker, 1994; 
Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Klein, 2002; Adam & 
Mehran, 2003; Anderson, Ronald, & Thomas, 2000; Coles, Daniel & Naveen, 2008) 
have argued that a greater number of directors contributes to increased firm 
performance. Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) found that a large board contributes 
more advantages in terms of problem-solving capabilities, i.e., by being able to gather 
more information that can provide potential solutions and critical opinions to correct 
any errors. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) claimed that a bigger board can help a company 
to provide diverse resources to enhance firm performance. Thus, larger boards are 
seen as providing effective oversight of management and different views to increase 
firm performance. Moreover, larger boards can be beneficial in terms of greater 
expertise and networking among directors (Goodstein et al., 1994).  
 
For family-controlled companies, a mixed argument exists about board size in terms 
of increasing firm performance. Several researchers (Pfeffer, 1972; Pearce & Zahra, 
1992; Klein, 2002; Adam & Mehran, 2003; Anderson et al., 2003; Coles et al., 2008) 
have explained that large boards can provide useful information and advice to 
management for monitoring the operations of the company well. Klein (2002) stated 
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that a company needs guidance and advice for the CEO to manage the company’s 
operations. Also, a larger board of directors can help a company to understand the 
firm’s environment (Pfeffer, 1972; Pearce & Zahra, 1992). Family businesses need a 
large board to better manage the firm and achieve good performance. 
 
In contrast, Chen et al. (2008) claimed that family-controlled companies prefer 
smaller boards. Mishra and Ratti (2011) found that a large number of directors in 
family-controlled companies are not as efficient as small number of directors. Mak 
and Yuanto (2004) evidenced that a smaller board shows a higher Tobins’ Q value, 
meaning small boards can enhance firm performance in the case of Singaporean and 
Malaysian companies. Amran and Che-Ahmad (2010) found that non-family 
controlled firms with a smaller board size have better performance than companies 
with a larger board size. 
 
Based on the stewardship theory, the directors in family-controlled firms normally are 
family members. When board of directors reinforce in family-controlled companies, 
the family can rely on the board for guidance, conflict management and decision-
making (Yopie & Itan, 2016). This can alleviate the stress that is often placed on the 
individuals to overseeing a family-owned business. The board of directors task to 
resolve various issues and providing guidance, with the ultimate success of the 
business as a top priority. Family members can rely on the board to make unbiased 
business decisions that may otherwise be impossible to reach. Therefore, the 
argument is made that small family boards prevent conflicts in decision-making (Itan, 
2015). Jensen (1993) argued that a small board makes communicating and decision-
making easier and helps prevent conflicts between shareholders and management 
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(Lipton & Lorsch, 1992) compared to a large board. O’Reilly, Caldwell, and Barnett 
(1989) explained that a large board will reduce effectiveness of interpersonal 
communication and thus cause problems and conflicts between management and 
shareholders. Itan (2015) argued that a small board in a company can increase firm 
performance better than larger boards. Therefore, based on the discussion above, this 
study hypothesizes that: 
H2a: There is a negative relationship between board size and firm performance 
for family-controlled companies. 
 
For non-family controlled firms in Indonesia, based on the agency theory perspective 
on board size, this study expects that non-family controlled companies with large 
boards can contribute to firm performance. Large boards can help to monitor the 
operations of the company and reduce conflicting shareholders’ interests (Singh & 
Harianto, 1989). Hermalin and Weishbach (2003) argued that members of the board 
have incentives to remain independent and that the directors are part of the market 
solution to the contracting problems within most organizations. Baidu and Appiah 
(2017) found that a large board can help the company to reduce agency problems and 
monitor management. Others have posited that a large board can provide a diversity 
of views and opinions based on the directors’ own backgrounds. Thus, different 
directors can contribute and provide different opinions and advice to enhance 
operations of the company. Further, it will be easy for large boards in a company to 
set up committees to delegate duties. Therefore, this study hypothesizes that: 
H2b: There is a positive relationship between board size and firm performance 
for non-family controlled companies. 
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3.5.1.2 Board Qualifications 
 
A board acts as an internal corporate governance and control system in a business 
(Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). The Code (2006) in Indonesia recommends that 
members of the board of directors should utilize their abilities and qualities, such as 
education, knowledge, skills, professionalism, experience and integrity to carry out 
their job and duties. Knowledge of taxation, finance and accounting, marketing, 
information and development systems, legal issues and other related areas are needed 
to make effective decisions to achieve better firm performance. The qualifications of 
board members will positively and significantly influence management decisions that 
will then impact on firm performance (Nicholson & Kiel, 2004; Fairchild & Li, 2005; 
Adams & Ferreira, 2007). 
 
Phan (2016) examines the relationship between board of director’s education and firm 
performance on a European dataset over the period from 1999 to 2013, employing a 
well-developed dynamic panel generalized method of moment estimator to alleviate 
endogeneity issue in corporate governance study. He found that no significant 
relationship between board education and firm performance when return on asset as a 
measurement. 
 
Several studies (Inmyxai & Takahashi, 2009; Yusuf, 1995) have explained that level 
of education is representative of the knowledge and skills of directors. A high level of 
education of board directors can increase firm performance. A CEO who has 
professional skills and high education can provide creative solutions and guidance for 
the company to solve complex problems (Bantel & Jackson, 1989). Yasser (2011) 
examined the influence of the qualification of directors on firm performance. He 
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proved that directors with higher education contribute to firm value. Therefore, firms 
with a majority of highly qualified board members can increase firm performance 
(Hamid et al., 2014). 
 
Based on the stewardship theory perspective, family directors are expected to be 
equipped with management knowledge and skills for improving firm performance. 
Family directors are expected to understand financial problems more than the outside 
educated directors. Further, Sebora and Wakefield (1998) argued that family directors 
are expected to have critical thinking in terms of solving problems and situations that 
arise in companies. 
 
In family-controlled companies, education and skills of family directors may not 
really influence firm performance. A family director who has technical knowledge 
can contribute to the monitoring of a firm more efficiently and effectively by using 
his/her abilities and experience which cannot be found in formal education. Amran 
and Che-Ahmad (2011) examined the relationship of the educational levels of board 
members with Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE, earnings per share (EPS) and OCF as proxies 
of firm performance. They found that there is no relationship between board 
members’ education and firm performance measured with Tobin’s Q and OCF. 
However, a positive relationship exists with firm performance for ROA, ROE and 
EPS.  
 
This study expects that lower educated directors in family-controlled companies may 
increase firm performance. In family-controlled companies, the directos who sitting in 
the board is family member and have crucial influence with business, thus, educated 
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director may not be needed in family companies. Based on stewardship theory 
perspective, Indonesian family-controlled firms may have concerned with higher cost 
when to hire educated director and families need to borne the costs by themselves. 
Furthermore, family companies put more weight on business succession. Therefore, a 
good education is not crucial for family directors to maintain the company. Hence, it 
is hypothesized that: 
 H3a: There is a negative relationship between the educational qualifications of 
board members and firm performance for family-controlled companies. 
 
For non-family controlled companies, the background of directors helps influence 
their knowledge. If board members have appropriate skills, knowledge and 
experience, they will have the ability to better manage the business and make business 
decisions. Specifically, having knowledge in business and economics is beneficial. 
Ultimately this will affect the value of the company. Santrock (1995) stated that the 
knowledge of board members supports them in reaching a higher career path. 
 
Nurudin (2004) mentioned that a study by Harvard University in the US reveals that 
success is not solely defined by experience and technical skills (hard skills), but by 
soft skills as well. The results reveal that success is only determined by approximately 
18% of hard skills and the remaining 82% is with soft skills. Hard skills are skills that 
can produce something visible and immediate. Unlike hard skills, soft skills are 
invisible and not immediate.  
 
Based on agency theory perspective, the minority shareholder tends to prefer hiring 
educated director to manage and run the business. They belived that education is an 
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investment in knowledge that increases firm productivity (Schultz, 1971). Further, 
Schultz (1993) pointed out that the evolution of knowledge contributed decisively in 
the growth rates of organizations. Therefore, from the literature discussed above, 
board qualification is an important attribute that influences firm performance. Without 
knowledgeable human resources, firms cannot survive, Hence, it is hypothesized that: 
H3b: There is a positive relationship between the educational qualifications of 
board directors and firm performance for non-family controlled companies. 
 
3.5.1.3 Frequency of Board Meetings 
 
Lawler, Finegold, Benson, and Conger (2002) found that effective meeting of 
directors have a positive impact on company performance. For example, Conger, 
Finegold, and Lawler (1998) stated that frequency of board meetings is an important 
factor in improving the effectiveness of a board. Many researchers have conducted 
studies on the frequency of meetings and believe that regular board meetings can 
improve effectiveness of boards (Letendre, 2004). Zahra and Pearce (1989) explained 
that regular board meetings can contribute to successful board performance. That is 
because through regular board meetings, directors can perform their duties of 
protecting shareholders’ interests (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Byrne, 1996).  
 
Empirical evidence has found positive results that support board of director activity 
and firm performance (Brick & Chidambaran, 2010; García-Ramos & García-Olalla 
2011; Vafeas 1999). Brick and Chidambaran (2010) suggest that the implementation 
of good corporate governance codes increases the pressure on firms, which is 
reflected where board of director have more meetings. The study of Vafeas (1999) 
found that board of directors that meet frequently were less valued by the stock 
97 
 
market. However, this association disappeared due to the improvement in firm 
performance after years of board of director increased their meetings (Gomez, Lagos 
& Betancourt, 2017). 
 
These improvements are more pronounced for firms with previous low firm 
performance and firms are not dedicated to execute corporate control of their 
operations. Jackling and Johl (2009) did not find any relation between the number of 
board of director meetings and firm performance in Indian firms. The insignificance 
of this finding may suggest that the relation between the number of meetings and 
performance can be more complex than a linear relation or the possibility that the 
increase of board of director meeting comes as a reaction to poor firm performance, 
which in turn affects economic performance in the following years (Vafeas, 1999). 
According to the recommendations of corporate governance codes and from the 
perspective of the stewardship theory, board of directors are groups of competent 
people that help managers to improve their decision processes, through their 
experiences, competences and different approaches that contribute to the debate in 
board of director meetings (Minichilli et al., 2009). Therefore, there are reasons to 
believe that board of meetings may be an important resource, and the frequency of 
board of director meetings can influence firm performance. On the contrary, a high 
frequency of board of director meetings could also be the result of board of director 
poor performance, being detrimental to firm economic results (Gomez et al., 2017). 
Based on discussion above, it is hypothesized that: 
 H4a: There is a negative relationship between the frequency of board meetings 
and firm performance for family-controlled companies. 
98 
 
The Indonesia Corporate Governance Code requires the board of directors to meet 
regularly, and board meetings are a mechanism to allow directors to set business 
strategies and monitor management effectively. Lawler et al. (2002) stated that a 
company that regularly holds board meetings can reduce internal conflicts among 
directors. Additionally, Carcello and Neal (2002) stated high frequency of board 
meetings will influence the quality of audit work, which in turn, can improve firm 
performance and protect shareholders’ interests. Vafeas (2005) stated that the 
frequency of board meetings is a valid measurement of the intensity of board activity 
and the relationship between the frequency of board meetings and firm performance. 
 
In non-family controlled companies, the corporate governance perspective posits that 
the frequency of board meetings is an attribute that can be used to measure the 
effectiveness of a board in a company (Vafeas, 1999). Every board member should 
attend meetings regularly to monitor management and discuss, set strategies, solve 
problems and share ideas and views to improve profits (Byrne, 1996). Regular board 
meetings can protect the shareholders’ interests and enhance performance. Horvath 
and Spirollari (2012) claimed that a significant relationship exists between the 
frequency of board meetings and firm performance. They found that low frequency of 
board meetings is related to low price-to-book value, which is caused by a weakness 
in communication among the board of directors. Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
H4b: There is a positive relationship between the frequency of board meetings 
and firm performance for non-family controlled companies. 
3.5.1.4 Board Expertise 
 
A company needs experts and qualified board members for decision-making. An 
expert is important for a company to monitor the management because experts have 
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experience and skills to solve complex problems (Yasser, 2011). Experts on the board 
are expected to use their ability to set strategies to improve firm performance. Ingley 
and Van Der Walt (2001) stated that expert and skilful directors may provide a 
strategic link to different external resources. The higher experience and skills of board 
members would ensure an effective board, which requires, “high levels of intellectual 
ability, experience, soundness of judgement and integrity” (Hilmer, 1998, p. 62). The 
revised Code of Corporate Governance (2006) in Indonesia also suggests that 
appointments to the board should consider relevant skills, knowledge, expertise, 
experience and professionalism when appointing directors. 
 
An expert is an individual who sits as a director, with great experience, skills, 
technical knowledge and ability in a particular area. Fairchild and Li (2005) argued 
that companies are looking for expert directors to monitor and control the 
management because expert directors have the necessary skills, experience and 
qualifications to handle the company effectively. Hillman et al. (2000) stated that 
experts in specific areas, such as in taxation, costing, financing, consulting, 
accounting and law, can support directors in decisions made. Therefore, board 
expertise may positively influence firm performance. Agrawal and Chadha (2005) 
found that directors having a CPA, CFA or similar professional qualification can 
prevent any earnings restatements. 
 
In line with the stewardship theory, stewards are seen to be important for increasing 
firm performance because the experts cum managers act as stewards that strive for the 
benefit of the company. An expert professional director may be highly effective in 
counselling role due to his/her industry contacts, skills, specialized knowledge and 
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experiences. Board expertise is an important board attribute that can help companies 
to achieve success. In Indonesian Codes, expert directors are needed to manage 
company operations and give advice on firm performance.  
 
Johannisson and Huse (2000) stated that expert directors have a positive relationship 
with family firm performance. Many companies seek expert directors to manage their 
companies (Fairchild & Li, 2005). However, sometimes, it is difficult to attract 
professionals to sit on family-controlled companies. Currently Indonesian family 
directors are in their second or third generations. Thus, those family directors have 
significant influence on the business as compared to outside expert directors because 
they have different aims for family directors in terms of managing a business. Hence, 
it is hypothesized that: 
 H5a: There is a negative relationship between the percentage of experts on the 
board and firm performance for family-controlled companies. 
 
Several previous researchers (Dunphy, Turner & Crawford, 1997; Hunt, 2000; 
Ljungquist, 2007; Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2011) have found that experts serving on 
the board can give ideas or strategies for management to face competition and 
increase company revenue. Board members must have the competency and capability 
to manage a company to create benefit for the company (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; 
Carver, 2002); and help in decision-making (Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2011). 
In today’s competitive business environment, a company needs qualified directors. A 
highly qualified board member can contribute to the company in terms of setting 
strategies and providing resourceful and innovative ideas to develop the firm (Amran 
& Che-Ahmad, 2010). Lawler et al. (2003) claimed that professionals can become 
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more effective strategic business partners, thus indirectly and positively influencing 
firm performance. Board expertise in areas, such as accounting, costing, financing and 
law, can specifically affect firm performance (Hillman et al., 2000). In Indonesian 
non-family companies, the main objective is to increase the shareholders’ wealth. 
Therefore, a company needs expert directors to achieve good firm performance. It is 
hypothesized that: 
 H5b: There is a positive relationship between the percentage of experts on the 
board and firm performance for non-family controlled companies. 
 
3.5.1.5 Females on the Board 
 
Board diversity provides for equitable representation on the board (Keasey, 
Thompson, & Wright, 1997), which allows access to the talents and perspectives of 
the diverse members (Pearce & Zahra, 1991; Singh & Vinicombe, 2004; Biggins, 
1999). Such diversity contributes to the company through effective, efficient and 
creativity problem-solving (Robinson & Dechant, 1997). Darmadi (2013) found that a 
lack of diversity on the board will cause a lack of critical innovation. 
 
Diversity may be measured in many ways, including age and race, but gender-based 
diversity is one of the most common. Robinson and Dechant (1997) and Alowaihan 
(2004) found that male directors outperform female directors because female directors 
lack industry experience and they tend to concentrate on less profitable sectors. Men 
seem to have higher education levels that can contribute to firm performance. There 
are different skills sets between female and male directors and bringing the different 
experiences and skills of female directors to the company would seem to lead to a 
better corporate governance system (Fondas & Sassalos, 2000). For example, female 
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directors have a more careful attitude and tend to avoid risks compared to male 
directors. Women directors do not make hurried decisions and take time to decide 
correctly (Kusumastutui et al., 2012). 
 
Shim and Eestlick (1998) found that Hispanic female directors had fewer years of 
business experience, few employees, and smaller annual sales than male directors. 
There is a significant difference between male directors and female directors with 
respect to the ratio of revenue. Despite work-life balance issues and perceptions that 
senior positions are not suited for women, several studies have shown that cultural, 
social and economic barriers are breaking down. Women usually face cultural 
obstacles to participate in family enterprises, like the challenges that women face all 
over the world.  
 
Amran and Che-Ahmad (2010) found that men have a greater chance of being the 
successor of a family firm. Male directors are expected to have the abilities, 
experience and knowledge to face competition. There is a perception that men will 
perform better than women. Moreover, men get more support from families. 
Indonesian family-controlled companies place an important role on the son as 
compared to the daughter. That is the reason why male directors succeed most in 
Indonesian family firms. Hence, it is hypothesized that: 
 H6a: There is a negative relationship between the number of female directors on 
the board and firm performance for family-controlled companies. 
 
Female directors are unique, valuable and provide different perspectives during board 
discussions with respect to achieving firm performance. Female directors who come 
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from the public sector have experiences in specific areas, such as public relations, law 
and communication, that can complement the skill areas of male directors, such as in 
human resources, accounting, operations and marketing (Zelechowski & Bilimoria, 
2004). 
 
Jamali, Safieddine, and Daouk (2007) found that female directors on a board can 
bring advantage for the firm’s governance by bringing in different skills, knowledge, 
experience, fresh ideas and perspectives to board deliberations. Bilimoria and 
Wheeler (2000) stated that female directors are normally younger than male directors 
and they may have more up-to-date ideas. 
 
In non-family businesses in Indonesia, female directors on boards contribute to a 
company by providing different opinions, knowledge and skills. Several previous 
studies (Fondas & Sassalos, 2000; Huse & Solberg, 2006) have argued that female 
directors are expected to contribute to reducing management problems. Female 
directors tend to question the conventional wisdom and are more open to discussions. 
The diverse view points by female directors can provoke lively board room 
discussions (Letendre, 2004), hence increasing the quality of decision-making. 
 
Several researchers (Carter, Simkins, & Simpsons, 2003; Bonn, 2004; Smith, Smith, 
& Verner, 2006; Sanchez & Silaghi, 2017) have found that gender diversity of the 
board can provide additional value to the company and show a positive relationship 
between the number of female directors and firm performance. Based on the 
discussion from several studies, it is hypothesized that: 
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H6b: There is a positive relationship between the number of female directors on 
the board and firm performance for non-family controlled companies. 
3.5.1.6 Managerial Ownership 
 
Managerial ownership contributes to the alignment of the different interests between 
the managers and outside shareholders (Hsu, 2010). High managerial ownership can 
minimize problems and reduce agency costs (Yasser, 2011). Managerial ownership 
helps management to improve their performance by maximising profits and making 
careful decisions, because the managers will share the profits and bear the risks of 
decisions made. These conditions can enhance the performance of a company (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). However, several previous studies (Demsetz, 1983; Fama & 
Jensen, 1983) have found that managerial ownership has a negative relationship with 
firm performance. They argued that managers may prefer non-value maximizing 
activities with a high level of managerial ownership and a high information 
asymmetrical environment.  
 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) found a linear relationship between managerial ownership 
and firm performance. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested the alignment-of-
interest hypothesis. This hypothesis posits that when management ownership 
increases, operational performance and firm value increase as well. Itan (2015) 
explained that managers who control and monitor a firm’s equity secure have the 
most favourable employment conditions. Accordingly, the directors who monitor a 
firm’s assets can potentially expropriate the benefits of outside investors by 
committing funds to non-beneficial projects that provide personal benefits (Lemmon 
& Lins, 2003). 
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Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010) examined the relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance by using Tobin’s Q in US companies from 1988 to 
2003. They argued that managerial ownership has a negative relationship with firm 
performance. Meanwhile, managers tend to decrease their ownership when a firm has 
good performance and more likely to increase their ownership when the finances of 
the company are constrained.  
 
Based on the findings in the previous studies, this study expects that managerial 
ownership has a negative impact on firm performance. At a lower level of ownership, 
the managers are motivated if they are rewarded with shares; thus, they will do their 
best to achieve the company’s goals and enhance performance. On the other hand, if 
the level of managerial ownership increases, these managers try to manipulate the 
financial report, seek personal interest and expropriate the interests of minority 
shareholders. 
 
In family-controlled companies, the stewardship theory hypothesizes that family 
ownership contributes to minimizing agency conflicts because shares owned by 
agents and agency conflicts can be monitored (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Gorriz and 
Fumas (1996) argued that when shares are concentrated in a few owners, these owners 
will minimize agency costs and carry out the entire decision process. 
 
On the other hand, the stewardship theory claims that ownership concentration may 
influence the family relationship in family-controlled companies. Corbetta and 
Salvato (2004) found that ownership concentration motivates board directors to act as 
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stewards. Moreover, family-controlled companies have special characteristics, 
including loyalty and trust (Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2011). 
 
Based on the above discussions, this study expects that managerial ownership by 
family directors has a positive relationship with firm performance. When family 
managerial ownership is low, family directors feel less responsible and do not have a 
sense of belonging. However, when the family ownership increases, the family 
directors take more effort to control and monitor the company because they feel the 
company is a part of them (Darmadi, 2012). Large family ownership in a company 
will motivate family directors to maximize their responsibility and control the 
company effectively. Thus, this study hypothesizes that: 
 H7a: There is a positive relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance for family-controlled companies. 
 
In contrast, this study predicts in non-family controlled companies, managerial 
ownership has a negative relationship with company performance. At a high level of 
managerial ownership in non-family controlled firms, firm performance will decrease 
(Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2011). When non-family directors have small ownership, 
they manage and control the company effectively, thus enhancing firm performance. 
However, when managerial ownership increases, they will prefer to seek personal 
interests rather than company’s interest. The effect of control rights on firm 
performance is in line with the argument that majority shareholders will be able to 
manage the company to obtain a private benefit (Ratnawati et al., 2016). Thus, firm 
performance will decrease. Based on the discussion above, this study hypothesizes 
that: 
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 H7b: There is a negative relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance for non-family controlled companies 
 
3.5.2 Attributes of the Board of Commissioners 
3.5.2.1 Size of the Board of Commissioners 
 
Indonesia has adopted a two-tier board system, which is a legacy of the Dutch 
colonial period. This structure separates the board membership into a board of 
commissioners who act as superintendents and set policies while directors monitor the 
daily operations of the company. The Limited Liability Company Act of 1995 states 
that the board directors and board of commissioners are appointed and dismissed by 
the general shareholders’ meeting. Therefore, boards of directors and commissioners 
must be responsible to the annual general meeting. In comparison to the boards of 
directors and commissioners in European countries, Indonesian commissioners are not 
powerful because they are not authorized to appoint or dismiss the board of directors. 
The managers do not have to be responsible to the board of commissioners. The 
implication is that the commissioners do not actually supervise the board of directors 
but instead become "friends" because they are in the same position (Harjito & 
Singapurwoko, 2014; Itan, 2015). 
 
The board of commissioners in Indonesia is known as Dewan Komisaris, and the 
Code in Indonesia requires that companies have at least three board commissioners. 
The role of the board of commissioners has been fiercely debated in previous studies. 
Singapurwoko (2013) argued that the board of commissioners can assist in taking care 
of stakeholders’ interests and the number of board commissioners’ influences firm 
performance. Though not specifically addressing the Indonesian system, the agency 
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theory might be seen as positing that the board of commissioners is an internal 
mechanism to carry out the functions of principal supervision and control of the 
behavior of management. The commissioners bridge the interests of principals and 
managers in the firm (Sembiring, 2005). Therefore, the board of commissioners plays 
an important role in monitoring and controlling the actions of managers, thus 
increasing firm performance (Saragih et al., 2012).  
 
Postma, Ees, and Sterken (2001) examined the relationship between performance and 
supervisory board in Dutch listed companies. They found that the size of the 
supervisory board does not determine firm performance. However, they found support 
for a negative relationship between the number of supervisory board members and 
firm performance. On the other hand, Bermig and Frick (2010) analyzed the effect of 
supervisory board size on performance by using 294 German listed companies for the 
period of 1998-2007. They claimed that the supervisory board seems to have no 
pronounced effect on operating performance and is negatively related to firm 
performance.  
 
In Indonesia, the board of commissioners is an important factor in enhancing 
corporate governance in a company. The board of commissioners can provide a 
company with strategic direction and help the board of directors to make decisions to 
achieve performance. From the agency theory perspective, the board of 
commissioners is an important attribute influencing firm performance (Darmadi, 
2012; Saragih et al., 2012; Singapurwoko, 2013).  
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Several previous studies (Darmadi, 2012; Saragih et al., 2012; Harjito & 
Singapurowoko, 2014; Itan, 2015) have discussed the impact of the board of 
commissioners on firm value. Harjito and Singapurowoko (2014) and Itan (2015) 
argued that a negative relationship exists between the board of commissioners and 
firm performance. They found that a large board of commissioners will decrease the 
effectiveness of a company because board commissioners have difficulties in carrying 
out their duties, including difficulties in communication and coordination among 
them. However, Saragih et al. (2012) and Darmadi (2012) claimed that a large board 
of commissioners may influence the relationship positively because they can 
effectively monitor manager’s actions, hence increasing firm performance.  
 
The board of commissioners can provide unbiased views (Darmadi, 2012; Itan, 2015) 
and bring in new ideas based on their knowledge (Singapurwoko, 2013). Some 
believe that a small board of commissioners indicates high levels of protect the 
minority shareholders (Yopie & Itan, 2016). A large board of commissioners also 
compromises familiarity with family members (Singapurwoko, 2013; Itan, 2015). 
  
Based on the stewardship theory, family members/directors who act as stewards can 
provide rich knowledge and stronger commitment to the firm than commissioners 
because family directors understand the operations of the company better as compared 
to non-executive directors (Saragih et al., 2012). Thus, family firms often choose to 
have fewer members on the board of commissioners (Surifah, 2013). This study has 
found mixed findings regarding size of board of commissioners. Therefore, it is 
hypothesized that: 
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 H8a: There is a negative relationship between the size of the board of 
commissioners and firm performance for family-controlled companies. 
 
For non-family controlled firms in Indonesia, the functions of the board of 
commissioners are to monitor and control management while running their business. 
The board of commissioners checks and balances the behavior of management (Itan, 
2015). Darmadi (2012) stated that a large number of board commissioners may 
increase the firm’s performance because they come from different backgrounds and 
have diverse expertise, characteristics and attributes which can contribute to board 
processes and decision-making, hence leading to increased firm performance. Itan 
(2015) found that non-family controlled companies need independent board 
commissioners because they can provide an unbiased opinion (Darmadi, 2012), bring 
in fresh ideas and help to make decisions based on knowledge (Saragih et al., 2012; 
Singapurwoko, 2013). Moreover, the board of commissioners is expected to provide 
abilities and expertise to improve the decision-making process (Saragih et al., 2012) 
and not to be controlled by the directors (Singapurwoko, 2013). The board of 
commissioners might be able to reduce managerial consumption and positively 
influence the decision-making of directors (Itan, 2015). Harjito and Singapurwoko 
(2014) explained that the board of commissioners is an independent board between 
companies and the external environment due to their expertise. Therefore, based on 
the above, it is hypothesized that: 
 H8b: There is a positive relationship between the size of the board of 
commissioners and firm performance for non-family controlled 
companies. 
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3.5.2.2 Independence of Board of Commissioners (Unaffiliated Directors) 
 
The Code of Corporate Governance requires at least one member of the board of 
commissioners to be independent. According to the Limited Liability Company Act 
No. 40 of 2007 (Article 120, 2nd), independent members of the board of 
commissioners (unaffiliated directors) are outsiders who are not affiliated with either 
the boards of directors or commissioners. Independent commissioners (unaffiliated 
directors) must fulfil the following criteria. They must: 1) not have any position as a 
director in any other company; 2) not be affiliated with the directors and 
commissioners; 3) not have any shares or ownership in the company either directly or 
indirectly; and 4) be an outsider. 
 
The independence of the board of commissioners in Indonesia is known as dewan 
komisaris independen. The potential impact of independent members on the board of 
commissioners may be examined through the lenses of the agency theory and 
stewardship theory. The agency theory suggests that independent commissioners are 
needed to monitor the actions of managers, thus helping the company to increase firm 
performance (Itan, 2015). For its part, these commissioners have wide networking and 
show that independence is advantageous for the company. 
 
The Code requires at least 30% of total board commissioners to be independent. 
Ramdani and Van (2009) argued that board independence can assist the board in 
taking care of stakeholders’ interests. Some researchers have found that the number of 
independent board commissioners influences firm performance. Some believe that too 
many independent commissioners are a problem. Saragih et al. (2012) claimed that a 
high proportion of independent board commissioners could create stifling strategic 
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actions, over-controlling, monitoring and lack of independence of management. Itan 
(2015) found that high proportion of independent board commissioners in Indonesian 
family companies is negatively related to firm performance. Conversely, the agency 
theory recommends that a large number of independent board commissioners can 
enhance firm performance.  
 
In family-controlled companies, Singapurwoko (2013) found that family companies 
sometimes prefer independent members on the board of commissioners (unaffiliated 
directors) because they give unbiased views (Saragih et al., 2012), offer open and 
functional counterpoints in decision-making and provide new dimensions of 
knowledge and skills that may not be found among family directors (Singapurwoko, 
2013). Despite these advantages, family-controlled companies in Indonesia do not 
generally employ independent commissioners (Harjito & Singapurwoko, 2014). Thus, 
family-controlled firms tend to appoint fewer independent members compared to non-
family controlled companies (Itan, 2015). 
 
The stewardship theory posits that family directors who act as stewards can provide 
more rich-specific knowledge and a stronger commitment to the company than 
independent commissioners because family members spend more time in the 
company that they manage. Family directors understand the conditions and company 
operations better than outside, independent commissioners. Thus, they can make 
better decisions (Surifah, 2013). Moreover, family owners are afraid to lose their 
control and believe that family members understand the firm’s competitive situation 
better than independent board commissioners (Harjito & Singapurwoko, 2014; Itan, 
2015). 
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Based on the literature review above, this study expects that independent board 
commissioners have a negatively significat relationship with firm performance for 
family-controlled firms. Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
 H9a: There is a negative relationship between the number of independent board 
commissioners and firm performance for family-controlled companies. 
 
In contrast, for non-family controlled firms, this study expects that the number of 
independent board commissioners is more than in family-controlled firms because the 
objective of non-family controlled companies is to maximize the shareholders’ wealth 
(Darmadi, 2012).  
 
Researchers have found that a higher proportion of independent commissioners has a 
positive relationship with firm performance because independent board 
commissioners possess diverse expertise, knowledge and experience that may 
improve the board’s decision-making (Singapurwoko, 2013). A larger number of 
independent commissioners in a company will increase the power of corporate 
governance and monitoring activity of major shareholders will be more effective if the 
number of independent commissioners is higher (Saragih et al., 2012). Independent 
commissioners will avoid the moral hazards carried by directors of a company to its 
interests through ownership accrual estimates that have an impact on earnings 
management in order to increase firm value (Itan, 2015). This shows that more 
independent commissioners can enhance shareholders’ value. Furthermore, from the 
corporate governance perspective, independent commissioners are unbiased, credible 
and protect the interest of minority shareholders; they have the knowledge, skills and 
experience to provide independent judgements on strategy and performance (NCG, 
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2006). Therefore, independent commissioners (unaffiliated directors) have a positive 
impact on firm performance (Darmadi, 2012; Saragih et al., 2012). Based on the 
discussion above, it is hypothesized that: 
H9b: There is a positive relationship between the number of independent board 
commissioners and firm performance for non-family controlled companies. 
 
3.5.3 Audit Committee Characteristics 
The Code (2006) in Indonesia requires an audit committee to be established in every 
company. Family companies need an audit committee to help them give an accurate 
financial report and provide useful information for investors when they want to invest 
their funds in the company. This study examines three audit committee characteristics: 
1) audit committee size; 2) audit committee independence; and 3) audit committee 
meetings. 
 
3.5.3.1 Audit Committee Size 
 
The Code (2006) requires companies to have at least three audit committee members 
comprising one independent commissioner and two members from outside. The 
company should have an audit committee no later than six months after listing on the 
Indonesian Stock Exchange. A listed company that has not appointed an audit 
committee must declare so in a written statement (NCG, 2006). 
 
The audit committee is responsible for controlling the financial reports and 
monitoring the external audit and internal control systems (including internal audit). 
Alijoyo et al. (2004) stated the audit committee has the function of helping 
commissioners to improve the accuracy of financial reports, create a climate of 
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discipline and increase the effectiveness of the internal audit function and external 
audit. The audit committee also identifies issues that require the attention of 
commissioners. In this way, the financial statements disclosed by the company may 
have a higher degree of reliability. Aldamen et al. (2012) provided empirical evidence 
that firms which establish an independent audit committee, report earnings containing 
smaller discretionary accruals compared to companies that do not form an 
independent audit committee.  
 
Empirical evidence on the relationship between audit committee size and firm 
performance is inconsistent. By using a market approach (Tobin’s Q), Chan and Li 
(2008) and Hamid et al. (2014) argued that audit committee size influences firm 
performance. On the other hand, Ilona (2008) found a significantly positive influence 
of audit committee size on firm performance. However, she used the accounting 
approach measurement for firm performance, i.e., ROA. Independent directors may 
reduce the agency problems in a company (Erickson, Park, Reising, & Shin, 2005). 
Erickson et al. (2005) argued that audit committee independence also can reduce 
agency problems. A larger number of audit committee members can effectively 
control and monitor management activity, prevent fraud, provide an accurate financial 
report and improve firm performance and earnings management. Therefore, audit 
committee size is posited to have a positive influence on firm performance.  
 
Based on the stewardship theory, the stewards protect and maximise shareholder 
wealth through firm performance. In family-controlled companies, family directors 
have a high concentration of ownership and the power to control all the operational 
activities of the company (Miller & Breton-Miller, 2006). Therefore, they do not need 
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large audit committee in the board because family companies invest all their wealth in 
the company, the controlling shareholders will tend to have the motivation to act 
altruistically to achieve goals and benefits for the stakeholders (Bubolz, 2001; 
Davidson, Stewart, & Kent, 2005).  Based on the arguments above, this study predicts 
that a smaller audit committee can enhance firm performance. Hence, it is 
hypothesized that: 
 H10a: There is a negative relationship between audit committee size and firm 
performance for family-controlled companies. 
 
For non-family controlled companies, the agency theory posits that a high number of 
audit committee members can lead to better firm performance. That is because a small 
audit committee lacks diversity of skills and knowledge, thus making it ineffective 
(Turley & Zaman, 2007; Hamid et al., 2014). Audit committee is viewed as an 
important element of corporate governance because independent directors of the audit 
committee can through various monitoring processes, and check the faulty conduct of 
managers. The audit committee may help in ensuring the reliability of the financial 
reporting process by keeping a check on manipulative, and self-centered activities of 
managers. Governance codes all over the world require firms to set audit committees 
and ensure their independence. 
 
Naimah and Hamidah (2012) examined the effect of audit committee characteristics 
on performance during the financial crisis and concluded that smaller committees 
with more experience and financial expertise were positively and significantly 
associated with company performance. Furthermore, Al-Matari et al. (2014) also 
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revealed that audit committee size was found to have a significant relationship with 
company performance. Hence, it is hypothesized that: 
H10b: There is a positive relationship between audit committee size and firm 
performance for non-family controlled companies. 
 
3.5.3.2 Audit Committee Independence 
 
The Code Corporate Governance in Indonesia requires a company to have a minimum 
of three audit committee members compromising one independent member and two 
members from outside. The independence of the audit committee is measured through 
ratio of independent members on the committee to all members of the audit 
committee (Kang & Kim, 2011). 
 
Several scholars have studied audit committee independence and firm performance. 
Swamy (2011) found that audit committee independence guarantees corporate 
governance practices. Abdullah et al. (2008) and Hamid et al. (2014) stated that audit 
committee independence is an important element in minimizing financial fraud; 
companies will operate optimally and increase its value. Therefore, an audit 
committee with a higher number of independent members is viewed more favorably. 
 
For family-controlled companies, the Code in Indonesia suggests that an audit 
committee should have a minimum of one independent member. Al-Matari et al. 
(2014) argued that no relationship exists between independence of audit committee 
members and family firm performance. This argument is consistent with Klein (2002) 
and Abbot et al. (2004) who claimed that independent of audit committee can 
decrease family firm performance and ensure low shareholder returns. Based on the 
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stewarship theory, families director act as steward and minimize the cost for hiring the 
outsider board and committee to monitor the families director action. Thus, base on 
discussion above, this study predicts that audit committee independence has a 
negative relationship with family firm performance. Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
 H11a: There is a negative relationship between audit committee independence 
and firm performance for family-controlled companies. 
 
In contrast, this study predicts a positive relationship between audit committee 
independence and firm performance for non-family controlled companies. Based on 
the agency theory, the majority shareholders tend to use their power to seek their 
personal interest and neglect the minority shareholders (Khang & Kim, 2011). 
Therefore, in terms to proctect the minority shareholders, they elected an independent 
audit committee to monitor management and reduce fraud (Swamy, 2011).  
 
The independence of audit committee increases its strength, and reduces the agency 
problem and the opportunity for expropriation by insiders (Yeh et al., 2009). 
Independence makes the committee more objective in monitoring the transparency of 
the financial reporting, and unbiased toward the executives, thereby reduces the 
agency problem between executives and other shareholders. Chan and Li (2008) 
found a positive relationship between the independence of audit committee and 
company performance. Similarly, Naimah and Hamidah (2017) found a positive 
association between independent audit committee members and profitability as a 
proxy for company performance. Based on the discussion above, it is hypothesized 
that: 
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 H11b: There is a positive relationship between audit committee independence and 
firm performance for non-family controlled companies. 
 
3.5.3.3 Audit Committee Meetings 
 
Audit committee meetings refer to the frequency of meetings conducted in a year. 
Audit committee meetings are important for monitoring management activity. The 
Code of Corporate Governance Indonesia (2006) requires audit committee meetings 
to be held at least once every quarter. If audit committee meetings are seldom held, 
this will lead to ineffective management. Xie, Davidson and Dadalt (2003); 
Raghunandan and Rama (2007) and Al-Matari et al. (2014) claimed that the 
frequency of meetings of the audit committee has an impact on the level of audit 
committee activity. 
 
In this current study, audit committee meetings refer to the frequency of audit 
committee meetings held in a year (Al-Matari et al., 2014). Many believe that more 
frequent meetings of an audit committee can provide useful information about 
auditing and accounting issues. Menon and Williams (1994) and Sharma et al. (2009) 
stated that a smaller number of audit committee meetings would lead to ineffective 
supervision of management. A company that has fraud will have misstatements in its 
financial reports and such misstatements have been related to fewer audit committee 
meetings (Hamid et al., 2014). A high frequency of audit committee meetings in a 
company can lead to accurate financial report, monitoring of internal controls and 
identification of management risks, therefore, leading to enhanced firm performance. 
In addition, only a few studies have examined the relationship between audit 
committee meetings and firm performance in Indonesia.  
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Based on stewardship theory perspective, family companies tend to have lower 
frequency of audit committee meeting because usually families will have their 
informal meeting when they meet. Larger audit committees can also lead to inefficient 
governance, thus yielding more frequent audit committee meetings (Vafeas, 1999). 
Sharma et al. (2009) find evidence that the number of audit committee meetings is 
negatively associated with firm performance.  
 
Anderson, Ferreira and Peters (2004) found that audit committees of S&P 500 firms 
whose memberships are entirely independent are associated with a significantly lower 
cost of debt financing. They also find that yield spreads for these firms are negatively 
related to frequency by which they meet in a year. Thus, they provide market-based 
evidence that higher frequency of audit committees meeting influence the firm 
performance. Hence, it is hypothesized that: 
 H12a: There is a negative relationship between the frequency of audit committee 
meetings and firm performance for family-controlled companies. 
 
In non-family controlled companies, an audit committee should hold more frequent 
audit committee meetings to be more efficient in its role of overseeing financial 
reports and internal control of the company (Vafeas, 2005). Audit committees must 
hold four meetings a year and the chairman must control and schedule the meetings 
(Al-Matari et al., 2014) to be consistent with the Code in Indonesia, which requires 
the audit committee to meet at least once every quarter. 
 
Audit committees that meet more frequently are better informed about the company 
circumstances (Al-Matari et al., 2014), and provide a more effective oversight and 
121 
 
monitoring mechanism of financial activities, which includes the preparation and 
reporting of company financial information. Abbott et al. (2004) found that the 
likelihood of companies restating their financial reports significantly decreased if the 
audit committee held at least four meetings a year. Similarly, there is evidence that 
audit committees of companies in financial difficulties do not hold meetings as 
frequently as those without financial difficulties (Alqatatim, 2018). Hsu (2007) also 
found that the number of audit committee’s meetings and company performance are 
positively and significantly associated. 
 
The agency theory posits that regular meetings of the audit committee could reduce 
agency conflicts and help minority shareholders by providing transparent, timely and 
accurate information (Bansal & Sharma, 2016). Al-Matari et al. (2014) argued that a 
higher audit committee meeting frequency will enhance firm performance. Based on 
discussion above, it is hypothesized that: 
 H12b: There is a positive relationship between the frequency of audit committee 
meetings and firm performance for non-family controlled companies. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter discusses the agency and stewardship theories, the theoretical framework 
and the development of hypotheses, based on evidence from previous literature. This 
chapter highlights the justifications for the development of the hypotheses. The 
research method to test these hypotheses and research design are provided in Chapter 
4. 
122 
 
CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN 
 
4.1 Overview of The Chapter 
This chapter is divided into six sections. It highlights the procedures for developing 
and conducting the research, including three equations for testing the hypotheses 
formulted in Chapter 3. In Section 4.2, the study examines the data collection process, 
the sample selection and the instruments used in this study. Section 4.3 discusses the 
panel data used in the data analysis. Data analysis and interpretation of the models are 
explained in Section 4.4; the research model and measurement in Section 4.5; 
followed by Section 4.6 which describes the variables and measurements used. 
Section 4.7 summarizes the research method and design used in the study. 
 
4.2 Data Collection 
Data in this study was collected using secondary sources (Cooper & Schindler, 2003). 
This study used the annual financial reports of publicly listed companies (PLCs), 
Indonesia Capital Market Directory (ICMD) report, books, magazine articles and 
newspapers to gather the necessary information. From magazine articles, the 
information gathered are about the value of quarterly market value, and from the 
newspapers are information on the daily and weekly market value of shares. The data 
from the annual financial statements were downloaded from the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange website (www.idx.co.id) and from the ICMD report published by Bisnis 
Indonesia and from books on family business and newspapers. The main aims of 
using secondary data are to get accurate data or information and to save time and 
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money (Ghauri & Gronhaugh, 2002). Secondary data is more likely to be accurate 
compared to collecting data on one’s own (Stewart & Kamins, 1993) and is more 
easily collected (Denscombe, 1998). 
 
Family-controlled PLCs in Indonesia are not listed as such in annual reports; therefore, 
the definition of a family-controlled company in this current study is that of a 
company in which an individual or a group of family members holds 20% or more of 
the outstanding shares (Itan, 2015). Equity ownership was gathered from indirect and 
direct shareholding of family members reported in the annual financial report or 
ICMD. The mechanisms of corporate governance, such as the attributes of board of 
directors, board of commissioners and audit committee were gathered from the 
website of the Indonesian Stock Exchange and the ICMD report. 
 
The data on firm performance (Tobin’s Q and ROE) was extracted from financial 
reports (balance sheet and profit and loss) downloaded from the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange website and gathered from the ICMD. 
 
4.2.1  Population and Sample 
This study used panel data for five years starting from 2010 to 2014 of PLCs on the 
Indonesian Stock Exchange. However, companies categorized under the finance 
sector were taken out from this study because of their differences in compliance and 
regulatory requirements. As at 31 December 2014, total companies on the Indonesian 
Stock Exchange listing statistics (http://www.idx.co.id) were 451 listed companies. 
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Table 4.1 
Sample Selection 
  
Number of 
Companies 
Total PLCs listed on Bursa Efek Indonesia  451 
(-) Finance 71 
Total Non-Financial PLCs 380 
(-) Companies listed since 2011 and above 118 
Total PLCs in the sample for 2010 to 2014 262 
 
From the total number of 451 firms listed on Bursa Efek Indonesia as at 31 December 
2014, 71 companies in the financial sector were excluded because these companies 
have a different regulatory framework that does not apply to other listed companies. 
The remaining non-financial PLCs totalling 380 companies were reduced by the 
removal of 118 companies because those companies listed since 2011 and above. The 
baseline for this study was companies that existed from 2010 until 2014. The final 
sample in this study was 262 PLCs and the total observation for the five years was 
1,310 samples. 
 
This study selected data for 2010 to 2014 (five continuous years) because the 2014 
financial report was the latest available one for all PLCs in Indonesia. This study is 
also concerned with the issue of family and non-family businesses and the influence 
on firm performance. This study expects to contribute useful information about family 
and non-family businesses during this five-year period.  
 
PLCs were chosen as sample in this study because information about financial report 
statement on PLCs can be easily collected by accessing the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange website. The data in the ICMD is also useful as this data, such as market 
share price, cannot be found in the annual reports. Lastly, the use of PLCs enables a 
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comparison to be made with previous studies conducted in Indonesia as most of the 
Indonesian studies have used PLCs. 
 
4.2.2  Instruments 
When collecting data from the annual financial and ICMD reports, the problem faced 
was accuracy. To ensure the accuracy of the data, the data had to be cross-referenced 
to other sources, whenever possible. In the annual reports, data relating to 
shareholding ownership, the profile of directors, financial statements and notes to the 
accounts, were scrutinised. 
 
To determine family-controlled companies, this study first prepared a list of PLCs by 
type of industry. After that, information on the PLCs was gathered from annual 
reports. Previous studies have used various definitions of a family firm.  For example, 
Wan-Hussin (2009) measured a family firm by the proportion of family members on 
the board of directors. In this current study, however, a family-controlled firm is 
determined as a firm in which an individual or a group of family members holds 20% 
or more of the outstanding shares of a company (Itan, 2015). This information was 
gathered from the ICMD database report and cross–checked with the information 
available in annual reports. 
 
Information on the board of directors, such as size, members’ qualifications, 
frequency of meetings, expertise, diversity and managerial ownership and information 
on the board of commissioners, such as size and independence (unaffiliated directors) 
were extracted from the annual reports from the profile of the 
directors/commissioners. These profiles were also gathered from the website 
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(www.businessweek.com) to determine the educational background and expertise of 
directors.  
 
Financial data, such as total equity, net income, earnings before tax, shareholder’s 
equity, total debt, ROE, EPS and market value per share were gathered from the 
annual financial statements at Yahoo Finance (www.finance.yahoo.com) and ICMD. 
 
Information about the attributes of the commissioners, including size and independent 
commissioners (unaffiliated directors) was gathered from the annual report section on 
corporate governance that contains information on the number of commissioners. In 
addition to checking the ICMD, the independence of board of commissioners 
(unaffiliated directors) could also be gathered from the corporate governance section 
in the annual financial report. 
 
As for audit committee characteristics, information on audit committee size and 
independence was gathered from the annual report section on corporate governance, 
which contains information on the number of members on the audit committee. In 
addition to checking the ICMD, information could also be gathered from the 
corporate governance section in the annual financial report, which explains how many 
times the audit committee conducted its meetings and how many members attended 
those meetings. 
 
All data were transferred into worksheets. The information on family-controlled and 
non-family controlled companies, structures of the board of directors and board of 
commissioners and audit committee characteristics were matched with the name of 
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the PLC. Before further work was done, the researcher established whether data was 
available for all the five years from 2010 to 2014. Once data was complete, the final 
sample was determined. 
Table 4.2 
Data Sources 
 
 
Sources Related Information 
Board of Directors Annual Reports Names, number of directors, 
number of meetings, gender, 
education and professional 
qualifications, number of 
shareholdings by each 
director. 
 Indonesian Capital 
Market Directory 
(ICMD) 
Names, number of directors, 
and gender. 
Board of Commissioners Annual Reports Names, number of 
commissioners and number 
of unaffiliated directors. 
 Indonesian Capital 
Market Directory 
(ICMD) 
Board of commissioners - 
name, number of 
commissioners. 
Audit Committee Annual Reports Names, independent audit 
committee members, size of 
audit committee, number of 
meetings. 
 Indonesian Capital 
Market Directory 
(ICMD) 
Names and size of audit 
committee. 
Control Variables Annuals Reports Debt and total assets. 
 Indonesian Capital 
Market Directory 
(ICMD) 
Debt, total assets, listing date 
and incorporation date. 
 
Based on Table 4.2, the information was mainly collected from annual reports. Most 
economic and financial research in corporate governance uses publicly reported 
financial information in the annual financial audit reports of the company. Hence, this 
study used quantitative analyses and data from the annual reports to examine the 
relationship between attributes of the board of directors, attributes of the board of 
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commissioners and audit committee characteristics of family-controlled companies 
and non-family controlled companies with firm performance. 
 
The annual financial reports of PLCs use Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) and are audited by independent or external auditors. Therefore, a high degree 
of confidence can be given to the reliability of the data. The information that can be 
found in various sections of the annual reports is displayed in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3 
Various sections in annual reports used in data gathering 
 
Sections in the annual reports Information colleted from sections 
Director’s profile Name, educational qualification, 
professional skills and gender. 
Corporate governance report Board size, unaffiliated directors, board 
meetings, audit committee size and audit 
committee meetings 
Director’s report Directors’ shareholdings 
Analysis of shareholdings Directors’ shareholdings 
Financial statement Financial information 
 
 
4.3 Panel Data 
Panel data analysis is a combination of the cross-sectional and time-series data. Panel 
data is robust to several violations of the Gauss Markov assumption (assumption of 
classical regression analysis). Modeling the independent variables on the dependent 
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variable in the regression is referred to as panel data (Ariefianto, 2012). The general 
estimated equation for analysing panel data is as the following equation: 
 
This study used panel data because the data was gathered from the five-year period 
from 2010 until 2014. With enough repeated cross-sectional observations, analysis of 
panel data allowed the researcher to study the dynamics of change in a short-time 
series. The panel data can improve the quality and quantity of data in a way that is not 
possible using only one of the two-dimensions (Baltagi & Wu, 1999; Greene, 2003; 
Gujarati, 2003). 
 
Panel data regression analysis endows it with both spatial and temporal dimensions. 
This helps to monitor some kinds of variables eliminated despite without observing 
them, by observing the time to time that change in the dependent variable. It monitors 
the omitted variables that differ between cases but are constant over time. Panel data 
is also used to control the omitted variables that vary from time to time but are 
constant between cases. There are some types of panel data analysis models: constant 
coefficient model, random effects model (REM) and fixed effects model (FEM). 
 
4.3.1  The Constant Coefficients Model 
The first type of panel model, the constant coefficient model, refers to both intercepts 
and slopes. If no significant effect is present for a spatial or temporal relationship, all 
data are regressed uing the Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) model. Although most of 
the time, either spatial effects or temporal effects exist, there are times when none of 
this is statistically significant when run using the pooled regression model (Stock & 
Watson, 2007). Pooled Least Squares (PLS) estimates panel data with the assumption 
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that the regression error is constant and is not affected by the object. This technique is 
effective to improve precision if the assumption is made that the relationship between 
all the independent and dependent variables are constant in the period and the objects 
used in the analysis. 
 
4.3.2 The Fixed Effects Model (FEM) 
Another type of panel data model has constant slopes but intercepts that differ 
according to the cross-sectional (group) unit, such as, firms. Even though there is 
insignificant temporal effect, a significant difference exists between companies in 
different types of models. The intercept is cross-section specific and different from 
one enterprise to another, whether or not it differs from time to time. 
 
In examining the impacts of FEM, the regression model is used as a basis for 
comparison. In the first step, the researcher examines time effects and the group 
(company). This can be tested by using the last or first time point as a reference. The 
paired t-test between the reference values assumes that the amount of time of the 
effect is equal to zero and the test is done. Researchers test for group, time and the 
effects of interaction, with the assumption that not all degrees of freedom have been 
consumed. By doing this test, it is expected that there is  no autocorrelation problem 
when improvements are made to the adjusted R
2
. The FEM estimates panel data 
regression with the assumption that the error affects the different objects as well as 
time and is fixed. 
 
Because the estimators in the FEM depend only on the mean deviation from their 
firms, they are sometimes referred to as the group estimator. When the cross-sectional 
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effect is correlated with the regressors, the effect will be correlated with the cross-
sectional mean group. OLS estimation on samples collected will be inconsistent, even 
if within the estimator, it is consistent. However, if the FEM is uncorrelated with the 
regressors, the group will not be an efficient estimator. If there are variations between 
the group means, the group estimator can be used, but it would be inconsistent if the 
fault cross-sectional correlates with the group means of the regressor (Davidson & 
MacKinnon, 1993). 
 
4.3.3 The Random Effects Model (REM) 
The REM is a regression with a random constant term. The REM estimates panel data 
regression with the assumption that the error affects the different objects as well as 
time and random. The way to deal with mistake or ignorance is to assume that the 
intercept is the result of a random variable. The function of random result is a random 
error plus average value. However, this particular error term in cross-sectional study 
that shows the deviation of the constant cross-sectional units (the company) should be 
correlated with the error variable if it is to be modelled (Greene, 2003). 
 
4.3.4  Choosing between the Fixed and Random Effects Models 
Hausman test is the generally accepted way of choosing between a FEM and REM. 
Statistically, fixed effects are not the most efficient model to run, but it is always a 
reasonable thing to do with panel data (they always give consistent results). On the 
other hand, REM will provide better p-values because it is a more efficient estimator; 
hence, it is more appropriate if statistically justifiable to do so. Selection of 
appropriate estimation techniques must be adapted to the conditions of the data. To 
132 
 
choose the best model among the OLS, FEM and REM, one should use the Chow and 
Hausman tests to know which model is the most suitable model. 
 
The Chow test is used to choose between OLS without dummy variables or the FEM. 
A regression model with a fixed effect panel is feasible for predicting the dependent 
variable, if the probability value is less than α (significance level). If the number is 
greater than or equal to significance with α the panel data regression models with 
OLS (Ariefianto, 2012). 
 
The Hausman test is defined as a statistical test to look into whether the FEM or REM 
is more appropriate to use. The Hausman test statistics follow the statistical 
distribution of Chi Square with the provisions that if the probability value is less than 
α, the correct model is a FEM; while conversely, if the value is α, the more 
appropriate model is the REM. 
 
The f-test is used to test the influence of the all independent variables simultaneously, 
as well as to test the linearity of the relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables. If the number is smaller than α significance, the independent 
variables simultaneously affect the dependent variable or the means used appropriate 
models. Conversely, if the value is less than α significance, a conclusion can be made 
that the independent variables simultaneously have no effect on the dependent 
variable (Ghozali, 2001). 
 
A t-test is used to test the effect of each independent variable on the dependent 
variable in a model. If the number is smaller than α significance, the independent 
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variables have a significant influence on the dependent variable. If the number is 
greater than or of equal significance to α, then the independent variable has no 
significant effect on the dependent variable (Ghozali, 2001). 
The resulting regression model fit to the panel regression is described by the 
coefficient of determination (R
2
), Standard Error of Regression and Akaike 
Information Criteria. Coefficient of Determination describes the percentage of model 
fit, or a value that indicates the extent to which the independent variables explain the 
dependent variable. According to Gujarati (2003), R
2
 in a regression equation is 
susceptible to the addition of independent variables. In situations in which a growing 
number of independent variables are involved, then the value of R
2
 will be even 
greater. Adjusted R
2
 is used in multiple linear regression analysis, and R
2
 is used in 
simple regression analysis. R
2
 values range from 0-100. 
 
4.4 Data Analysis and Interpretation 
Data must be cleaned and screened before conducting the analyses. Further, the 
diagnostic tests need to be carried out by applying the PLS and Generalised Least 
Square (fixed effects and random effects) methods. 
 
4.4.1  Getting data ready for analysis 
Screening and cleaning of data prior to the main analysis is time consuming and 
sometimes tedious. However, before the main analysis is conducted, careful 
consideration and resolution of the issues are fundamental to ensure an honest 
analysis of the data (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996, p. 57). When all data have been 
keyed into the worksheet, incomplete data can be excluded. 
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The data was analysed using the software Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS) and EViews. A few steps had to be completed before the data could be 
considered as reasonably good and of guaranteed quality. The steps include getting 
data ready for analysis (Sekaran, 2003, p. 301) by screening and cleaning them. 
 
4.4.2  Diagnostic tests 
Diagnostic regressions were conducted before each model was tested in this study. 
Diagnostic regressions can verify if the assumptions of multiple regression are met 
and to avoid misleading results. Diagnostic tests include normality, linearity and 
outlier tests of the sample in this study. Further, the autocorrelation test and 
multicollinearity test are explained. 
 
4.4.2.1 Outliers 
Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black (2006) said that outliers are observations that 
have their own unique characteristics. There are three ways to identify an outlier 
(Hamilton, 2003). First, using the studentized residual to observe whether the 
dependent variable is unusual for certain values of the independent variables. 
Normally, studentized residual values are above +2 or -2. Second, leverage is utilized 
to reveal whether an observation of an independent variable has deviated from the 
effects of the estimation of the regression coefficients. An observation has the 
potential to be an influential outlier if an observation has high leverage. Observations 
are relevant with leverage of more than 2k/n, where k is the number of independent 
variables and n is number of observations (Hamilton, 2003). The last method is 
identifying an influential observation to find outliers. When the observation is 
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dropped, it may significantly change the estimate of coefficients. Hence, the 
studentized residual method was applied in this study. 
 
Observations that are influential outliers should be identified. The effect of outliers 
can be problematic and a determination should be made as to whether they must be 
included in a study or discarded (Hair et al., 2006). Before running the regression, 
observations with a high studentized residual, defined as above +2 or -2, must be 
deleted. 
 
4.4.2.2 Normality and Linearity 
Normality is defined as the distribution of the error that is normally distributed. 
Histrogram is used to detect the normality for each variable. Normality is not needed 
to estimate the regression coefficients when using multiple regressions. However, for 
hypothesis testing, it is needed (Hair et al., 2006). Data is explored to confirm that 
normality assumptions hold true when using parametric tests. Several graphs 
predicted residuals are used to ensure normality, namely, quartile of a carriable versus 
the quartile of a normal distribution plot (Q-Q normal probability plot), standardized 
normal probability plot (P-P normal probability plot) and kernel density estimates plot. 
 
Pallant (2001) claimed that skewness and kurtosis values of the variable can be used 
to assess normality. Hair et al. (2006) argued that the linear influence between 
dependent variables and independent variables. Moreover, if values of standard 
deviations in the dependent variable are more than the value of standard deviations of 
the residuals, it indicates that nonlinearity is not a problem in regression. The 
Kolmogorove-Smirnov test can be used to make this assessment. 
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4.4.2.3 Multicollinearity 
One important assumption that underlies multiple regressions is multicollinearity; 
Multicollinearity means that between two independent variables have no exact 
collinearity existing (Cheng, Hossain & Law, 2001). If there is high multicollinearity, 
it will impact the estimated regression coefficient which then becomes unstable and 
unreliable. Further, it causes small changes to drastically increase in the model or 
sample (Hamilton, 2003). Hence, it will be difficult to accurately estimate the 
coefficient of the model tested (Cheng et al., 2001). Therefore, the possible existence 
of multicollinearity of the data should be checked first. This test may cause the 
researcher to obtain the wrong signs for the regression coefficients, insight t-ratios, 
high adjusted R-squared and few insignificant t ratios and high pair-wise correlation 
among regressors (Gujarati, 2003). 
 
This current study conducted a multicollinearity test to inspect the data. Examining 
the correlation matrix for the independent variables is the simplest way to check for 
multicollinearity. A value of 0.8 is acceptable (Bryman & Cramer, 1990). Meanwhile, 
a correlation with a value of 0.9 and above has a serious multicollinearity problem 
(Hair et al., 2006). Another way to detect themulticollinearity problem is to use 
variance inflation factor (VIF). If the value of VIF is more than 10, it is highly 
correlated (Hair et al., 2006). 
 
4.4.2.4 Autocorrelation 
Autocorrelation refers to violation of the assumption that size and direction of one 
error term has no bearing with another; and the errors are uncorrelated and 
independent. In order of notation, OLS assumes: E(µi µj) = 0. Autocorrelation can be 
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associated with time-series data and cross-sectional data. The past is the best predictor 
of the future. Meanwhile, what occurs in time t is the best predictor of what will occur 
in time t+1. As a result, observations are not usually independent. For the error term, 
differences exist between actual and predicted terms in a one-time period and are 
probably related (positively) to error in the next. If a series is “mean-reverting”, then 
errors may be negatively correlated. 
 
Autocorrelation may be due to data manipulation and model misspecification. A time-
series is created by aggregating the data and introducing a certain amount of 
smoothing by creating a quarterly data set by summing or averaging over months. 
Therefore, the randomness of some disaggregated data is lost. This smoothing can 
lead to systematic patterns in the error, therefore leading to the possibility of 
autocorrelation. 
 
The Durbin-Watson test is another way to determine if autocorrelation exists. It is 
absolutely standard to report the Durbin-Watson d test for autocorrelation when 
reporting regression results for time-series. It indicates positive autocorrelation if a d 
value is closer to 0, while negative autocorrelation is indicated if a d value is closer to 
4. Determining if the model has positive or negative correlation is close enought to 
define if  a d value is 0 or 4; there are both upper and lower critical values for d, 
which depend on the number of explanatory variables (k) and the number of 
observations (N). 
 
 
 
138 
 
4.5 Research model and measurement 
Equation 4.1 (Family-controlled companies) is as follows: 
FPERF = b0 + b2aBSIZEit + b3aBQUALit + b4aBMEETit + b5aBEXPit + b6aFDIRit + 
b7aMOWNit + b8aBCSIZEit+ b9aBCINDEit + b10aASIZEit + b11aAINDEit + 
b12aAMEETit + b13DEBTit + b14FAGEit + b15LNFSIZEit+ b16IPit + b17TSit + 
b18PROPit + + b19OTHERSit+ αi + λt + µit 
(Equation 4.1) 
Notes: FPERF=Firm performance, BSIZE=Board size, BQUAL=Board qualification, BMEET=Board 
meeting, BEXP=Board expertise, FDIR=Females on the board, MOWN=Managerial ownership, 
BCSIZE=size of Board of Commissioners, BCINDE=Independence of board commissioners, 
ASIZE=Audit committee size, AINDE=Audit committee independence, AMEET=Audit committee 
meeting, DEBT=firms’s debt, FAGE=Firm age, LNFSIZE=Firm size, IP=Industrial Products, 
TS=Trading services, PROP= Properties and OTHERS=Others. 
 
Equation 4.1 was tested using panel data regression analysis for family-controlled 
companies as sample. Equation 4.1 is derived from previous researchers (Villalonga 
& Amit, 2006; Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2011; Yasser, 2011) and includes two new 
variables identified by the researcher, which were tested in this study. These are: 1) 
board expertise (BEXP); and 2) independence of board of commissioners (unaffiliated 
directors) (BCINDE). Equation 4.1 tests the hypothesized relationship on attributes of 
the board of directors, attributes of the board of commissioners and audit committee 
characteristics and firm performance, which include H2a, H3a, H4a, H5a, H6a, H7a, H8a, 
H9a, H10a, H11a and H12a. The dependent variable is firm performance (accounting and 
market approaches) as explained in Section 4.6.1 below and the independent variables 
are attributes of the board of directors, attributes of the board of commissioners and 
audit committee characteristics as suggested by the literature and as explained in 
Section 4.6.2 below. 
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Equation 2 (Non-family controlled companies) is as follows: 
NFPERF = b0 + b2bBSIZEit + b3bBQUALit + b4bBMEETit + b5bBEXPit + b6bFDIRit + 
b7bMOWNit + b8bBCSIZEit+ b9bBCINDEit + b10bASIZEit + b11bAINDEit + 
b12bAMEETit + b13DEBTit + b14FAGEit + b15LNFSIZEit+ b16IPit + b17TSit + 
b18PROPit + + b19OTHERSit+ αi + λt + µit 
(Equation 4.2) 
Notes: NFPERF=Firm performance, BSIZE=Board size, BQUAL=Board qualification, 
BMEET=Board meeting, BEXP=Board expertise, FDIR=Females on the Board, MOWN=Managerial 
ownership, BCSIZE=size of Board of Commissioners, BCINDE=Independence of board 
commissioners, ASIZE=Audit committee size, AINDE=Audit committee independence, 
AMEET=Audit committee meeting, DEBT=firm’s debt, FAGE=Firm age, LNFSIZE=Firm size, 
IP=Industrial Products, TS=Trading services, PROP= Properties, and OTHERS=Others. 
 
Equation 4.2 tests for non-family controlled companies sample only. Equation 4.2 is 
adopted from previous works (Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2011; 
Yasser, 2011). Equation 4.2 is developed for the hypotheses H2b, H3b, H4b, H5b, H6b, 
H7b, H8b, H9b, H10b, H11b and H12b.  
 
4.6 Variables Definition and Measurement 
The data collected for this study comprise three categories of variables: 1) dependent 
variable; 2) independent variables; and 3) control variables. 
 
4.6.1  Dependent Variable 
This study uses firm performance as the dependent variable. The proxies used in this 
study to measure company performance are Tobin’s Q and ROE. In this study Tobin’s 
Q is used as an indicator of firm performance (Yasser, 2011; Villalonga & Amit, 2006, 
Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2011; Itan, 2015) because investors use it to gauge firm 
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performance. Tobin’s Q is defined as market equity value and debt divided by total 
assets. In Indonesia, the market equity value is the share price at fiscal year end. 
 
Another proxy to measure firm performance in this study is ROE. ROE is defined as 
net income divided by shareholders’ equity (Miller & Breton-Miller, 2006; Yasser, 
2011; Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2011). Sun and Tong (2003) argued that firm 
performance which is measured by the accounting approach is better than the market 
approach, the reason being the accounting approach is directly related to its financial 
survivability than the market approach and allows the evalution of firm performance 
for PLCs. 
 
4.6.2 Independent Variables 
The independent variables in this study are divided into four main parts: 1) family-
controlled companies; 2) attributes of the board of directors; 3) attributes of the board 
of commissioners; and 4) audit committee characteristics. 
 
4.6.2.1 Family-controlled Companies 
Many previous researchers (La Porta et al., 1999; Miller & Breton-Miller, 2006, 
Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Ibrahim et al., 2009; Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2011, Yasser, 
2011; Itan, 2015) have studied family companies and many definitions of family-
controlled companies exist. In this study, the definition of a family-controlled firm 
(FCF) is consistent with that of previous studies (Itan, 2015) and it is supported by the 
rule of transfer pricing documentation in Indonesia which states that an owner who 
holds the ownership of more than 20% is considered as a family company.  
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In this study, to determine if a company is a family-controlled firm, the researcher 
read the Director’s Profile section in the annual reports. After that, the researcher 
went through the ICMD to record the director’s shareholding and how many family 
members hold direct or indirect shares. For this study, an individual holding a 
minimum 20% of the shares of the firm is considered as a substantial shareholder and 
the company is considered to be family-controlled. If this criterion was not meet, then 
the company was not considered to be a family-controlled firm. A non-family 
controlled firm is one where the directors do not have any family relationship with the 
company or management. Companies are coded using a dummy variable (0, 1). A 
family-controlled company is coded as 1 and a non-family controlled company as 0 
(Itan, 2015). 
 
4.6.2.2 Board Size 
Board size (BSIZE) is defined as total number of directors in a firm. To determine the 
number of directors, the researcher looked at the list of directors in the annual reports 
and the ICMD. Previous studies in Indonesia have used this metric (Astuti & Yuniarto, 
2008; Saragih et al., 2012; Itan, 2015; Badu & Appiah, 2017). 
 
4.6.2.3 Board Qualification 
Board qualification (BQUAL) refers to the level of education of a director including 
diploma, bachelor’s degree, master’s degree or doctorate. The measurement used is 
the number of directors possessing a degree divided by the total number of directors. 
Very few studies have considered the impact of directors’ qualification on firm 
performance in Indonesia. Most of these studies have been done in other countries 
(Yasser, 2011; Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2011).  
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4.6.2.4 Board Meeting 
Board meeting (BMEET) is defined as the frequency of meetings held by the Board in 
one year. To determine the number of board meetings, the researcher read the 
corporate governance section in the annual reports and the director’s profile 
information in the corporate governance section, which mentions how many times the 
board held meetings in a year. A board meeting is an attribute of the Code of 
Corporate Governance in Indonesia, and this metric has been applied in previous 
studies (Saragih et al., 2011; Singapurwoko, 2013). 
 
4.6.2.5 Board Expertise 
To determine board expertise, the researcher carefully identified whether a director 
has a professional title. In Indonesia, if someone has a professional title, he or she 
uses the title after his/her name. Examples of professional titles in accounting are 
CPA, chartered accountant (CA), certified management accountant (CMA), the 
association of chartered certified accountants (ACCA) and bersertifikat konsultan 
pajak (BKP), and in engineering, it is Ir. The measurement for directors with 
professional qualification (BEXP) is the number of directors with professional 
qualifications divided by the total number of board of directors (Amran & Che-
Ahmad, 2011). To the researcher’s knowledge, board expertise has not been examined 
in Indonesia, and only a few studies have examined board expertise overseas, such as 
in Malaysia (Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2011). 
 
4.6.2.6 Females on the Board 
To determine females on the board, this research examined director’s profile in annual 
reports to determine if a director is a male or female director. Females on the board in 
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this study was measured by the total number of female directors on the board 
(Darmadi, 2013; Sanchez & Silaghi, 2017). 
 
4.6.2.7 Managerial Ownership 
To determine managerial ownership, the names of directors with shareholdings were 
retrieved from audit reports. Then, the directors’ names were recorded in the 
worksheet. The researcher then identified whether the directors are family directors 
and the percentage of shareholding. Directors without any ties to the largest family 
shareholder were classified as non-family directors (Itan, 2015). 
 
This step had to be done carefully to avoid double counting. In this study, managerial 
ownership is defined as the ownership of shares of the company by a director on the 
board (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2011, Yasser, 2011, Itan, 
2015). 
 
4.6.2.8 Size of Board of Commissioners 
Based on Indonesian regulations, Indonesia companies have adopted a two-tier board 
system, i.e.,  the boards of directors and commissioners. To determine the size of the 
board of commissioners, the researcher read the profile of the commissioner and the 
ICMD to identify how many board commissioners the company has. The size of the 
board of commissioners (BCSIZE) is defined as total number of board commissioners. 
The measurement has been applied in previous studies in Indonesia (Astuti & 
Yuniarto, 2008; Saragih et al., 2012). 
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4.6.2.9 Independence of Board of Commissioners  
The Code (2006) in Indonesia requires a minimum of one independent commissioner 
(unaffiliated director) of the total number of commissioners. Unaffiliated directors 
may be appointed during the company’s general meeting of shareholders, prior to the 
company’s listing (Singapurwoko, 2013). Furthermore, Bapepam-LK requires that at 
least one commissioner should be independent.  
 
To determine the independent board commissioners (unaffiliated directors), the 
researcher read the director’s profile and the ICMD to identify how many independent 
commissioners are in the company from the total board of commissioners. So, 
independence of board of commissioners (BCINDE) is defined as the number of 
independent board commissioners divided by total board commissioners. This 
measurement has been applied in previous studies in Indonesia (Saragih et al., 2012; 
Singapurwoko, 2013; Itan, 2015). 
 
4.6.2.10 Audit Committee Size 
Audit committee size (ASIZE) is defined as the total number of audit committee 
members in a company. To define audit committee size, the researcher read annual 
reports under the corporate governance section on audit committee. Audit committee 
size can be found in the ICMD. The measurement has been applied in several 
previous studies in Indonesia (Astuti & Yuniarto, 2008; Saragih et al., 2012; Al-
Matari et al., 2014; Hamid et al., 2014; Bansal & Sharma, 2016). 
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4.6.2.11 Audit Committee Independence 
Bapepam-LK requires a PLC to have a minimum one independent commissioner and 
two other audit committee members from outside the PLC. Audit committee 
independence (AINDE) is defined as the total number of independent audit committee 
members in a company divided the total number of audit committee members. To 
determine audit committee independence, the researcher read the annual reports under 
the corporate governance section about audit committee; audit committee size can 
also be found in the ICMD. This measurement has been applied in several previous 
studies in Indonesia (Astuti & Yuniarto, 2008; Saragih et al., 2012; Al-Matari et al., 
204; Hamid et al., 2014; Bansal & Sharma, 2016). 
 
4.6.2.12 Frequency of Audit Committee Meetings 
Audit committee meeting (AMEET) is an important attribute of corporate governance 
in Indonesia. The variable was determined by determining the frequency of meetings 
held by the audit committee in a year. To determine audit committee meeting, the 
researcher read the corporate governance section in the annual report. This 
measurement has been applied in several previous studies in Indonesia (Astuti & 
Yuniarto, 2008; Saragih et al., 2012; Al-Matari et al., 2014; Hamid et al., 2014; 
Bansal & Sharma, 2016). 
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Table 4.4 
The Measurement for Dependent and Hypothesized Variables and Expected Signs 
 
Acronym Variable Measurement 
Family 
Expect
ed Sign 
(+/-) 
Non-
family 
Expec
ted 
Sign 
(+/-) 
Sources 
Dependent 
(PERF): 
     
Q Tobin’s Q Market value of equity 
plus debt divided by 
book value of total 
assets. 
n.a. 
 
n.a 
Itan 
(2015) 
ROE Return on 
Equity 
Net income divided by 
shareholders’ equity  
n.a. 
 
 
n.a. 
Badu 
and 
Appiah 
(2017) 
Hypotheses
: 
  
 
  
FCF (H1) Family-
controlled 
company 
Family-controlled 
company is defined as 
family directors having 
ownership of a 
minimum of 20% in the 
company.  
 
 
It is coded as 1 if it is 
family-controlled 
company, 0 otherwise. 
+  Itan 
(2015) 
BSIZE (H2) Board size Total number of 
directors sitting on the 
board. 
- 
 
+ 
Singapu
rwoko 
(2013) 
BQUAL 
(H3) 
Board 
qualificatio
n 
Percentage of directors 
with degree divided by 
total directors. - 
 
 
+ 
 
 
Amran 
and 
Che-
Ahmad 
(2011) 
BMEET 
(H4) 
Board 
meetings 
Total number of board 
meetings held in a year - 
 
+ 
Singapu
rwoko 
(2013) 
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Table 4.4 
The Measurement for Dependent and Hypothesized Variables and Expected Signs 
(Continued) 
 
Acronym Variable Measurement 
Family 
Expect
ed Sign 
(+/-) 
Non-
family 
Expec
ted 
Sign 
(+/-) 
Sources 
BEXP (H5) Board 
expertise 
Professional 
qualification is defined 
as an individual having 
professional title, such 
as CA, CPA, CMA, 
ACCA, BKP, Ir, PPAP. 
 
Percentage of directors 
with professional 
qualification divided by 
total directors. 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+ 
Amran 
and 
Che-
Ahmad 
(2011) 
FDIR (H6) Female on 
board 
Total number of female 
directors sitting on the 
board 
- 
 
+ 
Darmadi 
(2013) 
MOWN 
(H7) 
Managerial 
ownership 
Percentage of shares 
owned by board of 
directors divided by 
total number of shares 
issued 
+ 
 
 
- 
Itan 
(2015) 
BCSIZE 
(H8) 
Size of 
board 
commissio
ners 
Total number of board 
of commissioners 
- 
 
+ 
Itan 
(2015) 
BCINDE 
(H9) 
Independen
ce of board 
of 
commissio
ners  
Percentage of 
independent board of 
commissioners divided 
by total board of 
commissioners. 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
+ 
Itan 
(2015) 
ASIZE 
(H10) 
Audit 
committee 
Size 
The total number of 
audit committee 
members 
- 
 
+ 
Hamid 
et al. 
(2014) 
AINDE 
(H11) 
Audit 
committee 
independen
t  
The total number of 
independent audit 
committee members 
- 
 
+ 
Hamid 
et al. 
(2014) 
AMEET 
(H12) 
Audit 
committee 
meetings 
The total number of 
meetings held by audit 
committee in a year. 
- 
 
+ 
Al-
Matari 
et al. 
(2014) 
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4.6.3  Control Variables 
In order to identify the specific effects of the attributes of the board of directors, 
attributes of the board of commissioners and audit committee characteristics on firm 
performance, this current study controlled for the effect of debt, firm size, firm age, 
and industry type. Debt, firm size, firm age and industry type are found to covary with 
many board characteristics and other governance variables (Fiegener & Brown, 2000; 
Nicholson & Kiel, 2004; Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2011). 
 
4.6.3.1 Debt 
Singapurwoko (2013) argued that most Indonesian companies prefer debt over equity 
and internal over external finance. Companies facing a financial deficit will first 
choose debt that will be observed later as a higher debt ratio (Myers & Majluf, 1984). 
High debt will make investors cautious in investing because of higher risks (Weston 
& Copeland, 1992). 
 
Sonfield and Lussier (2004) found that first generations in family companies prefer to 
use equity rather than debt to finance their company. Chen and Jaggi (2000) stated 
that family firms prefer to acquire external capital from the debt. The measurement of 
debt (DEBT) in this study is book value of long-term debt divided by total assets. 
 
4.6.3.2 Firm Age 
Firm age is defined as the number of years that a company has been in operation. 
Firm age has been linked to many decisions of a firm (Gregory, Rutherford, Oswald, 
& Gardiner, 2005; Boone, Field, Karproff, & Raheja, 2007; Amran & Che-Ahmad, 
2011). 
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Firm age impacts firm performance with the experience, market strategy and 
knowledge of the firm. Older firms are expected to have experience, reputation and 
image that can contribute to good firm performance compared to younger firms. 
Younger firms areexpected to have less power, less reputation in the market and are 
still developing their market position that needs a huge cost structure (Lipczinsky & 
Wilson, 2001). Boone et al. (2007) found that firm age can increase the benefits of 
monitoring by board members. However, the magnitude of these relationships may 
differ. In this study, firm age (FAGE) is measured by the number of years since the 
company was incorporated. 
 
4.6.3.3 Firm Size 
Gorriz and Fumas (1996) found that most family firms are smaller than non-family 
firms. However, a family firm has greater opportunity for managers to be active than 
when the firm size is large (Helmich, 1977). Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, and Johnson 
(1998) argued that small firms have significant influence on board size than large 
firms. Similarly, Lehn, Patro and Zhao (2004) found that board size is positively 
related to firm size but negatively related to growth opportunities.  
 
In a family business, family members sometimes do not consider expanding because 
they fear losing the family control if they raise funds from external or new investors 
(Church, 1993). However, some of the largest companies in Indonesia, such as Salim 
Group and Ciputra Group, are family-controlled. Helmich (1977) stated family-
controlled companies have greater opportunity to develop high level management and 
more complex corporate governance practices. Therefore, larger family-controlled 
companies may have more qualified, skilled and experienced candidates (Harveston, 
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Paula, Peter, & Julie, 1997). Measurement of firm size (LNFSIZE) is calculated by 
dividing the natural log of book value with total assets. 
 
4.6.3.4 Industry Type 
Industry type may be related to performance outcomes. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) 
stated the trading sector performs relatively better than other sectors. Indonesian 
companies are separated into three main industries as follow: 1) manufacturing 
(industrial products and properties); 2) non-manufacturing (trading services); and 3) 
others (plantation, construction, infrastructure projects, mining, hotels and 
technology). Kuryanto and Syafruddin (2005) found that manufacturing and non-
manufacturing sectors outperform other sectors because they have intellectual capital 
that is crucial for the success of the company; it also contributes to profitability and 
firm value. In this study, industry types were separated into these sectors: trading 
services (TS); industrial products (IP); properties (PROP); plantation, construction, 
infrastructure projects, mining, hotels and technology are grouped as OTHERS 
because these industries are smaller in number. 
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Table 4.5 
The Measurement of Control Variables 
 
Acronym Variable Measurement 
DEBT Debt The book value of long-term debt divided 
by total assets 
FAGE Firm age Number of years since incorporation 
LNFSIZE Firm size Natural log of the book value of total 
assets 
IP Industrial Products Industrial product is coded as 1, others 
are 0 
TS Trading services Trading services is coded as 1, others are 
0 
PROP Properties Properties is coded as 1, others are 0 
OTHERS Others Plantation, construction, infrastructure 
projects, technology, hotel and mining 
are coded as 1, others are 0 
 
 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This study uses secondary data to examine the relationship between family-controlled 
companies, attributes of the board of directors, attributes of the board of 
commissioners and audit committee characteristics and firm performance. The 
dependent variable, firm performance, is measured using the accounting and market 
approaches. The independent variables are categorized into family-controlled 
companies, attributes of the board of directors, attributes of the board of 
commissioners and audit committee characteristics. The sample size for this study is 
262 companies on the Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2010 to 2014 (five years). 
This study adopts panel data regressions to test the conceptual models. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 Overview of the Chapter 
This chapter presents empirical evidence concerning the relationship between family-
controlled companies, attributes of the board of directors, attributes of the board of 
commissioners and audit committee committees and company performance. This 
chapter comprises seven sections. The results of the outlier test are presented in 
Section 5.2, Section 5.3 explains the descriptive data. Section 5.4 discusses univariate 
analyses. Section 5.5 explains the testing for panel data. Then, Section 5.6 reports the 
results of the main Equation 4.1 (family-controlled companies) and Equation 4.2 
(non-family companies). Finally, Section 5.7 concludes the chapter. 
 
5.2 Results of Outliers 
A total of 262 PLCs were used in this study with 1,310 observations for the five-year 
period. This study used panel data because it is a more sensitive measurement of the 
changes that could take place between points in time (Cavana, Delahaye, & Sekaran, 
2000). Further, the results produced by panel data are more representative and 
meaningful because they are consistent and stable to make generalizations for the 
population. 
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Table 5.1 
Analysis of the sample 
 
Observations Number of 
Companies 
Total observations in 2010 262 
Total observations in the sample for 2010 to 2014 1,310 
Companies discarded (outliers) (15) 
Final sample 1,295 
 
The final sample was screened by examining the basic statistics for the frequency 
distribution of data. Descriptive statistics that include the maximum, minimum, mean, 
median and standard deviation values of the variables were scrutinized to detect any 
mistakes or missing values in all characteristics of the variables. Further, to identify 
the most extreme high and low values, the studentized deleted residual was run. The 
findings show that 15 samples exhibit extreme values for non-family controlled firms. 
Based on testing done above (studentized deleted residual), 15 outliers were discarded 
to avoid distortion in the results (Hair et al., 2006). The final dataset was 1,295 
observations (595 observations for family-controlled firms and 700 observations for 
non-family controlled firms) as presented in Table 5.1. 
 
5.3 Descriptive Data 
This section presents basic information regarding the attributes of the board of 
directors and board of commissioners and audit committee characteristics of family 
and non-family controlled firms in Indonesia. 
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Table 5.2 
 Frequency and percentage of family and non-family controlled companies 
Type Frequency Percent 
Family-controlled 595 45.95 
Non-family controlled 700 54.05 
Total 1,295 100 
 
Based on Table 5.2, the sample size for family-controlled companies is 45.95% (595 
observations) of the total sample, while non-family controlled companies is 700 
observations or 54.05% of the total sample. The findings of this study are similar to 
those of previous studies (Claessens et al., 2000; Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2011; Itan, 
2015) whereby family-controlled companies totalled almost 46% of PLCs. 
 
Table 5.3 
Frequency and percentage of family and non-family controlled companies by industry 
Industry Family Controlled Non-Family Controlled 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Trading services 150 25.21 95 13.57 
Properties 90 15.13 70 10.00 
Hotel 80 13.45 65 9.29 
Industrial products 65 10.92 190 27.14 
Infrastructure Projects 60 10.08 50 7.14 
Construction 55 9.24 65 9.29 
Technology 40 6.72 70 10.00 
Plantation 30 5.04 25 3.57 
Mining 25 4.20 70 10.00 
Total 595 100 700 100 
 
Table 5.3 shows the statistics of family and non-family controlled firms in relation to 
the business as defined by the Indonesian Stock Exchange. The largest sector for 
family-controlled companies is in trading services (25.21%), followed by properties 
(15.13%), industrial products (10.92%) and infrastructure projects (10.08%). For non-
family controlled firms, the largest sectors are industrial products (27.14%), trading 
services (13.57%), properties (10.00%) and mining (10%). 
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5.3.1  Structure of Board of Directors  
This section presents the structure of board of directors in family and non-family 
controlled firms in Indonesia. 
 
Table 5.4 
Frequency and percentage of attributes of board of directors 
 Size Family Controlled Non-Family 
Controlled 
  Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Board Size Less than 3 370 62.18 349 49.85 
 4 to 7 194 32.61 265 37.86 
 More than 7 31 5.21 86 12.29 
Board 
Qualification 
Less than 
50% 
14 2.33 8 1.14 
 More than 
50% 
581 97.65 692 98.86 
Board Meeting Less than 12 213 35.80 106 15.14 
 13 to 23 272 45.71 285 40.72 
 More than 24 110 18.49 309 44.14 
Board Expertise Less than 
50% 
571 95.97 654 93.43 
 More than 
50% 
24 4.03 46 6.57 
Female 
Directors 
Less than 2 539 90.59 634 90.57 
 3 to 4 51 8.57 62 8.85 
 More than 5 5 0.84 4 0.58 
Managerial 
Ownership 
Less than 
20% 
0 0.00 685 97.86 
 More than 
20% 
595 100.00 15 2.14 
 
The Code (2006) requires that the number of directors in a company should be at least 
three directors. From Table 5.4, board size is divided into three categories. This study 
reveals that most family-controlled firms have less than three directors with 62.18% 
of the sample, followed by 32.61% family-controlled companies having four to seven 
members and only 5.21% of family-controlled companies having a board size of more 
than seven members. Similarly, most non-family controlled companies have less than 
three members which represents 49.85% of the sample, followed by 37.86% with four 
156 
 
to seven members and only 12.29% with more than seven members. The findings for 
family and non-family controlled firms show that they favour a small board size (less 
than three members). The findings are consistent with previous works done by Hamid 
et al. (2014), Itan (2015) and Ferris et al. (2003). Small boards have been claimed to 
be more effective than large boards and make decision-making easier. However, the 
findings of this study contradict some past works done in Indonesia by Darmadi (2012) 
and Surifah (2013). 
 
In family-controlled companies, 97.65% have boards in which more than 50% of the 
board directors of family-controlled companies have a tertiary degree qualification. In 
non-family controlled companies, 98.86% have boards in which more than 50% of the 
board of directors have a tertiary degree qualification. Only 2.33% of family-
controlled companies and 1.14% of non-family controlled companies have less than 
50% of board directors with a degree qualification. This indicates that companies are 
well informed on the importance of qualified directors to be on the board. 
 
For board meeting, the Code (2006) requires companies to conduct board meetings at 
least once a month or 12 times a year. Table 5.4 illustrates the frequency of board 
meetings. The results show that highest frequency of meetings for family-controlled 
companies is 13 to 24 meetings in a year or 45.71% of the sample, followed by 
35.80% with less than 12 meetings in a year and only 18.49% of family-controlled 
companies with board meetings more than 24 times a year. In contrast, the majority of 
non-family controlled companies had more than 24 meetings in a year with 44.14% of 
the sample, followed by 40.72% with 12 to 24 meetings and only 15.14% had 
meetings of less than 12 times a year. These results show that most family and non-
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family controlled companies do comply with the Code (2006) requirement of having 
meetings at least once per month. 
 
Bapepam suggests that the board of directors should use their expertise to carry out 
their duties. With respect to family-controlled companies, 95.97% of the companies 
are in the category of less than half of the board members having a professional title, 
which in this study means expertise. The same relationship also applies to non-family 
controlled companies in which 93.43% of the companies are in the category of less 
than 50% of the members of the board having a professional title. Only 4.03% of 
family-controlled firms and 6.57% of non-family controlled firms are in the category 
where 50% of board directors have a professional title.   
 
The results of Table 5.4 show that male directors dominate most family-controlled 
companies and non-family controlled companies. For example, the largest category of 
female directors, which is less than two, comprises 90.59% of family-controlled and 
90.57% of non-family controlled companies. The category of two to four members 
comprises 8.57% of family-controlled companies and 8.85% of non-family controlled 
companies. Lastly, the category of more than four female directors is only 0.84% for 
family-controlled companies and 0.58% for non-family controlled companies. The 
findings are consistent with previous studies (Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2011; 
Kusumastutui et al., 2012).  
 
Table 5.4 indicates that most managers in family-controlled companies (100%) and 
non-family controlled companies (2.14%) hold more than 20% of shares in the 
company. It indicates that managerial ownership in family-controlled companies is 
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controlled by own family directors; therefore, family directors have power and are 
authorized to control all company activities. Non-family controlled companies show 
that 97.86% of shares in non-family companies are owned by independent directors. It 
indicates that non-family directors hold a small amount of shares in the companies 
with the majority not exceeding 20% ownership. 
 
5.3.2  Structure of Board of Commissioners 
This section presents the structure of board of commissioners in family and non-
family controlled companies in Indonesia. 
Table 5.5 
Frequency and percentage of attributes of board of commissioners 
 Size Family Controlled Non-Family 
Controlled 
  Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Size of Board of 
Commissioners  
Less than 3 63 10.59 70 10.00 
     
4 to 7 460 77.31 430 61.43 
 More than 7 72 12.10 200 28.57 
Independent 
Commissioners 
Less than 
30% 
24 4.04 80 11.43 
 30% to 50% 521 87.56 556 79.43 
 More than 
50% 
50 8.40 64 9.14 
 
Table 5.5 describes the size of the board of commissioners. The findings show that 
family and non-family controlled firms have almost similar sized boards of 
commissioners. Most of these companies have four to seven board commissioners 
with 77.31% for family-controlled firms and 61.43% for non-family controlled firms. 
About 12.10% of family-controlled companies and 28.57% of non-family controlled 
firms have more than seven members on their board of commissioners. Meanwhile, 
many family and non-family controlled firms do comply with the Code (2006), which 
requires a minimum of three commissioners on the board. About 10.59% of the 
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family-controlled firms and 10.00% of the non-family controlled firms do not follow 
the Code (2006) requirements. These companies still do not have three commissioners 
on the board, even though the Code (2006) requires it. The reason is because some 
Indonesian companies put more attention to directors who manage the company rather 
than board of commissioners as supervisors. 
 
The results show that majority of these families (87.56%) and non-family controlled 
(79.43%) companies have 30% to 50% independent commissioners. These companies 
(family and non-family controlled firms) have followed the guidelines of Bapepam-
LK (2014) and comply with the Code (2006), which requires that the minimum 
percentage of independent commissioners should be at least 30% of the total 
commissioners. There are 8.40% for family-controlled firms and 9.14% for non-
family controlled firms in which the membership of independent commissioners is 
more than 50%. However, 4.03% of family-controlled firms and 11.43% of non-
family controlled firms do not comply with Bapepam-LK (2014) because less than 
30% of the board commissioners are independent. So, there is still room for 
improvement for companies that do not follow the rules proposed by the Code (2006) 
and Bapepam-LK (2014). 
 
5.3.3  Audit Committee Characteristics 
This section presents the audit committee characteristics in family and non-family 
controlled companies in Indonesia. 
 
 
 
160 
 
Table 5.6 
Frequency and percentage of audit committee characteristics 
 Size Family Controlled Non-Family 
Controlled 
  Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Audit 
Committee Size 
Less than 3 589 98.99 687 98.14 
 More than 3 6 1.01 13 1.86 
Independent 
Audit 
Committee 
Members 
Less than 
30% 
21 3.53 75 10.71 
     
30% to 50% 573 96.30 625 89.29 
 More than 
50% 
1 0.17 0 0.00 
Audit 
Committee 
Meetings 
Less than 4 127 21.35 147 21.00 
 More than 4 468 78.65 553 79.00 
 
The Code (2006) requires that the audit committee must have at least three members. 
From the result in Table 5.6, it shows that about 98.99% of family-controlled firms 
and 98.14% of non-family controlled firms have less than three members on the audit 
committee. This indicates that the level of compliance among Indonesian companies 
with the Code (2006) is still lacking. The reason behind this finding may be because 
Indonesian companies appoint and rely more on external auditors or some Indonesian 
companies do not hire more audit committee members in order to minimize expenses. 
 
The results in Table 5.6 show that both family (96.30%) and non-family (89.29%) 
controlled firms have 30% to 50% audit committee members who are independent. 
The finding is consistent with Alijoyo et al. (2004) in Indonesia companies. Only 17% 
of family-controlled firms and 0% of non-family controlled firms have more than 
50% audit committee members who are independent. Lastly, 3.53% of family-
controlled companies and 10.71% of non-family controlled companies do not comply 
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with Bapepam-LK (2014) because less than 30% of the audit committee members are 
independent. 
 
Table 5.6 also illustrates the frequency of audit committee meetings. The results show 
that 78.65% family and 79.00% non-family controlled companies have more than four 
meetings in a year. Only 21.35% of family and 21% of non-family controlled 
companies held audit committee meetings less than four times a year. These results 
show that both family and non-family controlled companies have complied with the 
Code (2006) by frequently holding audit committee meetings in the company. 
Therefore, the audit committee is efficient. 
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Table 5.7 
Descriptive statistics for family-controlled companies and non-family controlled 
companies 
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Table 5.7 shows the results of the descriptive statistics of all variables for both the 
family-controlled companies and non-family controlled companies on the Indonesian 
Stock Exchange. The descriptive statistics show that family-controlled firms have 
higher mean values than non-family controlled companies for company indicators 
Tobins’ Q (mean = 1.91 and ROE (mean = 0.16)). Meanwhile, family-controlled 
companies contribute higher performance as compared to non-family controlled 
companies in Indonesia. 
 
In terms of board of director attributes, board size is four members per board for 
family and non-family controlled firms. This finding supports previous works done in 
Indonesia (Itan, 2015; Singapurwoko, 2013; Darmadi, 2012). Thus, companies in 
Indonesia comply with the Code (2006), which suggests that minimum board size is 
three persons. On average, 91% of non-family controlled companies listed on the 
Indonesian Stock Exchange have directors with at least a degree qualification. 
However, family-controlled companies have a slightly lower percentage of degreed 
directors, which is 89%. This shows that family-controlled companies prefer family 
members to run the companies rather than outside professional directors.  
 
With respect to board meetings, overall, family-controlled and non-family controlled 
companies listed in Indonesia had meetings more than 12 times per year. Thus, these 
companies in Indonesia followed the guideline of Bapepam-LK (2014) that suggests 
directors hold a meeting every month to discuss strategies, solve problems and make 
decisions to enhance firm performance. In terms of board expertise, 8% of family-
controlled firms and 12% of non-family controlled firms have experts on the board. 
This result suggests that the number of expert directors on the board is still low. 
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Lastly, the mean of female directors on the board is one member per board for all 
companies, both family-controlled and non-family controlled. The findings show that 
firms need to add more female directors to bring in different skills, knowledge, 
experience, fresh ideas and perspectives to board deliberations (Jamali et al., 2007). 
 
In terms of managerial ownership, on average, managerial ownership in Indonesian 
non-family controlled companies is about 2% of the total shareholdings. Family 
directors hold a greater number of shares (61%) than non-family directors (1%). 
Although the number of shares held by non-family directors is low compared to the 
family directors, non-family directors are rewarded with commissions and bonuses for 
a job well done. 
 
With respect to board of commissioner attributes, the mean for size of board of 
commissioners is four members per board for family and non-family controlled firms. 
This number indicates that firms in Indonesia comply with the Bapepam-LK (2014), 
which states that the minimum member of board commissioners should be three 
persons. In terms of commissioner independence, 40% of board commissioners are 
independent commissioners. Thus, companies in Indonesia follow the guidelines and 
comply with the Code (2006), which suggests that 30% of board commissioners 
should be independent. 
 
With respect to audit committee characteristics, the mean of audit committee size is 
three members and audit committee independence is 33% for family and non-family 
controlled firms. This finding demonstrates that firms in Indonesia comply with the 
Code (2006), which suggests that a audit committee must comprise three members 
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and 30% of them should be independent. In terms of frequency of audit committee 
meetings, Bapepam L-K (2014) suggests that the minimum frequency of audit 
committee meetings should be four times per year. On average, the frequency of audit 
committee meetings for family and non-family companies is six times per year. 
 
In terms of the control variables, the average amount of debt in the companies ranges 
from 50% to 60%. In terms of firm size, most companies in Indonesia have a firm size, 
on average, of Rp 12 billion. This amount is quite similar for family and non-family 
controlled companies. The companies surveyed are found to have an average firm age 
of 29 to 31 years. 
 
5.4 Univariate Analysis 
In this study, the t-test and Pearson correlation matrix was conducted for both family 
and non-family controlled companies. 
 
5.4.1  T-test for family and non-family controlled companies 
This study aims at investigating firm performance of family and non-family 
controlled companies and evaluates if there are any differences in mean between both. 
It ran independent sample t-test to test hypothesis 1. 
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Table 5.8 
Independent sample t-test 
 Levene’s Test for Equality 
of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Q 0.000 0.075 
ROE 0.008 0.054 
Notes: FC=Family-controlled, NFC=Non-family controlled, Q=Tobin’s Q, ROE=Return on Equity. 
 
 
Table 5.9 
Performance mean of family-controlled companies and non-family controlled 
companies 
 
 FC 
 
NFC 
 
Q 1.906 1.490 
ROE 0.163 0.0688 
Notes: FC=Family-controlled, NFC=Non-family controlled, Q=Tobin’s Q, ROE=Return on Equity. 
 
Table 5.8 shows that Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances for Tobins’ Q (0.000) 
and ROE (0.008) have a significant value < α = 0.05. It indicates that the variance of 
the family-controlled companies differs from non-family controlled companies. The t-
test for Equality of Means for Tobins’Q (0.075) and ROE (0.054) > α = 0.05. 
Meanwhile, the family controlled companies (H1) have higher firm performance than 
non-family controlled companies in this study. As shown in Table 5.9, family-
controlled companies have higher mean value for both indicators of firm performance 
than non-family controlled companies. Therefore, it confirms that family-controlled 
companies perform better than non-family controlled companies when Tobin’s Q and 
ROE are used to measure performance. These results are consistent with previous 
local works (Sujoko & Sobiantoro, 2017; Darmadi, 2013; Itan, 2015) and studies 
conducted in other countries (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Ismail & Mahfodz, 2009; 
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Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2011; Dewantoro, 2011; Yasser, 2011; Berg & Bart-Jan, 
2014). Family-controlled firms have a significantly positive relationship with firm 
performance as both the agency theory and stewardship theory posit. The findings 
support previous studies (Sujoko & Sobiantoro, 2007; Darmadi, 2013; Itan, 2015) that 
have found that family spirit and effective control are reflected in a company’s 
strategy in terms of generating higher firm performance and profitability. 
 
Family-controlled firms are believed to achieve competitive advantage and have a 
high sense of belonging that make owners become more concerned with the survival 
of companies. Family-controlled companies have incentives to reduce the agency 
problems between agents and principals, and thus, minimize agency costs (Harjito & 
Singapurwoko, 2014). Ibrahim et al. (2009) said that family-controlled firms have 
higher firm performance (ROE as firm performance indicator) than non-family 
controlled firms.  
 
Indonesian family-controlled firms have better profitability and efficiency than those 
owned by non-family shareholders. Further, family-controlled firms report better net 
income than non-family controlled firms. Family-controlled companies outperform 
because family ownership tends to enhance firm value and cost efficiency, thus, 
promoting a higher ROE. Therefore, the findings in this study are significant and 
positive with respect to firm performance by both performance measurements 
(Tobins’ Q and ROE). Thus, hypothesis H1 is supported in this study. 
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5.4.2  Pearson Correlation Matrix 
The Pearson correlation matrix was utilized to examine multicollinearity among the 
variables. Table 5.10 and Table 5.11 show that the value of Pearson correlation 
coefficient between the independent variables is lower than 0.80 (Gujarati, 2003) and 
0.70 (Pallant, 2001; Hair et al., 2006). Therefore, the results show no multicollinearity 
problem among the independent variables.  
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5.4.2.1 For Equation 4.1 (Family-Controlled Companies) 
Table 5.10 
Pearson correlation test for family-controlled companies 
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5.4.2.2 For equation 4.2 (Non-Family Controlled Companies) 
Table 5.11 
Pearson correlation test for non-family controlled companies  
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Table 5.10 presents the correlation matrix for family-controlled companies. BSIZE 
has a relationship with ROE. In Indonesian companies, the Code requires a minimum 
of three members on the board of directors. For BQUAL, the correlation shows a 
significantly positive relationship with Q. Besides the number of board of directors, 
director qualifications are an important element for enhancing firm performance. In 
terms of BMEET, a strong positive correlation exists with ROE. FDIR is positively 
related to ROE. The finding shows that the presence for female directors may help 
companies increase performance. Next, BEXP has a strong correlation with Q, BSIZE, 
BMEET and FDIR. This finding indicates that the presence of directors who have 
professional skills may help a company to achieve better performance. MOWN shows 
a mixed direction in findings, whereby it is negatively correlated with Q, PER, BSIZE 
and BQUAL, but positively related to BMEET. For BCSIZE, there is a positive 
relationship with BSIZE, FDIR and BEXP, but a negative relationship with BMEET 
and MOWN. BCINDE has a positive relationship with Q and BMEET, but a negative 
relationship with MOWN. The results indicate that an increase in number of 
independent commissioners may enhance firm performance. In terms of ASIZE, a 
positive relationship exists with Q, BEXP and BCSIZE. Next, AINDE is negatively 
correlated with Q, BEXP, BCSIZE and ASIZE. AMEET has a positive relationship 
with Q, BCSIZE and ASIZE, but is negatively related with AINDE. 
 
Table 5.11 explains the Pearson correlation matrix for non-family controlled 
companies. BSIZE has a significantly positive relationship with Q and ROE, 
indicating that a larger board in non-family controlled companies enhances firm 
performance. For BQUAL, a positive relationship exists with ROE, indicating that 
board qualification plays an important role in enhancing firm performance. BMEET 
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has a positive relationship with ROE and BSIZE, indicating that more frequent 
meetings of the directors increases firm performance.   
 
In terms of FDIR, a negative relationship exists with Tobins’ Q, but a positive 
relationship exists with BQUAL, indicating the positive impact of the number of 
female directors on qualifications. BEXP has a strong positive correlation with 
Tobins’ Q, ROE, BSIZE, BQUAL and BMEET, indicating that expertise has a strong 
impact on firm performance, firm size and meeting frequency. MOWN has a positive 
relationship with BSIZE and BMEET, showing that a manager who has high 
ownership in a company is interested in more frequent meetings. Next, BCSIZE has a 
strong positive correlation with BISIZE and BMEET. BCINDE is positively related 
with Tobins’ Q, BQUAL, BMEET and BEXP, but negatively related with BCSIZE. 
ASIZE has a positive relationship with BCSIZE, BQUAL and BCSIZE. However, 
AINDE has a negative relationship with BSIZE, BCSIZE and ASIZE. In terms of 
AMEET, a positive correlation exists with BSIZE, BQUAL, BMEET, FDIR, BCSIZE 
and ASIZE, but a negative relationship exists with AINDE. These results seem to 
indicate that regular audit committee meetings may contribute to firm performance. 
 
5.5 Testing for Panel Data 
This section presents the results of multicollinearity, the Hausman tests and 
autocorrelation, which examined whether the results violate the underlying necessary 
statistical assumptions to proceed. Only when the data passed the appropriate tests, 
multivariate analyses were utilised for analysing the observations. 
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5.5.1  Results of Multicollinearity Tests 
 
Table 5.12: VIF Tests for family and non-family controlled companies 
Variable FC NFC 
FCF n.a. n.a. 
BSIZE 2.23 1.88 
BQUAL 1.07 1.09 
BMEET 1.15 1.27 
BEXP 1.50 1.22 
FDIR 1.11 1.12 
MOWN 1.14 1.08 
BCSIZE 1.75 1.57 
BCINDE 1.13 1.10 
ASIZE 4.38 4.60 
AINDE 4.19 4.72 
AMEET 1.20 1.15 
DEBT 1.19 1.11 
FAGE 1.13 1.15 
LNFSIZE 1.98 1.68 
Variable FC NFC 
IP 1.40 1.33 
TS 1.22 1.32 
PROP 1.54 1.44 
OTHERS 1.78 1.50 
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Notes: ALL=Family and non-family controlled companies, FC=Family-controlled, NFC=Non-family 
controlled, Q=Tobin’s Q, ROE=Return On Equity, BSIZE=Board size, BQUAL=Board qualification, 
BMEET=Board meeting, BEXP=Board expertise, FDIR=Board diversity, MOWN=Managerial 
ownership, BCSIZE=size of Board of Commissioners, BCINDE=Independence of board 
commissioners, ASIZE=Audit committee size, AINDE=Audit committee independence, 
AMEET=Audit committee meeting, DEBT=firm’s debt, FAGE=Firm age, LNFSIZE=Firm size, 
IP=Industrial Products, TS=Trading services, PROP= Properties, OTHERS=Others. 
 
This section examines the VIF for all models (all companies, family and non-family 
controlled companies). Table 5.12 shows that VIF for all companies ranges from 1.07 
to 5.54. The VIF value for family-controlled companies ranges from 1.07 to 4.38 and 
that in non-family controlled companies ranges from 1.08 to 4.72. Thus, the values of 
VIF for the two models are found to range from 1.07 to 5.54, which is below the 
threshold value of 10 (Gujarati, 2003; Hair et al., 2006). Thus, multicollinearity is not 
likely to affect the regression analysis. 
 
5.5.2  Results of Hausman Tests 
 
Table 5.13 
Hausman tests 
Panel A: Family-Controlled Companies 
 Q ROE 
Chi
2
(14) 41.60 12.59 
Prob>chi
2
 0.0001 0.5585 
Panel B: Non-family Controlled Companies 
 Q ROE 
Chi
2
(14) 22.87 23.43 
Prob>chi
2
 0.0624 0.0436 
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The Hausman test examines if the individual effects are uncorrelated with other 
regressors in the model. The FEM is a model with fixed effects (FE) that correlate 
with the explanatory variables, while the REM is a specific case with zero correlation. 
The purpose of Hausman test is to check the null hypothesis that the coefficients 
estimated by the efficient RE estimators are the same as the ones estimated by the 
efficient FE estimators. If the p-value, prob > chi
2
, is larger than 0.05, then random 
effects should be used. However, if the p-value is significant or less than 0.05, then it 
is better to use FE. 
 
The results in Table 5.13 in Panel A (family-controlled companies) reveal a 
significant p-value for Tobins’ Q (FE), but not for ROE (RE). Next, Panel B (non-
family controlled companies) shows a significant p-value for ROE (FE), but not for 
Tobins’ Q (RE).  
 
5.5.3  Results of Autocorrelation 
Table 5.14 
Durbin-Watson 
 FC 
(Eq. 4.1) 
NFC 
(Eq. 4.2) 
Q 1.57 1.01 
ROE 1.43 1.84 
Notes: FC=Family-controlled, NFC=Non-family controlled, Q=Tobin’s Q, ROE=Return on Equity.  
 
Table 5.14 explains that the problem of positive autocorrelation exists. For 
autocorrelation problem, the assumption is that no autocorrelation problem is present 
if the REM is chosen (Greene, 2003; Gujarati, 2003).  
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5.6 Multivariate Analysis 
 
5.6.1 Generalized Least Squares (GLS) Estimation of Family-Controlled 
Companies: Attributes of the Board of Directors (H2a to H7a), Attributes of 
the Board of Commissioners (H8a to H9a) and Audit Committee 
Characteristics (H10a to H12a). 
 
This section discusses the family-controlled companies as sample. Sub-section 5.6.1.1 
discusses board of director attributes for family-controlled companies (H2a to H7a), 
next, sub-section 5.6.1.2 focuses on board of commissioner attributes (H8a to H9a) and 
sub-section 5.6.1.3 highlights audit committee characteristics (H10a to H12a). 
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Table 5.15 
Regression results for GLS estimation for family-controlled companies (H2a to H12a) 
 
   Model A Model B 
 H Expected 
Sign 
Q 
(Coefficient) 
ROE 
(Coefficient) 
BSIZE H2a - -.0014*** -.0114*** 
BQUAL H3a - -.0130*** -.0255** 
BMEET H4a - .0013** .0015*** 
BEXP H5a - -.3985** -.0236*** 
FDIR H6a - -.1516** .0294 
MOWN H7a + -1.093** -.0507** 
BCSIZE H8a - -.1165** -.0222** 
BCINDE H9a - .0054 -.2661** 
ASIZE H10a - -.3170** -.0753** 
AINDE H11a - -.8260** -.8348** 
AMEET H12a - .0030*** .5414** 
DEBT  - -.1915*** -.0101** 
FAGE  + -.0562*** -.0016*** 
FSIZE  + .9777*** .0132 
IP  + .0752*** .0066* 
TS  + .0434** .0343** 
PROP  + 0.0062* .0003*** 
OTHERS  + .0221** 0.0332** 
_CONS   .0049** -.1317*** 
R
2
   81.62 81.35 
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   Model A Model B 
 H Expected 
Sign 
Q 
(Coefficient) 
ROE 
(Coefficient) 
Adj. R
2
   76.36 72.19 
F stats   15.54 14.30 
P value   0.00 0.00 
Notes: * significant at 0.1 (2 tailed), ** significant at 0.05 (2 tailed), and *** significant at 0.01 (2 
tailed). Q=Tobin’s Q, ROE=Return on Equity, BSIZE=Board size, BQUAL=Board qualification, 
BMEET=Board meeting, BEXP=Board expertise, FDIR=Femles on the Board, MOWN=Managerial 
ownership, BCSIZE=size of Board of Commissioners, BCINDE=Independence of board 
commissioners, ASIZE=Audit committee size, AINDE=Audit committee independence, 
AMEET=Audit committee meeting, DEBT=firm’s debt, FAGE=Firm age, LNFSIZE=Firm size, 
IP=Industrial Products, TS=Trading services, PROP= Properties, and OTHERS=Others. 
 
 
Table 5.15 presents the findings of the relationships between family-controlled 
companies and firm performance. The results show that board meeting (H4a) and audit 
committee meeting (H12a) are positively related to firm performance; while board size 
(H2a), board qualification (H3a), board expertise (H5a), females on the board (H6a), size 
of board of commissioners (H8a), independent commissioners (H9a), audit committee 
size (H10a) and audit committee independence (H11a) are negatively related to firm 
performance. Other hypothesized variables, board meeting (H4a), managerial 
ownership (H7a) and audit committee meeting (H12a) reveal an opposite direction of 
what was predicted in this study. 
 
5.6.1.1 The Effect of Board of Director Attributes on Firm Performance for 
Family-Controlled Companies (H2a to H7a) 
 
In this part, the discussion focuses on the board of director attributes in family-
controlled companies and their relationship with firm performance. Table 5.16 shows 
that smaller board size (H2a) enhances the performance of family-controlled 
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companies as compared to larger board size for Tobin’s Q (-.0001***) and ROE (-
.0003***). These results are consistent with previous local works (Darmadi, 2012; 
Itan, 2015) and other overseas studies (Ferris et al., 2003; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; 
Chen et al., 2008; Mishra & Ratti, 2011; Horvath & Spirollari, 2012). Reasons for this 
relationship are that communication in smaller boards is easier, easier to make 
decisions and conflicts between shareholders and management can be avoided (Lipton 
& Lorsch, 1992). Additionally, the stewardship theory suggests that boards become 
ineffective when they become large. Family-controlled companies tend to save the 
cost and large boards face difficulty in communicating and coordinating among group 
members, thus creating conflict because of different opinions among directors. Large 
boards also do not help the top management to monitor the firm effectively. 
Furthermore, the structure and membership of boards in family-controlled companies 
include family members. Thus, smaller boards as compared to larger boards are more 
able to avoid conflicts among directors when making decisions (Horvath & Spirollari, 
2012). Yopie and Itan (2016) claimed that Indonesian family-controlled companies 
with larger boards do not enhance firm performance. Larger boards can generate more 
ideas and provide more advice, which make it difficult for managers to achieve a 
consensus and make correct decisions. Thus, sometimes, complications and conflicts 
occur; therefore, larger boards inhibit the development of a company. Therefore, 
hypothesis H2a is supported. 
 
This finding reveals that board qualification (H3a) decreases the performance of 
family-controlled companies (Q = -.0015***, ROE = .0125**). This study found that 
when there are more qualified directors sitting on the board, the lower firm 
performance. The reason behind this finding may be due the effect of the founders, 
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who have no qualification and eduation, but a very influential men in the companies. 
Some of the founders in Indonesian-family companies come from China, Malaysia, 
Singapore and other countries, and stay in Indonesia to build up and started the 
companies. Most of them are not equipped with high education background, but they 
can increases the firm performance based on personal experience and skills. Therefore, 
hypothesis H3a is supported. 
 
The result shows that board meeting (H4a) has a positive relationship with Tobin’s Q 
(.0043**) and ROE (.0097***) in family-controlled companies. Carcello and Neal 
(2002) found evidence that a high frequency of meetings influences the quality of 
audits and protects the interests of shareholders. This indicates that board meetings 
play an important role that includes monitoring of activities that leads to an 
improvement in the quality of boards. Based on stewardship theory, the frequency 
meetings between family directors may provide complex solutions, great strategies, 
new ideas and best management controller in terms of increasing firm performance. If 
the board of director is lack of skills, knowledge and experience to manage or control 
a company, a higher frequency of board meetings can reduce the problems. Therefore, 
high frequency of board meetings may positively and significantly influence family 
firm performance (Darmadi, 2013). Darmadi (2013), who studied Indonesian 
companies, claimed that PLCs in Indonesia are in a transitional stage. Presently, 
because company boards often lack appropriate skills and experience to manage the 
company, a greater frequency of board meetings may provide the information and 
knowledge for these directors to enhance firm performance. Therefore, hypothesis H4a 
is not supported. 
 
181 
 
Board directors’ professional knowledge and expertise (H5a) are negatively related to 
firm performance (Q = -.0128**, ROE = -.0041**). This finding indicates that higher 
board expertise may decrease the performance of a family firm. Currently, many of 
the major owners of Indonesian family-controlled companies are in their second or 
third generations; thus, some of the directors in Indonesian family-companies have no 
professional skills and expertise but are very influential in companies. Amran and 
Che-Ahmad (2011) explained that a fewer number of experts are more suitable for 
board effectiveness as compared to a high number of experts. The fewer number of 
experts result in better discussion and faster agreement and quicker decision-making 
among directors. Directors who are equipped with qualifications and skills might have 
different wishes for family directors in managing the company. Therefore, it creates 
conflict that may have influenced the results of this study. Thus, hypothesis H5a is 
supported. 
 
Female directors (H6a) has a negative relationship with Tobins’ Q (-.0376**). The 
result shows that female directors do not enhance Indonesian family-company 
performance. Among the reasons why this is so are because many Indonesian family-
controlled companies have traditional perceptions about family, in which the 
successors of company should be the eldest son of the founder (Holliday & Letherby, 
1993). Furthermore, the founder of the family-controlled company is often concerned 
with carrying on the family name. Typically, in Indonesia, a married daughter will 
adopt her husband’s surname and thus the symbolic identity of the company will be 
effected. Moreover, male directors are expected to be more competitive than female 
directors (Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2011). Therefore, hypothesis H6a is supported. 
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In this study, the evidence suggests that a low level of managerial ownership results in 
increased firm performance. Thus, when family ownership is low, the performance of 
family companies is enhanced. In Indonesia, ownership of family companies is highly 
concentrated, and a high family concentration of ownership causes lower firm 
performance. One reason given for this relationship is that family-controlled 
companies tend to expropriate funds from non-family shareholders (Singapurwoko, 
2013). Family-controlled companies need 15% equity in a listed company to control 
the firm effectively. Therefore, an effective way to mitigate the managerial ownership 
problem is when family ownership is low (Amran & Che-Ahmad, 2011). Based on 
discussion above, hypothesis H7a is not supported. 
 
5.6.1.2 The Effect of Board of Commissioner Attributes on Firm Performance 
for Family-Controlled Companies (H8a to H9a) 
 
This section focuses on the relationship between board of commissioner attributes in 
family-controlled companies and firm performance. Table 5.16 shows that a smaller 
board of commissioners (H8a) increases the performance of family-controlled 
companies for Tobin’s Q (-.0489***) and ROE (-.0334**). This finding is consistent 
with previous studies (Surifah, 2013; Harjito & Singapurwoko, 2014; Itan, 2015). 
This study provides evidence that more commissioners in family companies will 
decrease company performance. One reason that has been suggested for this 
relationship is that a larger board creates difficulties in terms of communication 
among commissioners (Harjito & Singapurwoko, 2014).  
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The stewardship theory provides a rationale for this finding. Family directors have a 
great sense of belonging to the company; thus, family directors exhibit a stronger 
commitment to the company as compared to commissioners. The expectation is that 
family directors understand more of the company’s inner workings and know the 
company’s operations better than commissioners who are not directly in charge of the 
daily operations of the company (Surifah, 2013). Further, Itan (2015), in a study of 
Indonesian companies, found that a larger board of commissioners in Indonesian 
family-controlled companies has a lower level of alignment between the board and 
company management and generates potential agency conflicts between principal and 
agent. Therefore, hypothesis H8a is supported. 
 
This finding reveals that a smaller proportion of independent commissioners (H9a) 
enhances the performance of family-controlled companies for ROE (-.0197**). Itan 
(2015) claimed that most Indonesian family-controlled companies dislike employing 
independent commissioners even though these commissioners could provide 
knowledge and experience that cannot be found in family directors (Harjito & 
Singapurwoko, 2014). The reason is that a family director is expected to understand 
the condition of company better than an outside director, resulting in better decisions 
that in turn, can increase firm performance (Surifah, 2013). In addition, family 
directors do not believe that independent commissioners can understand the firm’s 
competitive situation better than family directors (Harjito & Singapurwoko, 2014; 
Itan, 2015). Furthermore, independent commissioners on the board may be co-opted 
due to personal relationship of the independent commissioners with the CEO. 
Independent commissioners who have served and stay for a long time in a company 
may build a good relationship with management, thus, making it difficult for them to 
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give an independent judgement (Meng, 2009). Thus, hypothesis H9a is partially 
supported. 
 
5.6.1.3 The Effect of Audit Committee Characteristics on Firm Performance for 
Family-Controlled Companies (H10a to H12a) 
 
This section focuses on the relationship between audit committee characteristics in 
family-controlled companies and firm performance. Table 5.16 shows that smaller 
audit committees (H10a) enhance the performance of family-controlled companies for 
Tobins’ Q (-.0315**) and ROE (-.0402**). This finding supports the results of 
previous studies (Davidson et al., 2005; Miller & Breton-Miller, 2006). One reason 
for the relationship is that a larger audit committee may incur higher costs, which 
does not contribute to firm performance.  
 
The function of an audit committee is to monitor the reliability of the company and 
ensure cooperation with the legal department (Turley & Zaman, 2007). Family-
controlled companies need to spend extra funds, such as salary and bonus expenses 
for the audit committee. In Indonesian family-controlled companies, the owners have 
highly concentrated ownership and the power to control the daily operations of 
companies. Furthermore, based on stewardship theory, family members are act as 
steward because they have high feel of belonging to companies. Thus, they tend to 
minimize the agency costs. Because family-controlled companies put most of their 
wealth in the company, they seek to achieve and increase the benefits of company; 
therefore, audit committee size is preferably smaller. Thus, hypothesis H10a is 
supported. 
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In terms of audit committee independence (H11a), the results are negatively related to 
firm performance when measured using Tobin’s Q (-.0446**) and ROE (-.0361**). 
The findings are consistent with previous studies (Klein, 2002; Parker & Peters, 2004; 
Al-Matari et al., 2014). In Indonesian companies, the board of commissioners may 
promote better firm performance and ensure high shareholders’ returns (Klein, 2002). 
However, some believe that independent commissioners are better monitors of 
management than inside directors. Independent commissioners are seen as acting in 
the best interests of shareholders who can influence significant returns. This is 
particularly true when independent commissioners are members of the audit 
committee. For instance, Anderson and Reeb (2003) found that audit committee 
independence brings lower debt for financing costs. Therefore, when the firm needs to 
expand, the family management is reluctant to have debt; thus, it will affect the firm’s 
value. Therefore, hypothesis H11a is supported. 
 
Audit committee meeting (H12a), has a positive relationship with firm performance for 
Tobin’s Q (.0177**) and ROE (.0276**), showing that a higher frequency of audit 
meetings may enhance firm performance. Al-Matari et al. (2014) noted that stock 
prices increase when a company is controlled effectively and audit committee 
meetings are held regularly. This indicates that audit committee meetings can provide 
useful information and address problems. 
  
A local study by Hamid et al. (2014) argued that firms with a higher frequency of 
audit committee meetings can provide more accurate financial reports, monitor the 
internal controls and identify management risks, which in turn, may lead to increased 
firm performance. Further, owners of family-controlled companies have power to 
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control company operations; thus, the family owners may hold meetings and 
minimize agency costs (Miller & Breton-Miller, 2006). Therefore, hypothesis H12a is 
not supported in this study. 
 
5.6.1.4 The Effect of Control Variables on the Performance of Family-Controlled 
Companies 
 
This section examines the relationship of control variables on the performance of 
family-controlled companies in Indonesia. Debt has a negative relationship with 
Tobins’ Q (-.0000***) and ROE (-.0116**). One reason for this is that family 
directors put most of their wealth into companies. Family directors are reluctant to use 
an optimal amount of debt for financing their companies because they consider the 
company’s sustainability and ability to pay off the debt. Therefore, the insufficiency 
of funds to run the business may affect firm performance. 
 
In terms of firm age, the findings show a negative relationship with Tobins’ Q (-
.0094***) and ROE (-.0000***). One explanation for this result is that the 
performance of Indonesian family-controlled companies decreases when the firms 
become mature in the market. On average, younger firms are likely to achieve better 
performance than older firms because older firms suffer from routinization of 
operations, a lack of training and out-of-date information and become more 
conservative, which may decrease firm performance (Itan, 2015). 
 
Firm size is positively related to Tobin’s Q (.0000***).  It indicates that larger 
companies contribute more benefits than smaller companies (Helmich, 1977). When 
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the size of company is large, family companies have the opportunity to develop and 
train their top management to face complex problems and come up with the best 
solutions (Helmich, 1977). 
 
For family-controlled companies, this study finds that industries on the Indonesian 
Stock Exchange are positively related to firm performance for all performance 
indicators (Q and ROE). Thus, industries are also sensitive to firm performance 
indicators. 
 
 
5.6.2 GLS Estimation of Non-Family Controlled Companies: Board of Director 
Attributes (H2b to H7b), Board of Commissioner Attributes (H8b to H9b) and 
Audit Committee Characteristics (H10b to H12b). 
 
 
This section discusses non-family controlled companies only. Sub-section 5.6.3.1 
discusses board of director attributes for non-family controlled companies (H2b to H7b), 
sub-section 5.6.3.2 focuses on board of commissioner attributes (H8b to H9b) and sub-
section 5.6.3.3 highlights audit committee characteristics (H10b to H12b). 
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Table 5.16 
Regression results for GLS estimation for non-family controlled companies (H2b to 
H12b) 
 
   Model A Model B 
 H Expected 
Sign 
Q 
(Coefficient) 
ROE 
(Coefficient) 
BSIZE H2b + .0304** .0237** 
BQUAL H3b + .7434*** .9962** 
BMEET H4b + .0071** .0094*** 
BEXP H5b + .8056** .4094** 
FDIR H6b + 0.4561*** .0361*** 
MOWN H7b - 1.6147 -.2932 
BCSIZE H8b + -.0595** -.0222** 
BCINDE H9b + .7653** .0149** 
ASIZE H10b + -.4397** -.3956** 
AINDE H11b + 4.5245** 4.8047 
AMEET H12b + .0034** .0034** 
DEBT  - -.2636*** .2647** 
FAGE  + -.0040 -.0038 
FSIZE  + .6234*** .0026*** 
IP  + .0124** .0414** 
TS  + .0241** .0614* 
PROP  + .0024*** .0074*** 
OTHERS  + .0125** .0274** 
_CONS   .0000*** .1247*** 
R
2
   25.05 31.35 
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   Model A Model B 
 H Expected 
Sign 
Q 
(Coefficient) 
ROE 
(Coefficient) 
Adj. R
2
   23.52 29.53 
F stats   16.35 18.22 
P value   0.00 0.00 
Notes: * significant at 0.1 (2 tailed), ** significant at 0.05 (2 tailed), and *** significant at 0.01 (2 
tailed). Q=Tobin’s Q, ROE=Return on Equity, BSIZE=Board size, BQUAL=Board qualification, 
BMEET=Board meeting, BEXP=Board expertise, FDIR=Female Directors, MOWN=Managerial 
ownership, BCSIZE=size of Board of Commissioners, BCINDE=Independence of board 
commissioners, ASIZE=Audit committee size, AINDE=Audit committee independence, 
AMEET=Audit committee meeting, DEBT=firm’s debt, FAGE=Firm age, LNFSIZE=Firm size, 
IP=Industrial Products, TS=Trading services, PROP= Properties, and OTHERS=Others. 
 
 
Table 5.16 presents the findings for the relationship between non-family controlled 
companies and firm performance. The results show that board size (H2b), board 
qualification (H3b), board meeting (H4b), board expertise (H5b), female directors (H6b), 
independent commissioners (H9b), audit committee independence (H11b) and audit 
committee meeting (H12b) are positively related to firm performance; while size of 
board of commissioners (H8b) and audit committee size (H10b) reveal an opposite 
direction to what was predicted in this study. The other hypothesis on managerial 
ownership (H7b) has no significance with firm performance, and thus is not supported 
in this study. 
 
5.6.2.1 The Effect of Board of Director Attributes on Firm Performance for Non-
Family Controlled Companies (H2b to H7b) 
 
This section focuses on the relationship between board of director attributes in non-
family controlled companies and firm performance. With reference to Table 5.17, 
board size (H2b) is positively related with Tobins’ Q (.0472**) and ROE (.0146**). 
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These results are consistent with previous local studies (Darmadi, 2013; Surifah, 2013) 
and other country studies (Ferris et al., 2003; Zainal et al., 2009; Chen & Nowland, 
2010). Studies have claimed that larger boards in non-family controlled companies 
may increase firm performance. Some believe that a large board in a company can 
provide more resources and has a higher problem-solving capability (Darmadi, 2012). 
The rationale is that large boards provide more skills, knowledge, strategy and 
experience during shareholders’ meeting (Zainal et al., 2009; Surifah, 2013). Thus, 
large boards appear to be more effective as compared to small boards. Based on the 
discussion above, hypothesis H2b is supported in this study. 
 
In terms of board qualification, directors with a degree qualification (H3b) have a 
positive relationship with all indicators of firm performance (Q = .0049***, ROE 
= .0435**). The findings indicate that high educational background and skills are 
needed to enhance firm performance. Based on agency theory, a company needs 
educated directors’ to manage and control the operation of company, so that it can 
maximise the firm value and align the interest between principals and agents. Amran 
and Che-Ahmad (2011) claimed that directors who are well-educated are better able 
to understand financial matters, set strategy, and control management. Previous 
studies have suggested (Yasser, 2011) that a director who has better education can 
provide creative solutions and guidance to solve complex problems (Hamid et al., 
2014). Thus, companies have advantage when they have educated directors on the 
board. Therefore, hypothesis H3b is supported. 
 
The findings show that board meeting (H4b) has a positive relationship with Tobins’ Q 
(.0191**) and ROE (.0447**) in non-family controlled companies. In this finding, the 
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current study aligns with previous researchers (Yasser, 2011; Horvath & Spirollar, 
2012; Surifah, 2013; Darmadi, 2013; Harjito & Singapurwoko, 2014). The results 
indicate that a low frequency of board meetings exhibits the lowest price-to-book 
value. This may be due to a lack of communication among directors, and a higher 
frequency of board meetings can resolve this issue, thus enhancing firm performance 
(Yasser, 2011). Based on the agency theory, the frequency of board meetings may be 
used to measure the effectiveness of board activity (Vafeas, 1999); therefore, a high 
frequency of board meetings is seen as a mechanism to protect the interests of 
shareholders, share ideas and help improve company profits (Byrne, 1996; Darmadi, 
2013). Thus, hypothesis H4b is supported in this study. 
 
Board expertise (H5b) is found to increase firm performance in this current study, 
using Tobin’s Q (.0456**) and ROE (.0367**). Amran and Che-Ahmad (2011) found 
that board expertise contributes to helping companies to set strategies, increase board 
effectiveness and provide innovative ideas, thus enhancing performance. In short, 
Indonesian companies need directors who have expertise, skills and knowledge to 
monitor and manage the daily business. Furthermore, board expertise may reduce the 
conflicts between major shareholders and minor shareholders in terms of making 
complex decision and strategies. Therefore, hypothesis H5b is supported. 
 
Female directors (H6b) has a positive relationship with Tobin’s Q (.0014***), and 
ROE (.0031***). The finding is consistent with past studies (Carter et al., 2003; Bonn, 
2004; Smith et al., 2006; Majdalani et al., 2014). Several reasons exist for this 
relationship. Among them is that female directors have more market knowledge and 
project a better image and perception when communicating with customers (Smith, 
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2006; Majdalani et al., 2014). From agency theory perspective, female directors seem 
to be more successful in gaining support and commitment of customers and 
employees in the company (Majdalani et al., 2014), thus, increasing firm performance. 
Another reason why the number of female directors is positive and significant with 
firm performance is that the number of female directors is increasing from year to 
year in Indonesia. Although currently, more male directors serve on boards than 
female directors, female directors can provide opinions, skills and perceptions in 
terms of firm performance. Therefore, hypothesis H6b is supported. 
 
For non-family managerial ownership (H7b), the results show that managerial 
ownership does not significantly influence firm performance. The hypothesis in this 
study posited a negative relationship; however, the results fail to find any relationship 
between non-family managerial ownership and firm performance. This lack of a 
relationship may exist because the ownership structure differs across firms, including 
differences in the firms, the scale of economics, regulations and the environment in 
which they operate (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). Therefore, hypothesis H7b is not 
supported.  
 
5.6.2.2 The Effect of Board of Commissioner Attributes on Firm Performance 
for Non-Family Controlled Companies (H8b to H9b) 
 
 
This section focuses on the relationship between board of commissioner attributes in 
non-family controlled companies and firm performance. Table 5.17 shows that 
smaller board of commissioners (H8b) enhances the performance of non-family 
controlled companies for Tobin’s Q (-.0383**) and ROE (-.0143**). This study 
193 
 
provides evidence that a large board of commissioners in non-family controlled 
companies decreases the performance of the companies. In previous studies on 
Indonesia, Harjito and Singapurwoko (2014) and Itan (2015) claimed that smaller 
board of commissioners contributes to the alignment of the interests of shareholders 
and managers. Further, a larger board of commissioners may produce agency conflicts 
between majority and minority shareholders.  
 
In non-family controlled companies, the directors should be more independent 
because the board contains no family members who might influence the board. 
However, the results of this study contradict this hypothesis. Based on agency theory 
perspective, one of the reason why a larger board of commissioners might decrease 
firm performances is that larger board commissioners decreases the effectiveness of 
the company because a large number would make it difficult to carry out the board’s 
duties and included reasons such as difficulty in communication and coordination 
among commissioners, and the members of the board of commissioners who stay for 
a long time in a company might have built a personal relationship with managers. So, 
they may have difficulty in giving independent judgement when making decisions. 
Additionally, some of the commissioners may not be experienced, and they have no 
feel for business activities. Therefore, a large board of commissioners could destroy 
firm performance. Hence, hypothesis H8b is not supported in this study. 
 
In terms of independent commissioners, the result reveals that a larger proportion of 
independent commissioners (H9b) increases the performance of non-family controlled 
companies (Q =.0212**, ROE =.0145**). Singapurwoko’s (2013) study of 
Indonesian companies predicted that the number of independent commissioners in 
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Indonesian non-family controlled companies is likely to be higher than in family-
controlled companies because they believe that an independent commissioner can 
provide diverse expertise, knowledge, experience, independent opinions and ideas for 
companies. Further, a larger number of independent commissioners in Indonesian 
companies could increase the corporate governance level (Saragih et al., 2012). From 
the corporate governance perspective, an independent commissioner is responsible to 
supervise and be a watchdog of board activity. An independent commissioner can 
increase shareholder value, and has the knowledge to provide independent judgement 
on strategy and performance (NCG, 2006). Therefore, hypothesis H9b is supported in 
this study. 
 
5.6.2.3 The Effect of Audit Committee Characteristics on Firm Performance for 
Non-Family Controlled Companies (H10b to H12b) 
 
This part focuses on the relationship between audit committee characteristics in non-
family controlled companies and firm performance. Table 5.17 shows that audit 
committee size (H10b) is negatively related to non-family controlled firm performance. 
This finding indicates that a smaller audit committee enhances the performance of 
non-family controlled companies for Tobin’s Q (-.0357**) and ROE (-.0438**). The 
results in this study contradict what was hypothesised. Too many independent 
directors are on the boards leading to inefficient governance and increasing expenses 
(Bansal & Kharma, 2016). Hence, a larger audit committee can have a negative 
relationship with firm performance. Therefore, hypothesis H10b is not supported. 
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Audit committee independence is found to be positively related with all indicators of 
firm performance (Q = .0407**). The result reveals that a larger number of 
independent audit committee members enhance firm performance. In Indonesia, the 
audit committee is viewed as an important mechanism of corporate governance. That 
is because a more independent audit committee is better able to handle various 
monitoring processes and keep an eye on managers. Further, a more independent audit 
committee may ensure the reliability of the financial statement reporting process by 
checking on any manipulative actions of managers (Bansal & Kharma, 2016). Yasser 
(2011) mentioned that audit committee independence improves the quality of audit 
reports and increases firm performance. Therefore, hypothesis H11b is partially 
supported. 
 
For audit committee meeting (H12b), the finding shows that high frequency of audit 
committee meetings has a positive relationship with Tobins’ Q (.0218**) and ROE 
(.0410**). Regular and frequent audit committee meetings can help a company to 
minimize agency problems and reduce information asymmetry by providing 
transparent, timely and fair information to investors (Al-Mamun, 2014; Hamid et al., 
2014; Al-Matari et al., 2014; Bansal & Kharma, 2016). Bansal and Kharma (2016) 
suggested that a company in which the audit committee meets more frequently is 
likely to safeguard the bests interests of its investors, thus, enhancing firm 
performance. Hence, hypothesis H12b is supported. 
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5.6.2.4 The Effect of Control Variables on the Performance of Non-Family 
Controlled Companies 
 
Table 5.16 shows that debt is negatively related to Tobin’s Q (-.0000***) but 
positively related with ROE (.0312**). In Indonesian non-family controlled 
companies, debt is one way to raise capital. One reason for this negative relationship 
is that directors in non-family controlled companies are reluctant to use the optimal 
amount of debt to fund their companies because they consider debt to increase the risk 
of bankruptcy (Itan, 2015).  
 
Firm size is positively related with all indicators of firm performance (Q = .0003***, 
ROE = .0467**). This indicates that larger companies generate more profits; thus, 
firm performance is enhanced (Lehn et al., 2004). In terms of industries, this study 
finds that industries are also positively related with all indicators of firm performance 
with Tobin’s Q and ROE. Meanwhile, each industry is capable of influencing firm 
performance (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
This section presents the results for panel data by checking for outliers, looking for 
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and performing the Hausman test. 
This study developed two equations for different samples (family-controlled 
companies and non-family controlled companies). This is followed by the descriptive 
statistics, univariate tests and multivariate analyses and a discussion of these results.  
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The results show that family-controlled companies perform better than non-family 
controlled companies. Next, family-controlled companies with smaller board size are 
associated with better firm performance. However, a larger board size in non-family 
controlled companies contributes to firm performance which could be because they 
provide knowledge and skills that cannot be found among family directors. Board 
meetings are found to be positively related to firm performance for both family and 
non-family controlled companies. Next, board qualification and board expertise are 
negatively and significantly related with respect to firm performance for family-
controlled companies, but positively related with non-family owned companies. 
Female directors are seen to contribute value to non-family controlled companies, but 
not to family-controlled companies. Managerial ownership is found to be insignificant 
with respect to non-family controlled companies, but negatively and significantly 
related to family-controlled companies. 
 
In terms of board of commissioner attributes, a smaller board of commissioners 
enhances firm performance for family-controlled firms and non-family controlled 
firms. For independent commissioners, a higher proportion of independent 
commissioners contributes to firm performance for non-family controlled companies, 
but is significantly and negatively related to firm performance for family-controlled 
companies. 
 
With respect to audit committee characteristics, a smaller audit committee is seen as 
being likely to enhance firm performance for both family and non-family controlled 
companies. A higher proportion of audit committee independence helps enhance the 
reliability of the financial statement reporting process, thus, increasing the firm 
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performance for non-family controlled companies, but not for family-controlled 
companies. Last, a high frequency of audit committee meetings in non-family 
controlled companies is found to impact firm performance and help the companies to 
minimize information asymmetry and agency problem by providing transparency and 
fair information to investors. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 Overview of the Chapter 
This chapter draws conclusions from the results presented in Chapter 5 and provides 
some recommendations for the regulatory bodies and interested parties to consider. 
This chapter comprises five sections. Section 6.2 summarizes the results from the two 
main equations in this study. Next, Section 6.3 reports the implications of the study. 
Section 6.4 highlights the limitations of the study and suggestions for future research. 
Finally, Section 6.5 concludes the study. 
 
6.2 Summary of the Study 
The findings show that family-controlled firms perform better than non-family 
controlled companies. Therefore, hypothesis H1 is supported in this study. The 
findings indicate that family-controlled companies have higher firm performance, 
which occur for the following reasons: first, family directors have strong feeling for or 
sense of belonging to their companies because these directors have used their own 
pocket money to establish and grow the companies. Thus, these family directors will 
put full effort and sacrifice to enhance firm performance than directors in non-family 
controlled firms; second, family-controlled firms seek to repay the hard work of 
family directors. Hence, family-controlled companies pay higher dividends when they 
achieve higher performance, which will go back into the pockets of family members; 
and third, family companies are concerned with the sustainability of companies. 
Family-controlled companies tend to generate high profits so that the business can be 
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passed to the next generation. Therefore, this study has achieved Research Objective 1, 
which is to determine if Indonesian family-controlled firms have higher firm 
performance than non-family controlled firms. 
 
Research Objective 2 focuses on the impact of board of director attributes on firm 
performance for variables of board size (H2a, H2b), board qualifications (H3a, H3b), 
board meeting (H4a, H4b), board expertise (H5a, H5b), female directors (H6a, H6b) and 
managerial ownership (H7a, H7b). The results of this study support hypotheses H2a, H2b 
for board size, H3a, H3b for board qualifications, H4a, H4b for board meeting, H5b for 
board expertise and H6b for female directors. 
 
Board size (BSIZE) is positively related to firm performance for non-family 
controlled companies. The results demonstrate that larger board size leads to to better 
firm performance. This might occur for several reasons: first, a larger size of board of 
directors may increase the pool of expertise, increase the range of perspectives and 
provide potential strategies and networking; and second, a larger board increases the 
ability to monitor the actions of top management, make critical judgements to correct 
errors and subsequently motivate corporate players to perform their work more 
efficiently in order to increase shareholders’ value.  
 
For the second group, which is family-controlled companies, board size negatively 
and significantly influences firm performance. The findings show the smaller board 
size in family-controlled companies is associated with better performance. The 
reasons behind this finding is that members of a small board can communicate easily, 
make decisions and avoid conflicts between shareholders and management. The 
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second explanation as to why Indonesian family-controlled firms with smaller boards 
have higher and better performance may be because sometimes, larger board have 
more ideas and more advice, which make it difficult for managers to choose the right 
decisions. A third explanation might be family-controlled firms revolve around family 
culture. Therefore, H2a and H2b are supported. 
 
In terms of board qualifications (BQUAL), this study found it is negatively related 
with firm performance for family-controlled companies. The reason is that the effect 
of the founder board qualification influences the results. Most of the founders have 
low education and no qualified degree background. Education is known as an 
important element for firms’ performance, but  yet it is neglected in family-controlled 
companies in Indonesia. Thus, further research should pursue on this matter. However, 
for non-family controlled companies, the results reveal that a significantly positive 
relationship exists with the firm performance for non-family controlled firms. The 
findings show that more qualified board members in a company is associated with 
better firm performance for non-family controlled companies. Thus, H3a and H3b are 
supported. The results suggest that both family-controlled and non-family controlled 
firms should have directors who are equipped with higher education qualifications 
and skills. It is to ensure that the boards engage in better decision-making and are 
more capable of controlling the companies. This suggests that directors who are well-
educated can better understand financial matters, set strategy, control management 
and provide creative solutions to solve complex problems.  
 
Interestingly, when board meeting (BMEET) was tested against firm performance, the 
findings show a positive and significant relationship with performance for family-
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controlled and non-family controlled companies. The results reveal that a higher 
frequency of board meetings is associated with better performance. Among the 
reasons for this is that a greater frequency of board meetings may provide the 
opportunity to better share information and knowledge to enhance firm performance. 
Furthermore, a higher frequency of board meetings may be related to improved 
protection of shareholders interest, the exchange of ideas and views, helping board of 
directors who lack skills, knowledge and experience to manage the company 
effectively and reducing agency problems. Thus, H4b is supported, but not H4a. 
 
Board expertise (BEXP) has a negative relationship with performance for family-
controlled firms (H5a). A reason behind this may be that the professional backgrounds 
of founders influence the relationship. Most founders have low professional skills and 
expertise in this field but are very influential and respected in the companies. Some of 
the founders in Indonesian companies do not focus on expertise of directors, 
especially in family-controlled firms, and are perhaps, more interested in soft skills 
essentially in family relationships. These founders are employed based on family 
members’ relationship rather than talent. However, for non-family controlled 
companies, the study reveals a positively significant relationship between board 
expertise and firm performance. Hence, H5a and H5b are supported. Professional 
directors contribute by helping the companies in setting strategies, improving board 
effectiveness and providing innovative ideas. Thus, these professional directors add 
value to the company by enhancing firm performance. 
 
In terms of female directors (FDIR), the findings show mixed results. A higher 
number of female directors has a significantly positive influence on firm performance 
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for non-family controlled firms. One reason for this relationship is that female 
directors bring benefits to companies in terms of marketing knowledge to help the 
board make better decisions, provide different perceptions and create a better image 
when communicating with customers that lead to the enhancement of firm 
performance.  
 
However, the findings reveal a negative and significant influence of female directors 
on firm performance for family-controlled companies. The reason behind this finding 
may be that Indonesian family-controlled companies still abide by traditional 
perceptions in which the male is the most important figure and the successor should 
be the eldest son. Furthermore, family-controlled companies are more concerned with 
passing on the family name, which a married daughter is unable to do. That is because 
a married daughter will adopt her husband’s surname, and the symbolic identity of 
company would be effected and decrease firm performance. Thus, H6a and H6b are 
supported in this study. 
 
Remarkably, the findings show a negative and significant relationship between 
managerial ownership (MOWN) and firm performance for family-controlled 
companies. For non-family controlled companies, the results are not significant (H7b). 
The reasons are that higher amount of ownership held by managers will motivate 
managers to put more effort in managing the company; hence, firm performance will 
increase. However, when the managers have very great control of the company, the 
managers will be discouraged from maximizing the benefits for shareholders at large. 
This creates an agency problem (Type II), in which managerial owners would be more 
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concerned with their personal interests rather than those of outside shareholders, thus, 
decreasing firm performance. Thus, H7a and H7b are not supported in this study. 
 
Next, Research Objective 3 is on the examination of the attributes of the board of 
commissioners and their relationship with firm performance for size of  board of 
commissioners (H8a, H8b) and independent commissioners (H9a, H9b). The results are 
related to hypotheses H8a for size of board commissioners and H9a and H9b for 
independent commissioners. 
 
In terms of size of board of commissioners (BCSIZE), the results reveal a negative 
and significant relationship between BCSIZE and firm performance for family-
controlled and non-family controlled companies. Thus, a larger-sized board of 
commissioners causes firm performance to decline. Among the reasons for this 
relationship are that boards of commissioners in Indonesia are still weak in 
performing their governance function. They find it is difficult to carry out their duties, 
including barriers in communication among commissioners and lack of authority and 
knowledge of the firm. Another explanation why a larger board of commissioners 
might decrease firm performance is members of the board of commissioners who stay 
for a long time in a company might develop personal relationships with the CEO, 
making it difficult for them to retain their independence. Therefore, H8a is supported 
in this study, but not H8b. 
 
Independent commissioners (BCINDE) are significantly and positively related to firm 
performance for non-family controlled firms. The result shows that a larger number of 
independent commissioners may lead to better firm performance. The reasons for this 
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association are several. The greater the number of independent commissioners, the 
better the supervision and the ability of the board to act as watchdog for board activity, 
increase shareholder value and provide independent judgement on strategy. 
  
However, for family-controlled companies, the results show that a lower number of 
independent commissioners is negatively and significantly related to firm 
performance. This seems to suggest that these companies need more independent 
commissioners to improve performance. The reasons for a smaller number of 
independent commissioners in Indonesia are several. In Indonesia, although some 
companies have selected independent commissioners in accordance with the criteria 
for the position, these companies still do not meet the minimal compliance 
requirements of 30% and some of the independent commissioners might not be 
actually independent. Another explanation as to why Indonesian family-controlled 
companies have a smaller number of independent commissioners may be because 
family directors do not believe that independent commissioners can understand the 
firm’s operations and the family directors. Therefore, H9a and H9b are supported. 
 
Research Objective 4 relates to audit committee characteristics and firm performance 
for variables of audit committee size (H10a, H10b), audit committee independence (H11a, 
H11b) and frequency of audit committee meetings (H12a, H12b). The results of this study 
support hypotheses H10a for audit committee size, H11a, H11b for audit committee 
independence and H12a, H12b for audit committee meeting. 
 
Audit committee size (ASIZE) has a negative and significant relationship with firm 
performance for family-controlled and non-family controlled firms. The results 
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indicate that smaller audit committees enhance firm performance. Perhaps, a smaller 
audit committee can lead to efficient governance and has low expenses associated 
with it. Furthermore, perhaps a large audit committee is not favored because 
companies believe that there are already enough independent commissioners on the 
board. Therefore, H10a is supported in this study, but not H10b. 
 
In terms of audit committee independence (AINDE), the findings are mixed. The 
study reveals that a positively significant influence exists between audit committee 
independence and firm performance for non-family controlled firms. Reasons for this 
may be that audit committee independence may increase the reliability of the financial 
reporting process by its being able to check for any manipulative activities of the 
board and handle various monitoring processes on board activity. Therefore, H11b is 
supported. 
 
However, when the relationship between audit committee independence and firm 
performance was tested for family-controlled companies, a negative and significant 
association is found. One argument is that the presence of independent audit 
committee members may not be sufficient for the audit committee to carry out its 
monitoring roles. Furthermore, audit committee independence are likely to seek a 
decrease in the level debt and effect cash flows just when companies need to expand. 
Therefore, H11a is supported in this study. 
 
The findings reveal a positive relationship between the frequency of audit committee 
meetings and firm performance for family-controlled and non-family controlled 
companies. Therefore, H12b is supported in this study, but not H12a. The reasons may 
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be that higher frequency of audit committee meetings help a company to issue more 
transparent accounting reports, monitor internal controls and identify management 
risks. Further, to pursue their functions, the audit committee should hold regular 
meetings with external auditors to review financial reports, the audit process and the 
internal controls of the company.  
 
6.3 Implications of the Study 
This study discusses theoretical and practical implications in the following sections. 
6.3.1  Theoretical Implications 
This study reveals the relationship between board of director attributes, board of 
commissioner attributes and audit committee characteristics and firm performance. 
Further, this study includes two new variables (board expertise and unaffiliated 
directors) for board director attributes. Moreover, this study provides more evidence 
on family-controlled and non-family controlled firms based on Indonesian companies.   
 
From the perspective of the agency theory, the relationship between principals and 
agents is interesting in Indonesian companies. The majority of Indonesian companies 
are family-controlled companies in which the primary owner of the company acts as 
both the principal and agent; hence, the separation of ownership and control is blurred. 
This may create agency problem because of the owners’ involvement (Type II agency 
problem).  
 
In fact, the stewardship theory is more applicable to family-controlled companies in 
this study. The rationale is that the owner acts as the steward for the company. Thus, 
the owner/steward works hard for the interests of company and neglects his or her 
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own personal interests. This scenario is clearly seen in the case of family-controlled 
companies, whereby the family directors spent great effort for the company, they are 
more concerned on the sustainability of their companies for the next generation and 
the success of the companies is the pride of the families. 
 
This study also examined the relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance in the Indonesian context. This study finds that family-ownership 
structure, which is typical in Indonesia, is negatively related to performance. Thus, the 
findings in the Indonesian context are not the same as in Western countries. These 
negative results may be because Indonesian companies are mostly family-controlled 
companies; thus, the family ownership structure highly influences managerial 
ownership. Another reason may be due to ethnic diversity with different cultures, 
beliefs and practices. There are four main ethnic groups in Indonesia: Melayu, 
Chinese, Java and Batak. However, Chinese have a strong monopoly in business as 
compared to the other ethnic groups. Chinese businesses are more oriented towards 
family-controlled companies and the families act as major shareholders in a company. 
Therefore, the managerial ownership is more concentrated, which indirectly 
influences most businesses in Indonesia. 
6.3.2  Practical Implications 
This study contributes to companies and shareholders in Indonesia in several ways: 
first, the findings of this study contribute valuable potential sources for the public, 
investors and stakeholders, in general, which will help them to know and understand 
the characteristics of family-controlled and non-family controlled firms, the role of 
corporate governance mechanisms (board of director attributes, board of 
commissioner attributes and audit committee characteristics) with respect to firm 
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performance. The reason is that the characteristics between these two groups are 
similar in terms board qualification, board meeting, female on board and board 
expertise. However, they are different in terms of board size and managerial 
ownership. 
 
Next, most companies comply with The Code based on the data from this study. 
However, there are still some companies which do not follow the rules, especially 
concerning board of commissioner and audit committee. These findings indicate that, 
in general, companies in Indonesia comply with The Code. However, companies that 
show higher firm performance are seen to comply with The Code at a minimum level, 
and these companies prefer to use their existing practices where given the choice by 
The Code. For examples, family-controlled companies with small size of audit 
committee independent show better firm performance than large size of audit 
committee independent in non-family controlled companies. It may not be appropriate 
for regulators to advise non-family controlled companies to follow the same set of 
corporate governance guidelines as family-controlled companies. Certain 
requirements on family-controlled companies should be reviewed because the 
behaviour of family business is different from other companies. For example, small 
board size may make decision quickly and minimize the conflict between principal 
and agent. Therefore, family-controlled companies with small board size have better 
performance because decision making is prompt and resolute. 
 
Third, the finding highlights the ways to safeguard the interests of stakeholders by 
appointing independent commissioners. The companies should have an independent 
body for selecting and appointing independent commissioners from this pool. Any 
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independent commissioner who is qualified may register with this independent body 
and subsequently be chosen from this pool. PLCs that need an independent 
commissioner can contact the regulatory body and make a selection. Therefore, this 
process would create a pool of independent commissioners with skills and knowledge 
in specific areas that can provide the required qualities of independent commissioners 
for the PLCs, including family-controlled firms. 
 
Lastly, this study contributes to managers who need to pay attention to how board 
governance attributes in different managerial ownerships influence firm performance. 
Attending to these board governance attributes would allow managers to choose 
appropriate ways for dealing with a board of directors and board of commissioners. 
However, it should be noted that the benefits of enhancing firm performance through 
increased board governance are not the same across all companies. 
 
6.4 Limitations of the Study and Future Research 
This study has limitations in terms of data and methodology. The specific limitations 
of this study are as follows: first, this study attempts to examine the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange for family-controlled and non-family controlled firms but excludes 
financial firms. The Indonesian data provides richer understanding to this research, 
but care should be taken in generalising the results to other countries because of 
different regulations, practice, and economic factors. The Indonesian capital market 
differs from international markets in terms of size, number of listed firms, and market 
valuation. However, the findings and policy implications of this study can be 
extended to other economics where there are similar characteristics of corporate 
governance. The study separates the analysis of relationship between corporate 
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governance and firm performance for both family and non-family controlled 
companies because of the different business styles which family companies are likely 
to be managed by family-founder, while non-family companies prefer to appoint the 
expert directors. 
 
Second, the study used only 262 companies as the sample for a five-year period 
because some companies had insufficient information and data. To enhance the 
generalizability of the results, future researchers can include small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) as the sample of study.  
 
Third, the ICMC (Bapepam) does not provide guidelines on how to determine that a 
firm is a family-controlled company. Thus, the definition of family-controlled 
company was created based on previous studies using a 20% cut-off level of 
outstanding equity stake in the hands of family directors as the measurement. This 
current study uses a family director or a group of family members which have 
minimum ownership 20% in the Indonesian setting. Moreover, based on Indonesian 
Capital Market Law, Article (1) 1995, a family director who holds at least 20% 
shareholding of a company is a substantial shareholder. 
 
Fourth, this study used panel data approach, which is powerful in analysing 
longitudinal data. However, some individual data may not be captured in the model 
for market-based research. Perhaps, a better research instrument might capture some 
observations. Future research may consider primary data (questionnaire approach) to 
explore the issue from another perspective; and lastly, this study only examined 
managerial ownership. Therefore, future studies may consider examining other 
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ownership structures that impact firm performance, including institutional ownership, 
government ownership and blockholding, all of which could affect firm performance. 
Future research may also consider examining other board of commissioner attributes 
and audit committee characteristics, such as the expertise of board of commissioners, 
qualifications of the board of commissioners, tenure of the board of commissioners, 
audit committee expertise and audit committee education. 
 
Lastly, research on the concepts and values of Syariah (Islamic) corporate governance 
is lacking. With respect to research insight, it might be interesting to explore the 
concepts of Syariah corporate governance practice in Indonesian companies. 
 
6.5 Conclusion of the Study 
This study examines the impact of corporate governance mechanisms (board of 
director attributes, board of commissioner attributes and audit committee 
characteristics) on firm performance among Indonesian PLCs. This study contributes 
to the understanding of the impact on the performance of family-controlled and non-
family controlled businesses in Indonesia. The findings provide evidence that the 
Indonesian culture is unique, with a preponderance for family-controlled companies 
which is not similar to Western companies. 
 
In Indonesian family companies, the directors are the stewards and directors manage 
the firms for the interests of stakeholders, including themselves. Thus, the stewardship 
theory is applicable in Indonesian companies. Although Indonesian companies have 
implemented corporate governance mechanisms, however, they still have room for 
improvements to strengthen the Indonesian corporate governance standards.   
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APPENDIX A: List of the sample of Indonesian family and non-family controlled 
companies 
APPENDIX A1: List of Indonesian non-family controlled companies 
No Code Name of Company Industry 
1 
AALI Astra Agro Lestari Tbk. Plantation 
2 
ADES Akasha Wira International Tbk. Industrial Product 
3 
AKKU Alam Karya Unggul Tbk. Others 
4 
ALKA Alakasa Industrindo Tbk Others 
5 
AMFG Asahimas Flat Glass Tbk. Others 
6 
AMRT Sumber Alfaria Trijaya Tbk. Trading, Service 
7 
ASGR Astra Graphia Tbk. Trading, Service 
8 
ASIA Asia Natural Resources Tbk Trading, Service 
9 
ASII Astra International Tbk. Others 
10 
ATPK ATPK Resources Tbk. Mining 
11 
AUTO Astra Otoparts Tbk. Others 
12 
BAYU Bayu Buana Tbk Trading, Service 
13 
BCIP Bumi Citra Permai Tbk. Properties 
14 
BIPP Bhuwanatala Indah Permai Tbk. Properties 
15 
BKSL Sentul City Tbk. Properties 
16 
BMSR Bintang Mitra Semestaraya Tbk Trading, Service 
17 
BMTR Global Mediacom Tbk. Trading, Service 
18 
BNBR Bakrie & Brothers Tbk Trading, Service 
19 
BRAM Indo Kordsa Tbk. Others 
20 
BRPT Barito Pacific Tbk. Others 
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No Code Name of Company Industry 
21 BTON Betonjaya Manunggal Tbk. Others 
22 BUMI Bumi Resources Tbk. Mining 
23 BWPT BW Plantation Tbk. Plantation 
24 BYAN Bayan Resources Tbk. Mining 
25 CEKA Wilmar Cahaya Indonesia Tbk. Industrial Product 
26 CITA Cita Mineral Investindo Tbk. Mining 
27 CKRA Cakra Mineral Tbk. Mining 
28 CLPI Colorpak Indonesia Tbk. Trading, Service 
29 CNTX Century Textile Industry Tbk. Others 
30 CTBN Citra Tubindo Tbk. Others 
31 CTRP Ciputra Property Tbk. Properties 
32 CTRS Ciputra Surya Tbk. Properties 
33 DART Duta Anggada Realty Tbk. Properties 
34 DEWA Darma Henwa Tbk Mining 
35 DILD Intiland Development Tbk. Properties 
36 DKFT Central Omega Resources Tbk. Mining 
37 DLTA Delta Djakarta Tbk. Industrial Product 
38 DOID Delta Dunia Makmur Tbk. Mining 
39 DSSA Dian Swastatika Sentosa Tbk Trading, Service 
40 DVLA Darya-Varia Laboratoria Tbk. Industrial Product 
41 ENRG Energi Mega Persada Tbk. Mining 
42 EPMT Enseval Putera Megatrading Tbk Trading, Service 
43 ERTX Eratex Djaja Tbk. Others 
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No Code Name of Company Industry 
44 ETWA Eterindo Wahanatama Tbk Others 
45 EXCL XL Axiata Tbk. Transportation, Infrastructure 
46 FORU Fortune Indonesia Tbk Trading, Service 
47 FPNI Lotte Chemical Titan Tbk. Others 
48 FREN Smartfren Telecom Tbk. Transportation, Infrastructure 
49 GDST Gunawan Dianjaya Steel Tbk. Others 
50 GDYR Goodyear Indonesia Tbk. Others 
51 GJTL Gajah Tunggal Tbk. Others 
52 GMCW Grahamas Citrawisata Tbk. Trading, Service 
53 GTBO Garda Tujuh Buana Tbk Mining 
54 GZCO Gozco Plantations Tbk. Plantation 
55 HDTX Panasia Indo Resources Tbk. Others 
56 HERO Hero Supermarket Tbk. Trading, Service 
57 HEXA Hexindo Adiperkasa Tbk. Trading, Service 
58 ICON Island Concepts Indonesia Tbk. Trading, Service 
59 IGAR Champion Pacific Indonesia Tbk Others 
60 IKBI Sumi Indo Kabel Tbk. Others 
61 INAF Indofarma Tbk. Industrial Product 
62 INCO Vale Indonesia Tbk. Mining 
63 INDF Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk. Industrial Product 
64 INDX Tanah Laut Tbk Transportation, Infrastructure 
65 INPP Indonesian Paradise Property T Trading, Service 
66 INRU Toba Pulp Lestari Tbk. Others 
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No Code Name of Company Industry 
67 INTA Intraco Penta Tbk. Trading, Service 
68 INTD Inter Delta Tbk Trading, Service 
69 INTP Indocement Tunggal Prakasa Tbk Others 
70 INVS Inovisi Infracom Tbk. Transportation, Infrastructure 
71 ISAT Indosat Tbk. Transportation, Infrastructure 
72 ITMA Sumber Energi Andalan Tbk. Trading, Service 
73 ITMG Indo Tambangraya Megah Tbk. Mining 
74 ITTG Leo Investments Tbk. Trading, Service 
75 JPFA Japfa Comfeed Indonesia Tbk. Others 
76 JPRS Jaya Pari Steel Tbk Others 
77 KARW ICTSI Jasa Prima Tbk. Transportation, Infrastructure 
78 KBLI KMI Wire & Cable Tbk. Others 
79 KBLV First Media Tbk. Trading, Service 
80 KIAS Keramika Indonesia Assosiasi T Others 
81 KKGI Resource Alam Indonesia Tbk. Mining 
82 KOIN Kokoh Inti Arebama Tbk Trading, Service 
83 KPIG MNC Land Tbk. Trading, Service 
84 LAPD Leyand International Tbk. Transportation, Infrastructure 
85 LION Lion Metal Works Tbk. Others 
86 LMAS Limas Centric Indonesia Tbk Trading, Service 
87 LMSH Lionmesh Prima Tbk. Others 
88 LPIN Multi Prima Sejahtera Tbk Others 
89 LPLI Star Pacific Tbk Trading, Service 
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No Code Name of Company Industry 
90 LPPF Matahari Department Store Tbk. Trading, Service 
91 LSIP PP London Sumatra Indonesia Tb Plantation 
92 MAIN Malindo Feedmill Tbk. Others 
93 MAMI Mas Murni Indonesia Tbk Trading, Service 
94 MEDC Medco Energi International Tbk Mining 
95 MERK Merck Tbk. Industrial Product 
96 MITI Mitra Investindo Tbk. Mining 
97 MKPI Metropolitan Kentjana Tbk. Properties 
98 MLBI Multi Bintang Indonesia Tbk. Industrial Product 
99 MLPL Multipolar Tbk. Trading, Service 
100 MNCN Media Nusantara Citra Tbk. Trading, Service 
101 MPPA Matahari Putra Prima Tbk. Trading, Service 
102 MTDL Metrodata Electronics Tbk. Trading, Service 
103 MYOH Samindo Resources Tbk. Mining 
104 MYTX Apac Citra Centertex Tbk Others 
105 NIKL Pelat Timah Nusantara Tbk. Others 
106 OMRE Indonesia Prima Property Tbk Properties 
107 PGAS Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero Transportation, Infrastructure 
108 PICO Pelangi Indah Canindo Tbk Others 
109 PLAS Polaris Investama Tbk Trading, Service 
110 PLIN Plaza Indonesia Realty Tbk. Properties 
111 POOL Pool Advista Indonesia Tbk. Trading, Service 
112 PSAB J Resources Asia Pasifik Tbk. Mining 
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No Code Name of Company Industry 
113 PSDN Prasidha Aneka Niaga Tbk Industrial Product 
114 PTRO Petrosea Tbk. Mining 
115 PWON Pakuwon Jati Tbk. Properties 
116 RIGS Rig Tenders Indonesia Tbk. Transportation, Infrastructure 
117 RMBA Bentoel Internasional Investam Industrial Product 
118 RODA Pikko Land Development Tbk. Properties 
119 SCBD Danayasa Arthatama Tbk. Properties 
120 SCMA Surya Citra Media Tbk. Trading, Service 
121 SCPI 
Merck Sharp Dohme Pharma 
Tbk. Industrial Product 
122 SDPC Millennium Pharmacon Internati Trading, Service 
123 SGRO Sampoerna Agro Tbk. Plantation 
124 SHID Hotel Sahid Jaya International Trading, Service 
125 SKLT Sekar Laut Tbk. Industrial Product 
126 SMCB Holcim Indonesia Tbk. Others 
127 SMDM Suryamas Dutamakmur Tbk. Properties 
128 SMMT Golden Eagle Energy Tbk. Mining 
129 SONA Sona Topas Tourism Industry Tb Trading, Service 
130 SQMI Renuka Coalindo Tbk. Trading, Service 
131 SRSN Indo Acidatama Tbk Others 
132 TBMS Tembaga Mulia Semanan Tbk. Others 
133 TCID Mandom Indonesia Tbk. Industrial Product 
134 TFCO Tifico Fiber Indonesia Tbk. Others 
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No Code Name of Company Industry 
135 TOTO Surya Toto Indonesia Tbk. Others 
136 TPIA Chandra Asri Petrochemical Tbk Others 
137 UNIT Nusantara Inti Corpora Tbk Others 
138 UNTR United Tractors Tbk. Trading, Service 
139 UNTX Unitex Tbk. Others 
140 UNVR Unilever Indonesia Tbk. Industrial Product 
141 VOKS Voksel Electric Tbk. Others 
142 WICO Wicaksana Overseas Internation Trading, Service 
143 ZBRA Zebra Nusantara Tbk Transportation, Infrastructure 
135 TOTO Surya Toto Indonesia Tbk. Others 
136 TPIA Chandra Asri Petrochemical Tbk Others 
137 UNIT Nusantara Inti Corpora Tbk Others 
138 UNTR United Tractors Tbk. Trading, Service 
139 UNTX Unitex Tbk. Others 
140 UNVR Unilever Indonesia Tbk. Industrial Product 
141 VOKS Voksel Electric Tbk. Others 
142 WICO Wicaksana Overseas Internation Trading, Service 
143 ZBRA Zebra Nusantara Tbk Transportation, Infrastructure 
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APPENDIX A2: List of Indonesian family-controlled companies 
No Code Name of Company Industry 
1 ABBA Mahaka Media Tbk. Trading, Service 
2 ACES Ace Hardware Indonesia Tbk. Trading, Service 
3 ADMG Polychem Indonesia Tbk Others 
4 ADRO Adaro Energy Tbk. Mining 
5 AIMS Akbar Indo Makmur Stimec Tbk Trading, Service 
6 AKRA AKR Corporindo Tbk. Trading, Service 
7 ALMI Alumindo Light Metal Industry Others 
8 APLI Asiaplast Industries Tbk. Others 
9 APOL Arpeni Pratama Ocean Line Tbk. Transportation, Infrastructure 
10 ARGO Argo Pantes Tbk Others 
11 ARTI Ratu Prabu Energi Tbk Mining 
12 ASRI Alam Sutera Realty Tbk. Properties 
13 BAPA Bekasi Asri Pemula Tbk. Properties 
14 BIMA Primarindo Asia Infrastructure Others 
15 BISI BISI International Tbk. Plantation 
16 BKDP Bukit Darmo Property Tbk Properties 
17 BLTA Berlian Laju Tanker Tbk Transportation, Infrastructure 
18 BRNA Berlina Tbk. Others 
19 BTEK Bumi Teknokultura Unggul Tbk Plantation 
20 BUDI Budi Starch & Sweetener Tbk. Others 
21 CMPP Centris Multipersada Pratama T Trading, Service 
22 CNKO Exploitasi Energi Indonesia Tb Trading, Service 
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No Code Name of Company Industry 
23 COWL Cowell Development Tbk. Properties 
24 CPIN Charoen Pokphand Indonesia Tbk Others 
25 CPRO Central Proteina Prima Tbk. Plantation 
26 CSAP Catur Sentosa Adiprana Tbk. Trading, Service 
27 CTRA Ciputra Development Tbk. Properties 
28 DGIK Nusa Konstruksi Enjiniring Tbk Properties 
29 DNET Indoritel Makmur Internasional Trading, Service 
30 DPNS Duta Pertiwi Nusantara Tbk. Others 
31 DSFI Dharma Samudera Fishing Indust Plantation 
32 DUTI Duta Pertiwi Tbk Properties 
33 EKAD Ekadharma International Tbk. Others 
34 ESTI Ever Shine Tex Tbk. Others 
35 FAST Fast Food Indonesia Tbk. Trading, Service 
36 FASW Fajar Surya Wisesa Tbk. Others 
37 FISH FKS Multi Agro Tbk. Trading, Service 
38 FMII Fortune Mate Indonesia Tbk Properties 
39 GEMA Gema Grahasarana Tbk. Trading, Service 
40 GGRM Gudang Garam Tbk. Industrial Product 
41 GMTD 
Gowa Makassar Tourism 
Development Tbk. Properties 
42 GPRA Perdana Gapuraprima Tbk. Properties 
43 HITS Humpuss Intermoda Transportasi Transportation, Infrastructure 
44 HOME Hotel Mandarine Regency Tbk. Trading, Service 
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No Code Name of Company Industry 
45 IKAI Intikeramik Alamasri Industri Others 
46 IMAS Indomobil Sukses Internasional Others 
47 INAI Indal Aluminium Industry Tbk. Others 
48 INCI Intanwijaya Internasional Tbk Others 
49 INDR Indo-Rama Synthetics Tbk. Others 
50 INDS Indospring Tbk. Others 
51 INDY Indika Energy Tbk. Transportation, Infrastructure 
52 INKP Indah Kiat Pulp & Paper Tbk. Others 
53 JECC Jembo Cable Company Tbk. Others 
54 JKON Jaya Konstruksi Manggala Prata Trading, Service 
55 JKSW Jakarta Kyoei Steel Works Tbk. Others 
56 JRPT Jaya Real Property Tbk. Properties 
57 JSPT Jakarta Setiabudi Internasiona Trading, Service 
58 JTPE Jasuindo Tiga Perkasa Tbk. Trading, Service 
59 KDSI Kedawung Setia Industrial Tbk. Others 
60 KICI Kedaung Indah Can Tbk Industrial Product 
61 KONI Perdana Bangun Pusaka Tbk Trading, Service 
62 LAMI Lamicitra Nusantara Tbk. Properties 
63 LPCK Lippo Cikarang Tbk Properties 
64 LTLS Lautan Luas Tbk. Trading, Service 
65 MAPI Mitra Adiperkasa Tbk. Trading, Service 
66 META Nusantara Infrastructure Tbk. Transportation, Infrastructure 
67 MICE Multi Indocitra Tbk. Trading, Service 
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No Code Name of Company Industry 
68 MLIA Mulia Industrindo Tbk Others 
69 MRAT Mustika Ratu Tbk. Industrial Product 
70 MTSM Metro Realty Tbk. Properties 
71 MYOR Mayora Indah Tbk. Industrial Product 
72 NIPS Nipress Tbk. Others 
73 OKAS Ancora Indonesia Resources Tbk Trading, Service 
74 PANR Panorama Sentrawisata Tbk. Trading, Service 
75 PBRX Pan Brothers Tbk. Others 
76 PDES Destinasi Tirta Nusantara Tbk Trading, Service 
77 PGLI Pembangunan Graha Lestari Inda Trading, Service 
78 PKPK Perdana Karya Perkasa Tbk Mining 
79 PNSE Pudjiadi & Sons Tbk. Trading, Service 
80 PRAS Prima Alloy Steel Universal Tb Others 
81 PTSN Sat Nusapersada Tbk Others 
82 PUDP Pudjiadi Prestige Tbk. Properties 
83 PYFA Pyridam Farma Tbk Industrial Product 
84 RAJA Rukun Raharja Tbk. Transportation, Infrastructure 
85 RALS Ramayana Lestari Sentosa Tbk. Trading, Service 
86 RBMS Ristia Bintang Mahkotasejati T Properties 
87 RDTX Roda Vivatex Tbk Properties 
88 RUIS Radiant Utama Interinsco Tbk. Mining 
89 SAFE Steady Safe Tbk Transportation, Infrastructure 
90 SCCO Supreme Cable Manufacturing & Others 
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No Code Name of Company Industry 
91 SIAP Sekawan Intipratama Tbk Others 
92 SIMA Siwani Makmur Tbk Others 
93 SMAR Smart Tbk. Plantation 
94 SMDR Samudera Indonesia Tbk. Transportation, Infrastructure 
95 SMSM Selamat Sempurna Tbk. Others 
96 SOBI Sorini Agro Asia Corporindo Tb Others 
97 SPMA Suparma Tbk. Others 
98 SSTM Sunson Textile Manufacture Tbk Others 
99 STTP Siantar Top Tbk. Industrial Product 
100 SULI SLJ Global Tbk. Others 
101 TBLA Tunas Baru Lampung Tbk. Plantation 
102 TGKA Tigaraksa Satria Tbk. Trading, Service 
103 TIRA Tira Austenite Tbk Trading, Service 
104 TIRT Tirta Mahakam Resources Tbk Others 
105 TKGA Permata Prima Sakti Tbk. Mining 
106 TKIM Pabrik Kertas Tjiwi Kimia Tbk. Others 
107 TMAS Pelayaran Tempuran Emas Tbk. Transportation, Infrastructure 
108 TMPO Tempo Intimedia Tbk. Trading, Service 
109 TOTL Total Bangun Persada Tbk. Properties 
110 TRAM Trada Maritime Tbk. Transportation, Infrastructure 
111 TRIL Triwira Insanlestari Tbk. Trading, Service 
112 TRST Trias Sentosa Tbk. Others 
113 TRUB Truba Alam Manungga Engineeri Transportation, Infrastructure 
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No Code Name of Company Industry 
114 TSPC Tempo Scan Pacific Tbk. Industrial Product 
115 TURI Tunas Ridean Tbk. Trading, Service 
116 ULTJ Ultra Jaya Milk Industry & Tra Industrial Product 
117 UNIC Unggul Indah Cahaya Tbk. Others 
118 WEHA Panorama Transportasi Tbk Transportation, Infrastructure 
119 YPAS Yanaprima Hastapersada Tbk Others 
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APENDIX B: List of industry type 
Panel A. Sector Industrial Product 
No Code Name of Company 
1 ADES Akasha Wira International Tbk. 
2 RMBA Bentoel Internasional Investam 
3 DVLA Darya-Varia Laboratoria Tbk. 
4 DLTA Delta Djakarta Tbk. 
5 GGRM Gudang Garam Tbk. 
6 INAF Indofarma Tbk. 
7 INDF Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk. 
8 KICI Kedaung Indah Can Tbk 
9 TCID Mandom Indonesia Tbk. 
10 MYOR Mayora Indah Tbk. 
11 SCPI Merck Sharp Dohme Pharma Tbk. 
12 MERK Merck Tbk. 
13 MLBI Multi Bintang Indonesia Tbk. 
14 MRAT Mustika Ratu Tbk. 
15 PSDN Prasidha Aneka Niaga Tbk 
16 PYFA Pyridam Farma Tbk 
17 SKLT Sekar Laut Tbk. 
18 STTP Siantar Top Tbk. 
19 TSPC Tempo Scan Pacific Tbk. 
20 ULTJ Ultra Jaya Milk Industry & Tra 
21 UNVR Unilever Indonesia Tbk. 
22 CEKA Wilmar Cahaya Indonesia Tbk. 
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Industrial Products - Properties 
1 ASRI Alam Sutera Realty Tbk. 
2 BAPA Bekasi Asri Pemula Tbk. 
3 BIPP Bhuwanatala Indah Permai Tbk. 
4 BKDP Bukit Darmo Property Tbk 
5 BCIP Bumi Citra Permai Tbk. 
6 CTRA Ciputra Development Tbk. 
7 CTRP Ciputra Property Tbk. 
8 CTRS Ciputra Surya Tbk. 
9 COWL Cowell Development Tbk. 
10 SCBD Danayasa Arthatama Tbk. 
11 DART Duta Anggada Realty Tbk. 
12 DUTI Duta Pertiwi Tbk 
13 FMII Fortune Mate Indonesia Tbk 
14 GMTD Gowa Makassar Tourism Developm 
15 OMRE Indonesia Prima Property Tbk 
16 DILD Intiland Development Tbk. 
17 JRPT Jaya Real Property Tbk. 
18 LAMI Lamicitra Nusantara Tbk. 
19 LPCK Lippo Cikarang Tbk 
20 MTSM Metro Realty Tbk. 
21 MKPI Metropolitan Kentjana Tbk. 
22 DGIK Nusa Konstruksi Enjiniring Tbk 
23 PWON Pakuwon Jati Tbk. 
24 GPRA Perdana Gapuraprima Tbk. 
25 RODA Pikko Land Development Tbk. 
26 PLIN Plaza Indonesia Realty Tbk. 
27 PUDP Pudjiadi Prestige Tbk. 
28 RBMS Ristia Bintang Mahkotasejati T 
29 RDTX Roda Vivatex Tbk 
30 BKSL Sentul City Tbk. 
31 SMDM Suryamas Dutamakmur Tbk. 
32 TOTL Total Bangun Persada Tbk. 
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Panel B. Sector Trading and Service 
Sector Trading, Service 
1 ACES Ace Hardware Indonesia Tbk. 
2 AIMS Akbar Indo Makmur Stimec Tbk 
3 AKRA AKR Corporindo Tbk. 
4 OKAS Ancora Indonesia Resources Tbk 
5 ASIA Asia Natural Resources Tbk 
6 ASGR Astra Graphia Tbk. 
7 BNBR Bakrie & Brothers Tbk 
8 BAYU Bayu Buana Tbk 
9 BMSR Bintang Mitra Semestaraya Tbk 
10 CSAP Catur Sentosa Adiprana Tbk. 
11 CMPP Centris Multipersada Pratama T 
12 CLPI Colorpak Indonesia Tbk. 
13 PDES Destinasi Tirta Nusantara Tbk 
14 DSSA Dian Swastatika Sentosa Tbk 
15 EPMT Enseval Putera Megatrading Tbk 
16 CNKO Exploitasi Energi Indonesia Tb 
17 FAST Fast Food Indonesia Tbk. 
18 KBLV First Media Tbk. 
19 FISH FKS Multi Agro Tbk. 
20 FORU Fortune Indonesia Tbk 
21 GEMA Gema Grahasarana Tbk. 
22 BMTR Global Mediacom Tbk. 
23 GMCW Grahamas Citrawisata Tbk. 
24 HERO Hero Supermarket Tbk. 
25 HEXA Hexindo Adiperkasa Tbk. 
26 HOME Hotel Mandarine Regency Tbk. 
27 SHID Hotel Sahid Jaya International 
28 INPP Indonesian Paradise Property T 
29 DNET Indoritel Makmur Internasional 
30 INTD Inter Delta Tbk 
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Sector Trading, Service 
31 INTA Intraco Penta Tbk. 
32 ICON Island Concepts Indonesia Tbk. 
33 JSPT Jakarta Setiabudi Internasiona 
34 JTPE Jasuindo Tiga Perkasa Tbk. 
35 JKON Jaya Konstruksi Manggala Prata 
36 KOIN Kokoh Inti Arebama Tbk 
37 LTLS Lautan Luas Tbk. 
38 ITTG Leo Investments Tbk. 
39 LMAS Limas Centric Indonesia Tbk 
40 ABBA Mahaka Media Tbk. 
41 MAMI Mas Murni Indonesia Tbk 
42 LPPF Matahari Department Store Tbk. 
43 MPPA Matahari Putra Prima Tbk. 
44 MNCN Media Nusantara Citra Tbk. 
45 MTDL Metrodata Electronics Tbk. 
46 SDPC Millennium Pharmacon Internati 
47 MAPI Mitra Adiperkasa Tbk. 
48 KPIG MNC Land Tbk. 
49 MICE Multi Indocitra Tbk. 
50 MLPL Multipolar Tbk. 
51 PANR Panorama Sentrawisata Tbk. 
52 PGLI Pembangunan Graha Lestari Inda 
53 KONI Perdana Bangun Pusaka Tbk 
54 PLAS Polaris Investama Tbk 
55 POOL Pool Advista Indonesia Tbk. 
56 PNSE Pudjiadi & Sons Tbk. 
57 RALS Ramayana Lestari Sentosa Tbk. 
58 SQMI Renuka Coalindo Tbk. 
59 SONA Sona Topas Tourism Industry Tb 
60 LPLI Star Pacific Tbk 
61 AMRT Sumber Alfaria Trijaya Tbk. 
62 ITMA Sumber Energi Andalan Tbk. 
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Sector Trading, Service 
63 SCMA Surya Citra Media Tbk. 
64 TMPO Tempo Intimedia Tbk. 
65 TGKA Tigaraksa Satria Tbk. 
66 TIRA Tira Austenite Tbk 
67 TRIL Triwira Insanlestari Tbk. 
68 TURI Tunas Ridean Tbk. 
69 UNTR United Tractors Tbk. 
70 WICO Wicaksana Overseas Internation 
 
Panel C. Others 
Others - Mining 
1 ADRO Adaro Energy Tbk. 
2 ATPK ATPK Resources Tbk. 
3 BYAN Bayan Resources Tbk. 
4 BUMI Bumi Resources Tbk. 
5 CKRA Cakra Mineral Tbk. 
6 DKFT Central Omega Resources Tbk. 
7 CITA Cita Mineral Investindo Tbk. 
8 DEWA Darma Henwa Tbk 
9 DOID Delta Dunia Makmur Tbk. 
10 ENRG Energi Mega Persada Tbk. 
11 GTBO Garda Tujuh Buana Tbk 
12 SMMT Golden Eagle Energy Tbk. 
13 ITMG Indo Tambangraya Megah Tbk. 
14 PSAB J Resources Asia Pasifik Tbk. 
15 MEDC Medco Energi International Tbk 
16 MITI Mitra Investindo Tbk. 
17 PKPK Perdana Karya Perkasa Tbk 
18 TKGA Permata Prima Sakti Tbk. 
19 PTRO Petrosea Tbk. 
20 RUIS Radiant Utama Interinsco Tbk. 
21 ARTI Ratu Prabu Energi Tbk 
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Others - Mining 
22 KKGI Resource Alam Indonesia Tbk. 
23 MYOH Samindo Resources Tbk. 
24 INCO Vale Indonesia Tbk. 
 
Others - Plantation 
1 AALI Astra Agro Lestari Tbk. 
2 BISI BISI International Tbk. 
3 BTEK Bumi Teknokultura Unggul Tbk 
4 BWPT BW Plantation Tbk. 
5 CPRO Central Proteina Prima Tbk. 
6 DSFI Dharma Samudera Fishing Indust 
7 GZCO Gozco Plantations Tbk. 
8 LSIP PP London Sumatra Indonesia Tb 
9 SGRO Sampoerna Agro Tbk. 
10 SMAR Smart Tbk. 
11 TBLA Tunas Baru Lampung Tbk. 
 
Others - Transportation, Infrastructure 
1 APOL Arpeni Pratama Ocean Line Tbk. 
2 BLTA Berlian Laju Tanker Tbk 
3 HITS Humpuss Intermoda Transportasi 
4 KARW ICTSI Jasa Prima Tbk. 
5 INDY Indika Energy Tbk. 
6 ISAT Indosat Tbk. 
7 INVS Inovisi Infracom Tbk. 
8 LAPD Leyand International Tbk. 
9 META Nusantara Infrastructure Tbk. 
10 WEHA Panorama Transportasi Tbk 
11 TMAS Pelayaran Tempuran Emas Tbk. 
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Others - Transportation, Infrastructure 
12 PGAS Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero 
13 RIGS Rig Tenders Indonesia Tbk. 
14 RAJA Rukun Raharja Tbk. 
15 SMDR Samudera Indonesia Tbk. 
16 FREN Smartfren Telecom Tbk. 
17 SAFE Steady Safe Tbk 
18 INDX Tanah Laut Tbk 
19 TRAM Trada Maritime Tbk. 
20 TRUB Truba Alam Manunggal Engineeri 
21 EXCL XL Axiata Tbk. 
22 ZBRA Zebra Nusantara Tbk 
 
 
 
 
Others 
1 ALKA Alakasa Industrindo Tbk 
2 AKKU Alam Karya Unggul Tbk. 
3 ALMI Alumindo Light Metal Industry 
4 MYTX Apac Citra Centertex Tbk 
5 ARGO Argo Pantes Tbk 
6 AMFG Asahimas Flat Glass Tbk. 
7 APLI Asiaplast Industries Tbk. 
8 ASII Astra International Tbk. 
9 AUTO Astra Otoparts Tbk. 
10 BRPT Barito Pacific Tbk. 
11 BRNA Berlina Tbk. 
12 BTON Betonjaya Manunggal Tbk. 
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Others 
13 BUDI Budi Starch & Sweetener Tbk. 
14 CNTX Century Textile Industry Tbk. 
15 IGAR Champion Pacific Indonesia Tbk 
16 TPIA Chandra Asri Petrochemical Tbk 
17 CPIN Charoen Pokphand Indonesia Tbk 
18 CTBN Citra Tubindo Tbk. 
19 DPNS Duta Pertiwi Nusantara Tbk. 
20 EKAD Ekadharma International Tbk. 
21 ERTX Eratex Djaja Tbk. 
22 ETWA Eterindo Wahanatama Tbk 
23 ESTI Ever Shine Tex Tbk. 
24 FASW Fajar Surya Wisesa Tbk. 
25 GJTL Gajah Tunggal Tbk. 
26 GDYR Goodyear Indonesia Tbk. 
27 GDST Gunawan Dianjaya Steel Tbk. 
28 SMCB Holcim Indonesia Tbk. 
29 INKP Indah Kiat Pulp & Paper Tbk. 
30 INAI Indal Aluminium Industry Tbk. 
31 SRSN Indo Acidatama Tbk 
32 BRAM Indo Kordsa Tbk. 
33 INTP Indocement Tunggal Prakasa Tbk 
34 IMAS Indomobil Sukses Internasional 
35 INDR Indo-Rama Synthetics Tbk. 
36 INDS Indospring Tbk. 
37 INCI Intanwijaya Internasional Tbk 
38 IKAI Intikeramik Alamasri Industri 
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Others 
39 JKSW Jakarta Kyoei Steel Works Tbk. 
40 JPFA Japfa Comfeed Indonesia Tbk. 
41 JPRS Jaya Pari Steel Tbk 
42 JECC Jembo Cable Company Tbk. 
43 KDSI Kedawung Setia Industrial Tbk. 
44 KIAS Keramika Indonesia Assosiasi T 
45 KBLI KMI Wire & Cable Tbk. 
46 LION Lion Metal Works Tbk. 
47 LMSH Lionmesh Prima Tbk. 
48 FPNI Lotte Chemical Titan Tbk. 
49 MAIN Malindo Feedmill Tbk. 
50 MLIA Mulia Industrindo Tbk 
51 LPIN Multi Prima Sejahtera Tbk 
52 NIPS Nipress Tbk. 
53 UNIT Nusantara Inti Corpora Tbk 
54 TKIM Pabrik Kertas Tjiwi Kimia Tbk. 
55 PBRX Pan Brothers Tbk. 
56 HDTX Panasia Indo Resources Tbk. 
57 PICO Pelangi Indah Canindo Tbk 
58 NIKL Pelat Timah Nusantara Tbk. 
59 ADMG Polychem Indonesia Tbk 
60 PRAS Prima Alloy Steel Universal Tb 
61 BIMA Primarindo Asia Infrastructure 
62 PTSN Sat Nusapersada Tbk 
63 SIAP Sekawan Intipratama Tbk 
64 SMSM Selamat Sempurna Tbk. 
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Others 
65 SIMA Siwani Makmur Tbk 
66 SULI SLJ Global Tbk. 
67 SOBI Sorini Agro Asia Corporindo Tbk 
68 IKBI Sumi Indo Kabel Tbk. 
69 SSTM Sunson Textile Manufacture Tbk 
70 SPMA Suparma Tbk. 
71 SCCO Supreme Cable Manufacturing & 
72 TOTO Surya Toto Indonesia Tbk. 
73 TBMS Tembaga Mulia Semanan Tbk. 
74 TFCO Tifico Fiber Indonesia Tbk. 
75 TIRT Tirta Mahakam Resources Tbk 
76 INRU Toba Pulp Lestari Tbk. 
77 TRST Trias Sentosa Tbk. 
78 UNIC Unggul Indah Cahaya Tbk. 
79 UNTX Unitex Tbk. 
80 VOKS Voksel Electric Tbk. 
81 YPAS Yanaprima Hastapersada Tbk 
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APPENDIX C: Literature Matrix 
No. Country Author 
Sam
ple 
Size 
Year 
of 
Stud
y 
Finding 
1 Pakistan 
Abdullah, Shah, 
and Hassan (2008) 
452 
2003-
2006 
Companies which 
managed by family is 
better performed than 
companies which managed 
by non-family in overall 
condition. 
2 Malaysia 
Amran and Che-
Ahmad (2011)  
189 
2003-
2007 
Non-family controlled 
Malaysia companies seem 
to have small boards rather 
than large boards because 
small board size enhances 
the firm value. 
3 
Malaysia, 
Singapore, 
Hong Kong 
and Taiwan 
Chen and 
Nowland (2010)  
100 
1998-
2004 
Board size is significantly 
higher in family controlled 
companies because the 
monitoring of the board 
still weak.  
4 
United 
States 
Schulze, 
Lubaktin, Dino 
and Buchholtz 
(2001) 
1376 1995 
Family-managed firms 
incur agency cost 
5 Indonesia Darmadi (2013) 383 
2008-
2009 
Companies which 
managed by family is 
better performed than 
companies which managed 
by non-family in overall 
condition. 
6 
United 
States 
Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) 
511 
1976-
1980 
There has no significant 
influence of ownership 
concentration and profit 
return. 
7 
 Hong 
Kong 
Chen, Cheng and 
Hwang (2005) 
412 
1995-
1998 
There is no positive 
relationship between 
family ownership and 
ROA, ROE or Tobin’s Q 
8  Spain 
Gorriz and Fumas 
(1996)  
81 1990 
Family firms on average 
have higher productive 
efficiency than non-family 
firms.  
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No. Country Author 
Sam
ple 
Size 
Year 
of 
Stud
y 
Finding 
9 
United 
States 
Horvath and 
Spirollari (2012) 
Larg
e US 
firms 
2005-
2009 
Large firm prefer have a 
large board than small 
board because they 
expected large board can 
give benefit for solving the 
problem. 
10 Malaysia 
Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006)  
347 
1996-
2000 
Small board is expected 
outperformed than large 
board. 
 
11 Indonesia 
Harjito and 
Singapurwoko 
(2014) 
20 2001 
Companies which 
managed by family is 
better performed than 
companies which managed 
by non-family. 
12 Malaysia 
Ibrahim, Samad, 
and Amir (2009) 
290 
1999-
2005 
There is a strong 
relationship of small 
boards with firm 
performance for both 
family and non-family 
companies.  
13 Malaysia 
Ishak, Haron, 
Salleh, and Rashid 
(2011) 
236 2009 
Board structure may limit 
the extent of earnings 
management practices also 
will be followed by an 
increasing stock price and 
value of company. 
14 Indonesia Itan (2015) 152 
2009-
2014 
Business which control by 
non-family members are 
more favour than business 
which control by family 
when we trace into 
performance indicators. 
15  Chile 
Martinez, Stohr 
and Quiroga 
(2007) 
175 
1995-
2004 
Large board does not help 
the top management to 
monitoring the firm 
effectively. 
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No. Country Author 
Sam
ple 
Size 
Year 
of 
Stud
y 
Finding 
16 
Argentina, 
Australia, 
Canada, 
Hongkong, 
Ireland, 
Japan, New 
Zealand, 
Norway, 
Singapore, 
Spain, UK, 
US, 
Austria, 
Belgium, 
Denmark, 
Finland, 
France, 
Germany, 
Greece, 
Israel, Italy, 
South 
Korea, 
Mexico, 
Netherlands
, Portugal, 
Switzerland 
 
La Porta, Lopez-
De-Silanes and 
Shleifer (1999) 
54 1995 
Families or the state 
typically controls the 
firms. Controlling 
shareholders have power 
over firms. 
17 
United 
States 
Miller and Breton-
Miller (2006) 
Larg
e & 
publi
cly 
trade
d 
famil
y 
busin
esses 
N.A. 
Family firm do best when 
they take advantage of the 
potential for lower agency 
costs. 
18  China 
Mishra and Ratti 
(2011) 
Com
panie
s 
Chin
a 
2001-
2006 
Small boards are more 
effectively than large 
board because a small 
board in a company 
contribute higher Tobin’s 
Q than large boards 
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No. Country Author 
Sam
ple 
Size 
Year 
of 
Stud
y 
Finding 
19 Fortune 500 
Pearce & Zahra 
(1992) 
119 
1983-
1989 
Large boards can give 
more resource, have high 
solving problem capability, 
provides advice and 
strategy for firm to 
increasing the firm 
performance.  
20 India Sindhuja (2009) 115 2007 
Business which control by 
non-family members are 
more favour than business 
which control by family 
when we trace into 
performance indicators  
21 UK 
Westhead & 
Cowling (1997) 
427 
1991-
1994 
There has no any 
significant in company 
performance when we 
compare between 
companies which managed 
by family and companies 
which managed by non-
family. 
22 
United 
Stated 
Yermack (1996) 452 
1984-
1991 
large board are not 
enhance the firm 
performance and reduce 
the firm value because 
large board will caused an 
inefficient when take a 
decision 
23 Malaysia 
Zainal Abidin et 
al. (2009) 
75 2003 
Large boards appear to be 
more effective compare 
than small boards. 
24 
HongKong, 
Indonesia, 
Japan, 
South 
Korea, 
Malaysia, 
Philippines, 
Singapore, 
Thailand, 
and Taiwan 
 
 
 
 
Claessens et al. 
(2000) 
2980 1998 
The separation of 
ownership and control is 
most pronounced among 
family controlled firms. 
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No. Country Author 
Sam
ple 
Size 
Year 
of 
Stud
y 
Finding 
25 
United 
States 
Kets de Vries 
(1993) 
300 N.A 
Difficult for founder to 
accept his or her own 
mortality and to let go the 
power. 
26 Thailand 
Yammeesri & 
Lodh (2004) 
243 
1993-
1996 
A positive association 
between controlling 
ownership and firm 
performance. 
27 Turkey 
Mandaci & 
Gumus (2010) 
203 2005 
Ownership of Turkish firm 
is highly concentrated and 
it is belief to belong to 
individuals or families that 
have holding companies, 
in order to control their 
listed firms. 
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APPENDIX D: Summary for family-controlled companies 
 H Expected 
Sign 
Q 
(p-value) 
ROE 
(p-value) 
Hypothesis 
Supported? 
BSIZE H2a - -.0001*** -.0003*** Yes 
BQUAL H3a - -.0015*** -.0125** Yes 
BMEET H4a 
- .0043** .0097*** 
Significant 
with 
opposite 
direction 
(explanation 
are 
provided in 
text) 
BEXP H5a - -.0128** -.0041** Yes 
FDIR H6a - -.0376** -.0294 Partial 
MOWN H7a + .2181 .4883 No 
Significant 
BCSIZE H8a - -.0489*** -.0334*** Yes 
BCINDE H9a - .3657 -.0197** Partial 
ASIZE H10a - -.0315** -.0402** Yes 
AINDE H11a - -.0446** -.0361** Yes 
AMEET H12a 
- .0177** .0276** 
Significant 
with 
opposite 
direction 
(explanation 
are 
provided in 
text) 
DEBT  - -.0000*** -.0116**  
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 H Expected 
Sign 
Q 
(p-value) 
ROE 
(p-value) 
Hypothesis 
Supported? 
FAGE  + -.0094*** -.0000***  
FSIZE  + .0000*** .2304  
IP  + .0752*** .0066*  
TS  + .0434** .0343**  
PROP  + 0.0062* .0003***  
OTHERS  + .0221** 0.0332**  
_CONS   .0049** -.1317***  
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APPENDIX E: Summary for non-family controlled companies 
 H Expected 
Sign 
Q 
(p-value) 
ROE 
(p-value) 
Hypothesis 
Supported? 
BSIZE H2b + .0472** .0146** Yes 
BQUAL H3b + .0049*** .0435** Yes 
BMEET H4b + .0191** .0447** Yes 
BEXP H5b + .0456** .0367** Yes 
FDIR H6b + .0014*** .0031***  Yes 
MOWN H7b - .2988 .3138 Not 
significant  
 
BCSIZE H8b 
+ -.0383** -.0143** 
Significant 
with 
opposite 
direction 
(explanation 
are 
provided in 
text) 
BCINDE H9b + .0212** .0145** Yes 
ASIZE H10b 
+ -.0357** -.0438** 
Significant 
with 
opposite 
direction 
(explanation 
are 
provided in 
text) 
AINDE H11b + .0407** .5247 Partial 
AMEET H12b + .0218** .0418** Yes 
DEBT  - -.0000*** .0312**  
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 H Expected 
Sign 
Q 
(p-value) 
ROE 
(p-value) 
Hypothesis 
Supported? 
FAGE  + .2140 .3009  
FSIZE  + .0003*** .0467**  
IP  + .0124** .0214**  
TS  + .0241** 0.7410  
PROP  + .0024*** .0014***  
OTHERS  + .0125** .0254**  
_CONS   .0000*** .0521*  
 
